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1INTRODUCTION
Overcoming the Obstacles to  
Digital Learning
  By Chester E. Finn, Jr. and Daniela R. Fairchild
Digital learning is more than the latest addition to education reformers’ to-do 
lists, filed along with teacher evaluations, charter schools, tenure reform, aca-
demic standards, and the like. It’s fundamentally different: For digital learning 
to fulfill its enormous potential, a wholesale reshaping of the reform agenda itself 
is required, particularly in the realms of school finance and governance. But just 
as online education needs those reforms if it is to flourish, so does deep educa-
tion reform need digital learning, which can provide valuable solutions to some 
of education’s greatest challenges—beginning with the basic obsolescence of its 
familiar delivery system.
That system has not been dramatically altered for at least a century. Despite 
reformers’ earnest struggles to modify and smooth its course, the obvious dis-
repair of the present arrangement, and the enormous resources applied to its 
renovation, our schools and teachers still follow an old, meandering, cobblestone 
pathway rather than a fast, modern superhighway. Plenty of individual stones 
have been replaced and in a few places the right-of-way runs straighter than it 
once did—think standards, accountability, school choice, teacher evaluations—
but nothing has altered the essential path of our nation’s education system.
Until now, that is. Today, American education has the potential to be com-
pletely rerouted and accelerated by digital learning. Indeed, truly boosting student 
achievement—as well as individualizing instruction and creating high-quality op-
tions for children and families among, within, and beyond schools—will depend 
to a considerable extent on how deftly our K–12 system can exploit this potential, 
both in its pure form (full-time online instruction) and in various “blended” 
combinations of digital and brick-and-mortar-based instruction. 
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Digital instruction enables the launch and scaling of major-league advances 
in the quality and variety of curricular content and the ways it is delivered to 
learners. It invites and makes possible transformative changes in the nature of a 
teacher’s work and in the structure (and compensation) of the teaching profes-
sion. It holds unrivaled potential to transform education from a classroom-based 
activity confined to the hours of 8:00 to 2:30, Monday through Friday, thirty-six 
weeks a year, into a bona fide 24/7 opportunity that’s accessible just about any-
where. Besides all that, it can help boost the productivity of our K–12 system and 
thus elicit more bang from ever-scarcer education bucks.
Making the most of these remarkable opportunities, however, hinges on our 
willingness—and capacity—to alter a host of ingrained practices. We dare not 
settle for patching a bumpy, twisty country lane. We need to build a new road. 
Technology cannot keep its promise to accelerate the modernization and 
reform of K–12 education unless reformers and policymakers understand that 
potential, embrace it, and clear the obstacles that today block its realization. 
There are more such obstacles than one might think—and each of them 
will prove hard to overcome, not least because they are deeply carved into our 
traditional K–12 system and now regarded as valuable protections or benefits by 
education’s innumerable factions, bureaucracies, and interest groups. This is why 
the short history of digital learning up to this point is full of patches, detours, 
and work-arounds.
Such partial fixes make possible modest progress, at least in some places for 
some period of time, but one would be daft to view them as durable, full-bore 
solutions. Knocking down the real barriers to change will be a huge undertak-
ing, however, and nothing on today’s familiar reform agenda can get this job 
done. Which is to say, a serious effort to overcome the obstacles means reshap-
ing that agenda, even redefining what we mean by “education reform.” Indeed, 
the nascent revolution in digital learning is revealing the cracks and gaps in the 
reform agenda of the past quarter century—and pointing the way toward a new 
one that is apt to prove even more wrenching and challenging than what we’ve 
been working to achieve.
The barriers take three forms.
First and most familiar are self-absorbed and self-serving groups that do their 
utmost either to capture the potential of technology to advance their own interests 
or to shackle it in ways that keep it from harming those interests. 
3Overcoming the Obstacles to Digital Learning 
Second, also familiar but showing up here in new ways, are issues of organi-
zational capacity within our public education system, a system that has enormous 
difficulty accommodating and assimilating change—and the more wrenching 
the change the greater the difficulty.
Third—and newest, most perplexing, most fundamental, and thus hardest 
to tackle—are the core governance and financing structures of our K–12 system 
itself. Though we’ve begun to recognize these as major impediments to important 
reforms within our current brick-and-mortar world, they turn out to be even 
more constraining—and damaging—to education in the online realm.
The five essays in this volume touch on all three kinds of obstacles. Let us 
take them up in turn. 
Self-centered Interest Groups
The many adult interest groups that live off our public education system are 
already doing their best to co-opt digital learning for their own ends—and to 
ensure that nobody uses it to threaten their power, membership, or revenue base. 
Two such groups are especially powerful players in the politics and policies of 
public education.
First are local districts and their school boards, vigorously represented by the 
National School Board Association (NSBA). This crowd would stifle the openness 
and global reach of digital learning in the name of district empowerment and lo-
cal monopoly. According to Ann Flynn, NSBA’s director of education technology, 
online learning “should be something that school districts can control.”1 Such 
a cramped viewpoint has even been adopted by some smart reform thinkers. 
Writing recently in Education Next, for example, veteran thought leader (and 
digital-learning advocate) Paul Peterson notes that “if digital learning is to ad-
vance beyond the pilot stage, it needs to work within the current system of public 
education, not against it…Whether digital learning is blended into the classroom 
or offered online, or both, districts have to be part of the action.”2
Yet leaving local districts and their boards in charge of digital instruction 
will retard innovation, entrepreneurship, collaboration, and smart competition, 
simultaneously stifling students’ ability to find—and be taught by—the very best 
educators in the state, region, nation, or even world. It will raise costs, undermine 
efficiency, block rich instructional options, restrict school choice and parental 
influence, and strengthen the hand of other interest groups—including but not 
limited to already-too-powerful teacher unions. 
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For wherever one finds school districts and boards, one almost always finds 
unions equally determined to prevent digital learning from shrinking their ranks 
or weakening their power bases. In many places, they have secured legislation 
limiting the scope of digital learning or have written clauses into their contracts 
to counter its growth. In California, for example, the state teacher union’s model 
contract requires that
no employee shall be displaced because of distance learning or other educa-
tional technology. The use of distance education technology shall not be used 
to reduce, eliminate, or consolidate faculty positions within the district.3
In other places—perhaps more surreptitiously—teacher unions have ensured 
that class-size mandates (costly and dysfunctional as they are in the brick-and-
mortar world) still apply to online schools. Yet staffing arrangements—how many 
and what sorts of people, with what skills and training and compensation—will 
be dramatically different for online learning than for traditional schools. In 
chapter one of this volume, Bryan C. Hassel and Emily Ayscue Hassel explain 
why—and what needs to change to maximize digital learning’s potential in this 
realm. With the proliferation of high-quality online content, solid instruction 
in the “basics” will eventually become “flat”—available anywhere globally (and 
likely at no charge). Meaning that, yes, fewer teachers will be needed. But also 
that their effectiveness will matter even more than it does today, as the quality of 
a teacher will affect learning outcomes for many more students across schools, 
districts, states, and even nations. (The Hassels also explain how digital educa-
tion will further professionalize teaching by limiting mindless administrative 
tasks, focusing teacher talent, and improving pay for the high-quality instructor.)
Those are the main interest groups, but they’re not alone. Also worthy of note 
are textbook publishers and the myriad other companies with which schools and 
districts partner to deliver transportation, food, insurance, supplies, and much, 
much more. They’re not evil (and some aren’t even selfish in the ordinary sense), 
but they are all self-interested, and—if they prevail—will smother, slow, or distort 
the potential of online learning.
Human and Organizational Capacity
Over the past fifty years, the student-faculty ratio in America’s K–12 schools has 
dropped from twenty-seven to one to fifteen to one; the student-to-staff ratio 
5Overcoming the Obstacles to Digital Learning 
(which includes cafeteria workers, central-office receptionists, and other non-
teaching personnel) plummeted from fifty to one in the 1950s to ten to one today.4 
When all the pay stubs are tallied, we find over 3 million teachers and umpteen 
more “support staff” working in what is America’s second-largest industry.5 Yet 
education’s bulked-up employment has barely touched overall student achieve-
ment, which has scarcely risen during this period. Instead, the added HR heft 
has contributed to the bureaucratization, lethargy, and routinization of the K–12 
enterprise, buttressing its rigid procedures, internal fiefdoms, and tendency 
toward compliance rather than innovation—much less transformation. Reform 
ideas—no matter how sharp—struggle to pierce the thick bureaucracy. School-
turnaround efforts offer a sobering case in point. As Andy Smarick has written, 
examples of failed turnaround efforts abound. National data for 2004–05 show 
that of the schools required to undergo restructuring under No Child Left Behind, 
less than 20 percent were able to exit “improvement status” two years later. State-
level data mimic these dismal federal findings. Smarick writes:
In 2008, 52 Ohio schools were forced to restructure because of persistent fail-
ure. Even after several years of significant attention, fewer than one in three had 
been able to reach established academic goals, and less than half showed any 
student performance gains.6 
Our own research on school turnarounds is equally bleak.7 Inertia, traditional 
routines, contracts, and procedural requirements dilute the potency of these 
turnaround efforts—and of education reform more generally. 
In order to see real jumps in student achievement, results-linked quality 
control of curricula, educators, and programs needs to look dramatically differ-
ent. Our current system is laden with input regulations like textbook mandates, 
certification requirements, and notches on teachers’ professional-development 
belts. None of which has been shown to improve student achievement (and some 
of which have actually been shown to hinder it). In the digital-learning era, these 
become even more dangerous tokens of “quality,” as they work to hamper innova-
tion. As Rick Hess explains in chapter two: 
One of the great advantages of online learning is that it makes “unbundling” 
school provision possible—that is, it allows children to be served by providers 
from almost anywhere, in new and more customized ways. But taking advan-
tage of all the opportunities online learning offers means that there is no longer 
one conventional “school” to hold accountable. Instead, students in a given 
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building or district may be taking courses (or just sections of courses) from a 
variety of providers, each with varying approaches to technology, instruction, 
mastery, and so forth.
His essay goes on to outline three ways to police—and improve—quality in 
digital learning. But it’s not just bloated personnel ranks and ineffective quality-
control metrics that have held the system back. We reformers share in the blame 
with our habit of layering new policies upon old and shoving program after 
program into the current educational frame rather than replacing outmoded, 
ineffective, or inefficient initiatives with novel platforms and ideas. With that 
layering, of course, has come the education system’s addiction to cash and its 
assumption that nothing can be done differently without additional resources.
In fact, it should cost taxpayers fewer dollars to educate each pupil in the 
online world—though various trade-offs will need to be made. According to 
analyses by Tamara Butler Battaglino, Matt Haldeman, and Eleanor Laurans, 
described in chapter three, full-time virtual schooling currently costs, on aver-
age, about $3,600 less per pupil than its traditional counterpart. The potential 
savings associated with “blended learning” are smaller but far from negligible. 
As digital learning evolves, its costs are apt to drop further. Once digital instruc-
tion is further vetted, innovated, and brought to scale, this bottom-line cost may 
drop even further. Which is not to say that the choices, priority adjustments, and 
trade-offs associated with it are obvious or easy, only that we face a rare opportu-
nity and—considering our fiscal circumstances—likely need to wean American 
public education from its cash habit.
Fundamental Structural Flaws
Two nearly universal and deeply entrenched structural arrangements in American 
public education pose huge impediments to the success of digital learning. The 
painful truth is that this education revolution cannot occur under the customary 
arrangements for financing schools nor within our current governance system.
Consider, first, how we presently fund education: financing programs and 
bureaucratic structures via rigid and formulaic distribution, not paying for stu-
dents or schools, much less for learning. This antiquated system stymies innova-
tion, as Paul Hill explains in chapter four. And it doesn’t make much sense in an 
era when students must be able to direct resources to the education providers of 
their choice.
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But it doesn’t have to be this way. Hill shows how we can leapfrog our system 
of school finance to fund education, not institutions; move money as students 
move; and pay for unconventional forms of instruction. (This rebooted system 
would also be able to defund those programs that are found wanting.) This new 
model would offer parents a choice of whole-school providers while also afford-
ing them a limited amount of “pocket money,” with which they could purchase 
any number of tutoring or enrichment programs, from advanced math classes 
to piano lessons. As Hill writes, “This would allow some public funds to flow to 
new and innovative programs…Yet parents could not be led into making choices 
that compromised their children’s core instruction.”
Now consider our agricultural-era devotion to “local control” of public educa-
tion and ask how this arrangement can possibly work well—indeed, what it even 
means—when the delivery system itself is unbound by district, municipal, or even 
state borders. Who is really “in charge” when students assemble their education 
from multiple providers based in many locations, some likely on the other side of 
the planet? Digital learning, like digital communications, lives on the Internet—
often “in the cloud”—and knows no natural geographic or political boundaries. 
Sure, it can be inhibited by totalitarian regimes that fear websites or any com-
munications that may loosen their grip. When left to flourish in the marketplace, 
however, digital learning will yield innovation, competition (affecting content, 
quality, delivery mechanisms, and price), and eventual economies of scale. And 
those will—and ought to—develop without regard to municipal boundaries.
To be sure, public officials have an obligation to exert curricular quality con-
trol—for which they in turn are accountable to voters and taxpayers—and must 
safeguard minors from “virtual menaces.” But that is not the same as putting 
local districts in control of digital learning, as our current system expects. In 
chapter five, John Chubb spotlights the incapacities of our present K–12 educa-
tion-governance system, calling instead for a state-based model. K–12 education 
controlled by local entities is rigid and change averse, Chubb concludes. What’s 
more, few districts are large enough marketplaces to really foster innovation. 
States provide the scale necessary to support research and development, to allow 
for flexible programming, and to extend the reach of top-rate teachers. (Chubb 
then lays out ten concrete steps to make this new set-up a reality.) 
Whew! Reshape the financing and governance of public education? On top 
of new HR arrangements for teachers and improved quality control of content? 
Yes, it’s a tall order and a major reformulation of America’s education-reform 
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agenda. It doesn’t erase the need for rigorous standards, tough accountability, 
vastly improved data systems, better teacher evaluations (and training, etc.), 
stronger school leaders, and much else that reformers have been struggling to 
bring about. But it says, in effect, that far more than those reforms are needed in 
order to bring U.S. public education into the modern era. 
The Charter School Warning Bell
For those still unconvinced, the charter school saga offers a cautionary tale. In 
the early days, antireform interest groups mangled charter legislation in myriad 
ways. As a consequence of their efforts, nearly half of states impose some kind of 
cap on the number of charters allowed in their districts.8 Other states force charter 
schools to fit under extant union contracts.9 Some restrict charter-authorizing 
powers to districts, a classic case of empowering foxes to look after chickens. 
Almost nowhere are charters properly funded. And in many states and com-
munities, they remain shackled by far too many regulations.
We’ve seen how these co-optations and conditions weakened the realization 
of chartering’s potential. And we can see, in retrospect, how the early promoters 
of charter schools failed—or neglected—to plant these schools in a salubrious 
policy environment.
If similar failures hamper digital learning, the loss will be still greater. For 
while charters (perhaps due to the constraints they’ve faced) remain a smallish 
subset of “different” schools that operate alongside the traditional system, digital 
learning has the potential to alter the system itself both fundamentally and ir-
reversibly. It’s no sideshow. It isn’t even the center ring. It’s the circus tent itself.
This volume lays out the most worrisome obstacles to smart and widespread 
implementation of digital learning: staffing, quality control, costs, financing 
structures, and school governance. It also supplies thoughtful recommendations 
for overcoming those obstacles—not because the nascent digital-learning move-
ment is a public good unto itself but because of the good it can bring about for 
our children’s education.
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Teachers in the Age of Digital Instruction
  By Bryan C. Hassel and Emily Ayscue Hassel, Public Impact*
As digital learning has grown in prominence, a predictable debate has emerged: 
Teacher-union officials worry that online learning, educational software, video 
delivery, and other forms of technology-enabled instruction will be used pri-
marily to replace teachers in a quest to save money. An article on the National 
Education Association’s website entitled “Laptops are Not Teachers” quotes Idaho 
Education Association president Sherri Wood criticizing an Idaho education-
reform law that will give high school students laptops beginning in 2015. The law 
“trades teachers for technology,” she says. “You simply cannot replace a teacher 
with a laptop.”1 
Yet it’s not only union officials fueling teachers’ fears. Digital advocates and 
the media also stoke the fire. “Just as the Internet replaced telephone operators 
and the nightly news anchor as the default source of information,” writes Gregory 
Ferenstein in the magazine Fast Company, “teachers may be next on the chop-
ping block.”2 
We have little doubt that the digital future will transform education, but we 
don’t believe it requires an either-or decision between technology and teachers. 
Rather, digital education needs excellent teachers and the teaching profession 
needs digital education. 
As digital tools proliferate and improve, solid instruction in the basics will 
eventually become “flat”—available anywhere globally. The elements of excellent 
teaching that are most difficult for technology to replace will increasingly dif-
ferentiate student outcomes.
* The authors thank Joe Ableidinger for research support on this chapter.
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In the digital future, teacher effectiveness may matter even more than it does 
today, as these complex instructional tasks are left to the adults responsible for 
each student’s learning. Teachers who nurture motivated, tenacious problem 
solvers while using new technologies to reach more children can become the fuel 
of local, state, and national economies. Schools will not need as many teachers as 
we know them. But excellent instructors, many in new roles, will need the right 
technology and instructional supporting teams to achieve excellence at scale, 
within budget, and potentially for much higher pay than today.3 The selectivity 
and prevalence of these excellent teachers-in-charge who will leverage technol-
ogy—and be leveraged by it—will be the distinguisher of learning outcomes 
among schools and nations. 
In order to achieve this potential in the United States, myriad policies affect-
ing teachers—from professional development to compensation—will need to be 
revamped. This paper outlines how. 
The Digital Revolution and Excellent Teachers Need One Another
Even as the content of digital instruction improves, accountable adults will re-
main critical to student outcomes. Digital fare will eventually accomplish much 
of the diagnosis of learning levels and provision of matching instruction, particu-
larly in core knowledge and skills, that today distinguish excellent teachers from 
peers. But successful teaching is much more than delivery of core instruction, no 
matter how effective. It also involves the following:
  motivating students to take on next challenges and persist despite barriers;
  helping students with time and task management and other habits critical 
to success; 
  building children’s social and emotional skills and fortitude; 
  mentoring and modeling life skills;
  addressing personal and family situations that may impede learning;
  helping students dig deeper into material and develop higher-order thinking 
skills (analytical, conceptual, and creative); and
  taking responsibility for ensuring learning outcomes by making changes 
when a student’s learning growth stalls—below or above standards.
These distinguishing aspects of teachers who produce outstanding learning 
results with more students are not ones that technology can fully replace. At 
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the same time, in order to become a profession in which excellent teachers are 
rewarded and may reach more students over time, the teaching profession needs 
the digital-learning revolution. Digital learning has the potential to transform 
teaching in three primary ways, detailed in the pages that follow: 
  Enabling excellent teachers to reach more students. Great teachers will in-
creasingly be able to teach more students in person as digital learning replaces 
portions of instruction in an individualized fashion and provides time-saving 
student data; reach students remotely via technology; and capture and share 
their performances and methods widely through video and smart software 
that individualizes learning.4 Even among excellent teachers, various people 
will thrive in different roles.
  Attracting and retaining more of these excellent teachers. As excellent 
teachers reach more students, they will be able to earn more out of regular 
per-pupil funds. The combination of higher pay and career opportunities 
made possible by digital learning will, in turn, help teaching attract and keep 
the best performers.
  Boosting effectiveness and job options for average teachers. Average teach-
ers will benefit as digital technology and the extended reach of their excellent 
peers take complex tasks off their to-do lists, enabling them to focus on the 
parts of teaching at which they can excel. Through technology, they can also 
obtain real-time data and advice about how to help each of their students 
succeed, saving time and improving performance. Digital learning makes it 
easier to personalize instruction, which many average teachers find difficult 
or impossible to achieve with whole classrooms of students with a wide array 
of needs. Some new roles will pay less, but many will also require hours far 
shorter than today’s typical fifty-hour teacher workweek.5
To be sure, not all of today’s teachers will benefit from these transformations. 
In all likelihood, these changes will mean that the nation needs fewer teachers as 
we now know them—fully and solely accountable for whole classrooms of chil-
dren. Today’s ineffective teachers can be replaced by more effective ones in this 
new digital-learning world, either through remote instruction or the extended 
reach of more effective teachers to more students. Those ineffective teachers 
who still wish to remain in education may find new roles available. But the new 
roles that are instructional, such as tutoring small groups, will be better filled by 
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today’s average teachers, rather than the least effective ones. Some new roles, such 
as online-learning lab monitors who do not provide instructional support, may 
be appropriate for today’s less effective teachers. But in many cases, new sector 
entrants who have digital hardware and software know-how will fill these roles. 
The net effect is likely to be a smaller, but much stronger and more highly 
paid, teaching force coupled with new, lower-paid roles—many with appealing, 
shorter hours—that support the fully accountable teachers. This differentiated 
structure is similar to that which has emerged with changing roles and technol-
ogy in other professions like law and medicine. 
Employing digital technology to transform the teaching profession in ways 
that benefit students holds enormous promise. That promise will likely go un-
realized, however, without significant changes in public policies and manage-
ment systems, in the allocation of funds, in the technology infrastructure, and, 
perhaps most importantly, in the level of will and demand for better student 
outcomes. Here we outline a vision for how these changes can be realized. 
Extending Great Teachers’ Reach
We know the quality of instruction students receive makes a huge difference in 
their achievement. Having teachers in the top 25 percent of effectiveness versus 
the bottom 25 percent would enable the average low-income child to make up the 
typical achievement gap in just three to four years.6 Consecutive excellent teach-
ers also can help middling students leap ahead. Yet we also know that given the 
way schools generally work today, with one teacher assigned to each classroom, 
only about 25 percent of classes will have one of these top-tier teachers at a given 
time. The other 75 percent will not. 
As we have argued elsewhere, one promising strategy to change those 
numbers is to extend the reach of excellent teachers to more students, pay-
ing these teachers more, and attracting and keeping more of them—while 
still remaining within budget.7 States, districts, and schools are beginning to 
deploy more-comprehensive systems to determine teacher effectiveness. As 
those systems improve, education leaders will know with more certainty and 
in more subjects and grades which teachers are achieving the strongest results. 
Schools can move to identify the best teachers more rapidly, rather than wait-
ing for systems that better allow for legally defensible dismissals.8 With better 
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evaluation, the opportunity to leverage great teachers to help more students will 
grow significantly.9
Some ways of extending excellent teachers’ reach do not require technology. 
For example, schools could shift a few more students into better teachers’ class-
rooms or put teacher-leaders in charge of multiple classrooms. But the digital 
revolution can extend great teachers’ reach much further, in three ways: replacing 
a portion of instructional work with digital tools, interacting with more students 
remotely by removing some noninstructional tasks, and instructing students 
“boundlessly” via video and smart software that personalizes learning.
New Roles for In-Person Teachers
Even in the digital age, in-person teachers remain critical. Because of the child-
care function school plays in our economy, most children will continue to attend 
brick-and-mortar schools. Their in-person teachers, and other school person-
nel, will be responsible for motivating them, teaching them time management, 
addressing social and emotional issues that affect their learning, and making 
changes when their learning stalls. In-person teachers also will be best positioned, 
at least in the near future, to develop students’ higher-order thinking: their ability 
to apply knowledge and skills to analyze challenging problems, grasp broader 
concepts, and devise new ideas and solutions.
But time is a critical constraint for this type of educator. With only so many 
hours in the day, even the best face severe limits on the number of students they 
can reach. The promise of digital technology in this context is its ability to free 
excellent in-person teachers’ time using what we call “time-technology swaps.”10 
In this model, digital instruction takes over a portion of great in-person teachers’ 
instructional duties, such as delivering lectures and assessing students’ mastery 
of standards. This frees teachers’ time—allowing fewer (and better) in-person 
teachers to reach more students with the personalized, enriched portions of their 
instruction.11 
These swaps involve fundamental restructuring of the school day: using 
digital instruction specifically for the purpose of freeing enough hours of great 
teachers’ time to work with a significant number of additional students—not just 
layering available technology atop current education-delivery models. Students 
spend 25 percent or more time with digital instruction, most likely focused on 
knowledge and skill acquisition. Adults still supervise students during this time, 
but they do not need to be teachers as we know them. Indeed, many will not be. 
16
EDUCATION REFORM FOR THE DIGITAL ERA
Numerous schools have begun using digital instruction for time-technology 
swaps, many of them described in Innosight Institute’s Rise of K–12 Blended 
Learning profiles.12 Here are two examples:
  Rocketship Education. In this California-based charter school network’s 
elementary schools, students spend 25 percent of their time in a “learning 
lab,” receiving self-paced digital instruction and live tutoring monitored by 
paraprofessionals. Because this frees teachers’ time, three teachers are able to 
reach a total of one hundred students, rather than just seventy-five, in rotating 
classes of twenty-five students at a time.
  KIPP Empower. In this Los Angeles K–8 charter school, part of the national 
KIPP network, teachers in each classroom rotate students among computer-
based adaptive-learning programs, teacher-led small groups, and individual-
ized instruction with teachers. Overall class sizes are twenty-eight or twenty-
nine students per teacher (compared with about twenty in typical KIPP LA 
schools), but with half the class engaged in computer instruction at any given 
time, teacher-led groups number between fourteen and fifteen students for 
core subjects (reading, math, writing, and science).
Time-saving, Productivity-enhancing Tools
One way to free teachers’ time is to off-load some instructional duties to digital in-
struction. Another is to find ways for digital tools to streamline noninstructional tasks 
that take teachers’ time but are important for excellent student outcomes. According 
to data from the 2007–08 Schools and Staffing Survey, elementary and secondary 
teachers spend twenty-two and twenty-four hours per week, respectively, on nonin-
structional duties (things like administrative paperwork, etc.).13 Could digital tools 
help reduce that load?14 Here is a list of instructional and noninstructional duties and 
a sampling of tools designed to streamline them:
  Compiling and analyzing student data. New York City, working with the technol-
ogy firm Wireless Generation, implemented the Achievement Reporting and 
Innovation System (ARIS) to put a wide array of data and analysis at teachers’ 
fingertips.15
  Personalizing instruction modes and levels of work. School of One provides the 
math program at three New York City middle schools. School of One’s “learn-
ing algorithm” recommends to teachers a daily schedule (“playlist”) of learning 
activities tailored for each student, reducing teachers’ lesson-planning load.16
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Beyond time-technology swaps, digital tools can also free great teachers’ time 
in other ways. (See the sidebar “Time-saving, Productivity-enhancing Tools.”)
Remote Instruction
Remote instruction comes in two flavors: “synchronous” and “asynchronous.” In 
synchronous instruction, the teacher and the students are interacting with one 
another in real time via videoconference, video-chat, shared online “whiteboards,” 
audio-conference, online text chat, or even just simple telephone calls. Cameras 
placed in classrooms can give remote teachers visual access to whole classes, en-
abling these educators to be aware of how students are responding to their instruc-
tion. As technology improves, this kind of interaction is likely to feel increasingly 
like natural, in-person interaction—especially as video conferencing becomes 
smoother and as three-dimensional holograms of teachers or “immersive” online 
environments, like those experienced in games, are used more frequently.20
In asynchronous instruction, teachers still interact with students, but not in 
real time. Instead, they provide written online feedback on assignments, answer 
students’ questions via email, or post a response to an online discussion board 
for many students to see.
Remote instruction opens up numerous professional opportunities for teach-
ers that are less likely or impossible in an all-in-person environment:
  Living where you want to live. One of the biggest challenges in providing great 
instruction to all students is that many children live in places with a limited 
  Finding or creating lesson plans and materials. BetterLesson is a free website that 
invites teachers to “find lesson plans, classroom materials and instructional 
resources from high-performing teachers.”17 Taking a different tack is Teacher-
sPayTeachers, an open marketplace launched by a former NYC teacher, where 
teachers buy and sell original teaching materials. Subscription-based netTrekker 
enables teachers (and students) to search 300,000 “digital resources” that it says 
have been “vetted by high-performing teachers.”18 Since the quality of materi-
als posted to such sites is likely to vary widely, one key to their success will be 
enabling the best to rise to the top based on user ratings or, better yet, efficacy 
with students.
  Performing administrative tasks. Numerous electronic “gradebooks” have emerged to 
track attendance, keep calendars, and share assignments and grades with students 
and parents. Examples include Engrade and LearnBoost.19
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supply of good, or great, in-person teachers—with rural areas as the prime 
example. Remote instruction makes it possible for teachers to live where they 
want to live, while educating students where they live.
  Choosing a work setting. Remote teaching enables individual teachers to 
work from home, or pods of remote teachers to work in an office together 
as is common in other professions. Remote instruction also enables teach-
ers to combine in-person teaching with remote duties. In Alabama’s online 
school, for example, most of the faculty members have traditional teaching 
jobs during the day.21
  Individualizing instruction. Remote learning can increase the amount of 
personal individualized attention a teacher provides students. Distance para-
doxically can make it easier for educators, who do not have the additional 
duties that an in-person teacher typically would, to focus on one student at 
a time. Innosight Institute’s profile of Riverside Virtual School, for example, 
reports, “Overall, teachers say that they interact more with students as online 
teachers than when they are teaching a face-to-face course. Students also 
report having higher levels of engagement.”22
  Specializing. As Rick Hess and others have argued, one promising way to 
improve the teaching profession is to “unbundle” the teaching role, enabling 
teachers to specialize in the aspects of teaching they do best—delivering en-
gaging presentations, tutoring in small groups, or leading analytic discussion 
sections.23 Focusing the time of great teachers on specific tasks linked directly 
to student achievement and relieving them of less significant duties can free 
their time to teach more students.
  Leveraging time by managing or assisting other remote teachers. An excellent 
remote teacher with managerial or coaching competencies could remain a 
teacher while also supervising or helping one, two, or more other teachers.24 
If teachers in this role are truly accountable managers rather than just unac-
countable advisors, it will actually extend the reach of the excellent teacher’s 
standards and practices—and create meaningful career paths for educators 
who want to remain teachers.25
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Boundless Instruction
Remote instruction is limited by a scarce resource: the time of the teacher. Even 
if teaching remotely allows an instructor to reach more students, a person can 
work only so many hours in a day.
With boundless instruction, teachers capture their instructional prowess in 
a way that can then be shared widely, with a theoretically unlimited number of 
students. Two primary modes of boundless instruction are becoming increasingly 
common, each of which suggests new roles for great teachers: 
  “Mediagenic” superinstructors. The ability to broadcast video lessons over the 
Internet makes it possible for teachers who are excellent content explainers to 
become star teachers, reaching a potentially boundless number of students. 
The most well-known of these efforts, undertaken by the Khan Academy, 
made 2,600 video lessons available online on a wide range of subjects; these 
have been viewed over 80 million times by people worldwide (as of October 
2011).26 Other examples include video course libraries made available by 
universities such as Carnegie Mellon and MIT and initiatives like Learning 
Match that enable individual teachers to test and then submit their own video 
lessons. We expect that video may expand to include holograms someday 
soon, given the rapid progression of holographic technology. The potential 
benefits to students are obvious: As this technology advances, no student 
should ever have to learn about the quadratic formula, or the causes of the 
Civil War, or the dynamics of supply and demand from anyone other than 
the very best explainers of those topics worldwide.
  Application architects. The digital explosion offers another set of opportuni-
ties for teachers: They can create or help design software applications that 
guide students through a series of “lessons,” making it possible for them to 
master academic content without direct teacher interaction. In Disrupting 
Class, Clayton Christensen, Michael Horn, and Curtis Johnson write about 
Virtual Chem Lab, an online application that enables students to engage 
in simulated chemistry experiments. Virtual Chem Lab is used by 150,000 
students and is one of many examples of applications created by instructors 
eager to extend themselves to a larger number of students.27 In New York 
City’s Quest to Learn School, teachers collaborate with video game designers 
from the Institute of Play to create game-based learning experiences that can 
be used both within Quest to Learn and also boundlessly.28
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Attracting and Retaining the Best
Digital learning has the potential to create new career opportunities for excellent 
teachers. As they reach more students, they should be able to earn more—out of 
the per-pupil funding attached to a larger number of students. The chance of en-
hanced advancement and pay will, in turn, make the profession a more attractive 
long-term career for high performers. As a result, U.S. public education should 
have an easier time attracting and retaining top talent in teaching, ultimately 
making the profession a more welcoming place for high-achieving graduates to 
spend full careers. The United States won’t need as many teachers; as in other 
industries, technology will do increasing portions of the work and enable other, 
lower-paid staff members to support both students and the excellent teachers in 
charge of their instruction.
Boosting Average Teachers’ Effectiveness
In addition to giving dramatically more students access to excellent teachers, 
digital learning also has the potential to boost the effectiveness of average teach-
ers—those who keep their students on track, but who struggle to close achieve-
ment gaps or help middling students leap ahead. We see several ways that digital 
learning could help these teachers achieve better outcomes. We keep this analysis 
brief, as this topic has been well examined by other commentators:29
  Delivering initial knowledge and skill instruction. The more students are learn-
ing through the “smart software” described above, the more time teachers will 
have to help students overcome learning barriers and to teach higher-order 
skills. Meanwhile, schools can ensure the accuracy and consistency of basic 
knowledge and skill instruction delivered digitally. 
  Generating real-time student data and lesson-plan advice. Today’s best teach-
ers excel at diagnosing each student’s needs and planning instruction ac-
cordingly. Digital technology holds the promise of providing other teachers 
with similar insight, by analyzing results and recommending next steps 
personalized to the student’s needs.
  Enhancing professional development. Digital technology makes it possible 
for teachers to learn from videos of great teachers, obtain critical and timely 
feedback on their own video-recorded lessons, and connect with other teach-
ers as mentors or peer-helpers. Some portion of excellent teachers’ time freed 
in time-technology swaps also can be used to coach or manage peers.
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  Enabling specialization. As more of the work of teaching is handled by means 
of digital technology, teachers can increasingly specialize in their teaching 
strengths—such as particular subjects or parts of the teaching process. Some 
teachers who are average overall may be excellent specialists.
  Introducing time-saving, productivity-enhancing tools. Such tools can free 
teachers’ time for understanding student data, planning lessons, or person-
alizing instruction. (See the sidebar “Time-saving, Productivity-enhancing 
Tools.”)
Resculpting Policy and Management Systems
The changes described above won’t happen automatically. Digital learning will 
have to improve significantly (see the sidebar “Not There Yet”). In addition, poli-
cies and management systems must change in order to make these new arrange-
ments viable.33 Here, we briefly explore policies that are particularly relevant to the 
Not There Yet
To realize the changes in the teaching profession discussed here, the digital landscape 
itself will need to improve in at least three ways. First, as the Digital Learning Now! 
signatories and others have said, providing universal low-cost access to broadband 
Internet for all K–12 teachers and students—during and beyond “school hours”—
would greatly accelerate the nation’s ability to start implementing these ideas.30
Second, digital users do not yet have platforms that help them find and deploy 
the best and best-fit among the explosion of digital resources. The lack of platforms 
that connect digital resources to varying curricula and individual child needs is a ma-
jor barrier to personalizing learning. In all likelihood, the marketplace will increasingly 
provide multiple versions of such an integrative platform, but for now it remains an 
item on the “technology wish list” of the schools featured in The Rise of K–12 Blended 
Learning.31 
Finally, digital instruction must become significantly better than some aspects of 
in-person instruction, ultimately matching excellent teachers. Measurement of digital 
learning effects on student outcomes is nascent, but research indicates only a small 
edge over average instruction for now.32 Without significant improvements, the major 
educational benefit of digital learning will be allowing successful time-technology 
swaps to extend the reach of excellent live instructors. Instead, the two in tandem—
excellent digital tools and excellent live teachers for all children—should be the goal 
of policy changes.
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teacher role: those related to training and professional development, certification, 
class size, evaluation and supervision, compensation and related finance systems, 
employment arrangements, and unionization.
Training and Professional Development
Teacher training and professional development (PD) will need to change in two 
primary ways as digital learning becomes more prevalent.34 First, digital learning 
will change what teachers need to learn. As teaching becomes more differenti-
ated, so must teacher training and PD. Putting on a top-notch video-recorded 
teaching performance requires a competency and skill set different from those 
needed for, say, remote tutoring—and certainly different from those needed by 
an effective in-person educator. 
Teacher-preparation programs and ongoing PD must address these new 
needs. But one factor will help lighten the training load: The passage of time will 
also involve a generational shift, with the ranks of teachers increasingly filled 
by “digital natives,” who grew up using digital tools, rather than “digital im-
migrants,” who did not.35 Indeed, we can already see many signs of increasing 
technological proficiency among teachers. In 2000, the average state reported 
that in 28 percent of schools, more than half were “beginners” when it came to 
technology. By 2005, the percentage was down to 15, and one can only think it 
has continued to decline.36
Second, digital learning can change how teachers receive training and PD. In 
2005, the average state reported that 34 and 35 percent of its schools delivered 
PD online or via video, respectively. By 2006, these percentages were up to 65 
and 74. More recent data are unavailable, but it seems likely that these percent-
ages have continued to increase. In the digital age, teachers’ roles are likely to 
shift over time, as technology makes different modes of teaching possible, and 
as individuals advance their instructional careers. PD, too, needs to be dynamic, 
available “on demand” rather than in big dollops at the beginning of a teacher’s 
career and during summers.37 
Certification
Today’s certification practices do little to screen out ineffective teachers, and they 
appear to prevent some high-potential candidates from entering the profession.38 
The digital age makes certification reform even more pressing for two reasons:
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  The need to teach across state lines. The use of digital tools can extend teach-
ers’ reach nationally and internationally. This possibility heightens the im-
portance of eliminating state-based certification barriers: No policy should 
block great teachers from reaching a given state’s children, no matter where 
teachers reside or which license they hold. State policies need to be swiftly 
amended to fix this issue. If they are not, federal policymakers should step in: 
Under the interstate commerce clause, the emerging interstate economy for 
instruction allows for federal preemption of state laws that affect this national 
talent exchange. Just as federal law prevents individual states from restricting 
commerce across state lines in other industries, federal action could trump 
state policies that keep great teachers who reside elsewhere from instructing 
the state’s children virtually.
  The need to use noncertified personnel. Under some state-certification laws, a 
licensed teacher must supervise students who are taking core courses, even if 
they are learning online. This restriction undermines the economics of using 
digital learning to free great teachers’ time, pay them more, and save money. 
Without such restrictions, schools could employ less expensive nonlicensed 
personnel to monitor students, splitting cost savings between salaries for the 
fewer, better in-person teachers and the school. Unless paired with shared 
cost savings, digital instruction will not launch the kind of virtuous cycle of 
sustainable excellence described above, in which digital instruction enables 
excellent in-person teachers to reach more students, enables schools to pay 
them more for doing so, and thereby entices greater numbers of excellent 
teachers to enter and stay in the profession.
Class Size
Thirty-six states currently have some limit on class size.39 These limits apply 
equally to the best and worst teachers. Digital learning bumps up against class-
size restrictions in two ways. First, limiting the number of students that a remote 
instructor can serve would detract from one of the key potential advantages of 
this type of instruction: the ability of excellent teachers to reach more students. 
Second, even in brick-and-mortar schools, class-size restrictions can limit the 
advantages of digital learning. Schools are configuring students in myriad ways, 
having them, at different times, work independently, in small groups, in learn-
ing labs, and in traditional classroom-based settings. Without this flexibility, it 
would be difficult for these schools to blend digital and in-person learning. State 
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policymakers should eliminate simplistic across-the-board limits or, at the very 
least, build in the possibility of flexibility for schools that have an alternative 
model. 
Evaluation and Supervision
The rise of digital learning presents both bad news and good news for teacher-
evaluation reform. The bad news is that today’s new evaluation systems are largely 
being built for a traditional one-teacher-one-classroom model, at exactly the time 
that this conventional mode seems poised to decline. The role changes described 
above create two challenges for teacher evaluation. 
First, digital tools will make it increasingly possible to “unbundle” the teach-
er’s role, so that multiple people (rather than a single teacher) contribute to a 
student’s learning. Of course this is not completely new, but it is likely to accel-
erate in the digital age, as little Susie receives algebra instruction via video, has 
her homework assigned and graded by a remote teacher, and receives extra help 
from a classroom paraprofessional. In this multiperson context, how can each 
participant’s “value-add” be identified? 
This complexity means that, whatever arrangements emerge, policies should 
require that one adult be ultimately accountable for each student’s learning in 
each measured subject. That adult could be in-person or remote. That adult may 
employ digital tools, enlist other adults, and otherwise mobilize resources on 
behalf of the child. But for the state’s or district’s teacher-evaluation system, the 
student “counts” for that teacher’s evaluation. Accordingly, this accountable adult 
must have significant choice over resources—human and otherwise—used in the 
child’s education as well as adequate data about performance of those resources, 
a topic to which we return in our conclusion.
Second, as teacher roles become more differentiated, a simplistic rating of 
each teacher as “highly effective,” “effective,” and so forth becomes less meaning-
ful. Teachers themselves, their peers and supervisors, and students’ parents will 
need to know not just how effective teachers are overall (already a tricky task), 
but how effective they are in specific roles within the teaching process. Teachers 
who are highly effective at leading a whole in-person classroom, for example, 
may be less effective at remote education and vice versa. Likewise, teachers 
who are experts at teaching about the Civil War may stumble when asked to 
explain the Progressive Era. Ideally, data and evaluation systems will become 
multidimensional, yielding insight not just about how effective teachers are, but 
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in what aspects of teaching they are effective.40 Increasingly, evaluation systems 
will need to examine not just outcomes and easily observable practices, but the 
underlying competencies that determine individuals’ fitness for different roles.41 
Developing these systems will take time, but will ultimately be more useful than 
less nuanced approaches.
The good news for teacher evaluation is that the digital age should make pos-
sible unprecedented levels of transparency in teaching (and data collection) that 
should, in turn, facilitate evaluation and developmental feedback for teachers. In 
today’s “closed-door” classrooms, little of what goes on can truly be captured in 
a way that would enable a teacher’s peers, supervisors, or coaches to see how he 
or she is teaching. Observations can help, but they are inevitably sporadic and 
somewhat artificial. The more teaching that happens virtually, the more observ-
able it becomes—both live, and in retrospect. 
Compensation and Related Finance Systems
Though new compensation structures will be needed, we do not here prescribe 
an alternative compensation system for the digital age. Organizations will want 
to engage different approaches that fit their circumstances. What works for a 
statewide public virtual school might not be best for a for-profit online-education 
provider, a cyber charter network, or a district that is blending digital and in-
person learning.
Instead, we offer three observations:
  The need for flexibility. State policies or collective-bargaining agreements 
that mandate lockstep salary schedules and tie funding to specific positions 
must be set aside to enable teacher pay to reflect the sort of role differentiation 
described above. Of particular importance are three kinds of flexibility: (a) 
the ability to pay excellent teachers more for educating a larger number of 
students successfully; (b) the flexibility to employ people not on the teacher 
salary schedule to perform roles such as monitoring digital-learning labs, 
tutoring, or performing parts of remote instruction, rather than requiring 
the use of licensed teachers for such duties; and (c) the ability to make school 
funding flexible more generally, enabling schools to allocate funds to dif-
ferent kinds of staff and technology to meet students’ needs. Item (a) is in 
part a matter of simple fairness to excellent teachers, but also a key to start-
ing the potential virtuous cycle of expanded great teacher reach, leading to 
greater pay and career opportunities, leading to higher levels of retention and 
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attraction of new high-caliber entrants. Items (b) and (c) are vital to unlocking 
the funds needed to make (a) possible.
  Evolving finance systems and teacher compensation. Chapter four of this 
volume—“School Finance in the Digital Learning Era”—addresses how 
school-finance systems need to change in the digital age. If, following the 
suggestion of some proponents, finance for digital learning moves toward 
a system in which providers are paid (either in full or in part) only if their 
students succeed, then providers will need to design teacher-compensation 
systems to align incentives. Outcome-based funding can encourage effective 
use of both digital learning and the adults accountable for its success. 
  The market for teacher talent. The rise of remote and boundless instruction 
opens up the possibility of a national, or international, market for teaching 
talent. Especially if finance systems shift to rewarding providers for results, 
excellent teachers—in-person and online—will become increasingly valu-
able financially, and they should be able to leverage that value into higher 
compensation for themselves. Whether they are providing remote instruction 
to specific groups of students, converting their teaching talent into bound-
lessly available resources like video recordings or smart software, or using 
digital instruction to extend their reach in-person, top teachers should have 
expanded earning opportunity. How all this will sort out in the marketplace 
is, of course, uncertain. The most well-known provider of video instruction, 
the Khan Academy, currently provides all its content free of charge and cov-
ers costs with philanthropy. In Korea, where teaching excellence is revered, 
superinstructors can earn six or seven figures.42 Enabling great U.S. teachers 
to earn what they are worth to society may be necessary in order to scale up 
a sustainable national marketplace for great teachers.
Employment
The more divorced teaching becomes from a specific school site, the easier it be-
comes to imagine different kinds of employment arrangements for teachers. Some 
of these are implied in previous sections, but there are other possibilities as well:
  Working for a virtual school or online education provider. Already, an increas-
ing number of teachers work for one of the state-run or charter virtual schools 
or private providers of online education, full time or in addition to their “day 
jobs” as in-person teachers. As these providers grow, they will create other 
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opportunities for teachers to contribute, such as by recording top-notch vid-
eos of content that can become part of providers’ libraries.
  Working as a provider of specialized instruction. Online providers like Con-
nections Academy and K12 offer the full range of content. But other providers 
are emerging to offer more specialized services, such as Presence Telecare, 
which uses videoconferencing to offer online speech therapy. Presence em-
ploys licensed speech therapists nationally who work from home on a flex-
ible schedule. Similar services are likely to emerge across other specialties, 
including core academic-content areas. These services could hire teachers as 
employees or consultants, or could be organized, owned, and run by teachers 
themselves, just as in law, medicine, and other professions.43 
  Working as a designer. Teachers will have increasing opportunities to con-
tribute to “boundless” instructional resources such as smart software, either 
by developing it themselves or by working as an employee or contractor for 
developers.
Unions 
Terry Moe and John Chubb (author of chapter five, “Overcoming the Governance 
Challenge in K–12 Online Learning) predict that unions will inevitably lose out 
as digital learning takes hold, because of lost geographic concentration and re-
duced number of teachers, both of which are key to union power.44 While this is 
a plausible outcome, we see another possibility. 
Whatever the effect of digital learning on the overall number of jobs in the 
education sector, there can be little doubt that technology will transform the 
field into a much wider array of differentiated roles in comparison to today’s one-
teacher-one-classroom model. Union leaders who grasp this reality and step in to 
support employees in this changing sector may keep their organizations viable. 
Those who do not adapt may face trouble as the employment structure shifts. 
Union relationships could enable predictable wages for a growing number of roles 
and portable benefits that employees may carry with them into new jobs. Educa-
tion unions that provide benefits directly may attract free-agent employees who 
want security in a work environment where roles and jobs are changing and where 
not all labor is attached to specific schools in full-time, permanent positions. 
Motion picture and other entertainment-industry unions may provide starting-
point models for the future of education: Stars are paid for their disproportionate 
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economic and entertainment value, but other professionals are paid predictable 
wages and have access to benefits. In these sectors, union rules set minimum pay 
for supporting roles without limiting pay for top-tier performers.
A Revitalized Teaching Profession, If We Have the Will
These potential changes bode well for the teaching profession, which has the 
chance to become, like other professions, an “opportunity culture” that gives 
teachers a wide array of ways to advance while still remaining teachers, and to 
be rewarded for their contributions.45 They bode especially well for consistently 
excellent teachers, who stand to gain the most in terms of expanded opportu-
nities and rewards, and whose ranks should increase because of the enhanced 
attractiveness of the job to high performers. But they also bode well for average 
teachers who, by taking advantage of the time-saving potential of digital tools 
and other potential benefits, will have much greater opportunity to contribute 
to excellence than they can in traditional classrooms.
This is not to say the changes bode well for all teachers. As the nation comes 
to need fewer instructors per pupil, school providers will be able to push out the 
very least effective teachers (if policy allows). These changes would be positive for 
students and the public, as schools should be able to achieve better results, within 
current budgets, by employing fewer, better teachers. 
While digital learning will mean fewer traditional teachers, not all of these 
jobs will disappear: Some will be replaced by new roles, such as monitoring 
students during digital instruction time, providing small-group tutoring, and 
performing noninstructional duties. Remote and boundless instruction will 
open all kinds of jobs for people in technical fields, but also for people who can 
play specialized nonteaching roles online to help students as they work with the 
technology. Where today’s teaching profession resembles the bygone age of the 
solo general-practitioner doctor carrying out all of the practice’s tasks himself, 
tomorrow’s is likely to look increasingly like the modern medical field: with a wide 
array of different professionals and paraprofessionals playing a range of roles that 
together add up to a coherent system of service delivery centered around patients. 
Similar changes occurred in the legal profession, enabling better lawyers to earn 
more by serving more clients with teams of junior associates, paralegals, and 
administrative assistants. All of this is so familiar today that it is easy to forget 
how recently these significant changes occurred. 
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Of course, this is easy to envision on paper. Without a strong demand from 
education providers to use digital learning effectively, uptake will be slower than 
it could be. Likewise, the significant changes in policy and management systems 
that are needed to usher in these new opportunities will not happen, or will hap-
pen much too slowly to keep up with the potential of technology.46 
One way to create this demand would be to empower excellent teachers who 
have already proven they are driven to succeed. What if schools, districts, or 
even states gave willing individual excellent teachers the power and funding to 
integrate digital technology (and other human resources) into learning, in ex-
change for taking on a larger load of students? What if these great teachers gained 
control of a good portion of the funding generated by their expanded numbers of 
students? This power to purchase, use, and change digital and human resources, 
and to assess the options based on data and prior results, would allow the person 
accountable for students’ results to determine curricular content and better en-
sure student achievement. What if not just one or a few excellent teachers gained 
that power, but thousands or tens of thousands? 
Whether through that approach or some other, the nation’s schools and 
policymakers will need the courage to dramatically change—and not just nibble 
away at the edges of—a profession that has remained static as other professions 
have advanced. Without that courage, our teachers and students—and our na-
tion—will miss an enormous opportunity made possible by the advent of digital 
technology while other nations undoubtedly seize it.
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Quality Control in K–12 Digital Learning:  
Three (Imperfect) Approaches
  By Frederick M. Hess
Digital learning poses an immense dilemma when it comes to ensuring quality. 
One of the great advantages of online learning is that it makes “unbundling” 
school provision possible—that is, it allows children to be served by providers 
from almost anywhere, in new and more customized ways. But taking advantage 
of all the opportunities online learning offers means that there is no longer one 
conventional “school” to hold accountable. Instead, students in a given building 
or district may be taking courses (or just sections of courses) from a variety of 
providers, each with varying approaches to technology, instruction, mastery, 
and so forth. (Students may also be benefiting from other providers of tutoring, 
out-of-school supplementation, and more.) To further complicate this picture 
(and add to its political volatility), many providers are likely to be profit-seeking 
ventures. Finding ways to define, monitor, and police quality in this brave new 
world is one of the central challenges in realizing the potential of digital learning.
The reformers who shaped our current system of schooling in the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth centuries drew from the “best practices” of their time. 
In doing so, they designed a centrally managed, one-size-fits-all system of more-
or-less standardized schools staffed by teachers doing more-or-less standardized 
work. (It was not unlike the mass production and assembly line systems being 
devised at approximately the same time for industry.) The presumption was that 
roughly similar schools, school districts, and educators could simultaneously 
serve many different students without altering or tailoring their practices in major 
ways. What may have worked a hundred years ago, however, has now led to over-
burdened educators and institutions that have trouble doing anything very well. 
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Virtual schooling’s greatest power is that it creates the opportunity to recon-
sider what is feasible. Digital learning makes it possible to deliver expertise over 
distances, permits instructors to specialize, allows schools to use staff in more 
targeted and cost-effective ways, and customizes the scope, sequence, and pacing 
of curriculum and instruction for particular children. All of these considerations 
facilitate the delivery of high-quality, high-impact instruction. At the same time, 
because it destandardizes and decentralizes educational delivery, digital educa-
tion is far harder to bring under the yoke of the quality-control systems and 
metrics that have been devised for traditional school structures. 
To realize the potential gains in cost efficiency, customization, instructional 
quality, pupil engagement, and—ultimately—student learning that the digital age 
makes possible will require policymakers and practitioners to find new ways to 
monitor and police quality. Absent the familiar panoply of credentials, staffing 
ratios, instructional hours, Carnegie units, and school days that now provide 
tangible assurance that a given school is “real” and legitimate, digital learning 
will struggle with finding acceptance. 
Why Quality Control Matters
In their enthusiasm for virtual learning, reformers risk three key mistakes. First, 
technophiles can too readily succumb to the hope that virtual schooling is a rising 
tide that will inevitably sweep away all obstacles before it, despite any missteps 
with regard to quality control or incentives. “The power of technology today,” 
write Terry Moe and John Chubb in Liberating Learning: Technology, Politics, and 
the Future of American Education, “simply cannot be overstated… Technology 
promises to change the fundamentals of how teaching and learning have taken 
place for centuries.”1 In Saving Schools: From Horace Mann to Virtual Learning, 
Paul Peterson suggests that “as technology improves, schools can match students 
to their ideal difficulty point, giving them the intrinsic satisfaction that comes 
with a genuine learning experience.”2 
Such sentiments eerily recall the enthusiastic claims once made for the trans-
formative power of school choice. Twenty years ago, Moe and Chubb asserted 
that “reformers would do well to entertain the notion that choice is a panacea…
It has the capacity all by itself to bring about the kind of transformation that, for 
years, reformers have been seeking to engineer in myriad other ways.”3 Devel-
opments like school choice and digital learning do indeed have the potential to 
be “disruptive” forces (in the terminology of Clay Christensen), but there is no 
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guarantee that they will play that role.4 In the case of school choice, little or no 
quality control in too many states yielded a slew of mediocre and faltering charter 
schools. Moreover, excessive faith that excellence would inevitably win out led 
reformers to spend little time or energy on quality control—yielding middling 
performance and an industry filled with unexceptional providers committed to 
safeguarding their livelihood. Such results dampened public enthusiasm and the 
willingness of policymakers to support autonomy and opportunities to expand. 
The second key mistake that reformers make is failing to acknowledge the 
implications of public attachment to familiar institutions and routines. Propo-
nents of digital learning are right to point out that the current system is rife with 
failure. But the system is also familiar, and reaps the advantages of popular sup-
port, inertia, and the benefit of the doubt. Where children and schooling are con-
cerned, the burden of proof is going to fall on the new and unfamiliar. Worrying 
about the perils of education technology is hardly new. (See the sidebar “Historic 
Tussles over Quality in Distance Education.”) While today’s skeptics fret about 
online instruction, it was once books and the printing press that were feared by 
educators, who agonized that students would learn the wrong things if left to read 
on their own. In the seventeenth century, Sir Roger L’Estrange (once a member 
of the English Parliament and translator of Aesop’s fables) wondered “whether 
more mischief than advantage were not occasion’d to the Christian world by the 
invention of typography.”5 Newness and unfamiliarity create a high bar to clear 
when assuring parents and the public that technology-infused learning (whether 
it involves books or iPads) is not a “risky” departure from what they have known. 
Reformers make a third key mistake when they overlook the fact that K–12 
education is publicly run, funded, and regulated, and therefore inherently politi-
cal. Public officials are risk averse—they want to ensure that public dollars and 
agencies avoid doing obviously corrupt or dangerous things. Those opposed to 
digital learning can slow or halt its spread if they can get voters (and public of-
ficials) worried about the risks involved. It is no surprise that union officials and 
other opponents of digital learning are eager to identify and highlight signs of 
malfeasance. When former governors Jeb Bush and Bob Wise rolled out their 
bipartisan Digital Learning Now! compact in late 2010, Sherri Wood, president 
of the Idaho Education Association, denounced the digital push in the Gem 
State: “It’s about getting a piece of the money that goes to public schools. The big 
corporations want to make money off the backs of our children.”6 Such attacks 
tend to gain steam when examples of inept or corrupt provision abound, but are 
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Historic Tussles over Quality in Distance Education
Those who imagine that digital learning’s challenges are unprecedented would do 
well to consider the (surprisingly) long history of distance education. The earliest use 
of distance education in any formal sense is probably Isaac Pitman’s use of written 
correspondence to teach shorthand as early as 1840 in Bath, England. For the cost 
of a postage stamp, anyone could receive shorthand lessons by mail and have those 
lessons corrected and returned in the same fashion.7
Experiments with “correspondence schools” emerged as early as the 1870s, 
when formal courses were conducted via mail by educational institutions. Their 
instructors were paid by individual students per course. Starting in 1873, Illinois 
Wesleyan University experimented with distance-instruction degrees. A student could 
even earn a doctorate in philosophy without setting foot on campus. The distance-
learning program received so much criticism, though—namely from the University 
Senate of the Methodist Church and from the North Central Association of Colleges 
and Secondary Schools—that the program was dead by 1906.8 Meanwhile, in the 
1880s, thirty-two professors from universities including Harvard and Johns Hopkins 
formed the Correspondence University of America—but it also failed to survive. 
As more for-profit organizations entered the distance-education market, peoples’ 
concerns about distance schools’ practices and the quality of a correspondence de-
gree intensified. In those early years, there were two noteworthy attempts to control 
quality. In 1915, the growing number of correspondence study options led to the 
formation of the National University Extension Association, which sought to establish 
uniform guidelines for distance-learning providers. These guidelines included course-
transfer procedures and course-quality standards.9 In 1926, a monitoring organiza-
tion was established—the National Home Study Council (NHSC), later renamed the 
Distance Education and Training Council (DETC)—to identify high-quality provid-
ers in the distance-learning field. Today the DETC consists of around one hundred 
distance-learning institutions spread across twenty-one states and seven countries, 
including the military’s distance-learning providers.
Concerns still abound, however, that these institutions, lacking the familiar rou-
tines and processes of brick-and-mortar colleges, may function as “diploma mills.” 
While some traditional institutions may have low standards, it is at least evident that 
they exist. Not even that much can be taken for granted about entities that need not 
maintain traditional facilities and cannot boast a visible population of faculty and 
students. Policing the worth and meaning of the credentials they offer has proven a 
thorny challenge. 
Seeking to highlight these problems in 2001, U.S. senator Susan Collins bought 
a BS in biology and an MS in medical biology from Lexington University for $1,515, 
without taking any courses. If anyone called to inquire about the validity of the degree, 
the institution assured her, it would provide confirmation of her academic record and 
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less likely to do so when problems are minimized. Because these reforms are 
political, success depends in large part on making policymakers and the public 
comfortable with the proposed changes. That’s where quality control comes in.
From Quality Schools to Quality Learning
Embracing the power of digital learning entails shifting from a focus on “schools” 
and “teachers” to one on “schooling” and “teaching.” Education must no longer be 
understood as something done by holistic, uniform, and self-contained organiza-
tions but rather as a suite of services provided by a shifting web of providers—and 
provided differently in different circumstances to different pupils. (That’s the 
point of customizing, after all.) Rather than having a faculty that teaches English, 
math, French, and so forth, schools may have multiple online providers for each 
subject—or for portions of a particular course. 
For instance, one provider might help students with writing and composition, 
but not teach novels or literature. Another might specialize in offering rich, in-
teractive instruction about pivotal historical periods, without offering a full-scale 
chronological course. Still others (for example, outfits like Rocketship Education 
or Edison Learning) might package content from multiple online providers and 
in-person school faculty to offer “blended” instruction. 
Today, most “virtual charter schools” still constitute a fairly conventional 
“school unit,” one that can be held accountable as a whole for aggregate student 
performance. However, as the unbundling of education proceeds, it will no longer 
be safe to presume that student outcomes reflect the performance of a “school” 
or even a “teacher.” In an increasingly granular world, holding providers re-
sponsible for their outcomes requires devising ways to gauge the performance of 
each provider in turn, rather than simply documenting the aggregate results for 
children in a given classroom, school unit, or locale. Such a task is an enormous 
her 3.8 grade-point average.10 According to former U.S. representative Michael Castle, 
practices of that kind have been “a heck of a lot simpler with the use of the Internet. 
The tracking of them and the prosecution of them is a heck of a lot harder.”11
Those who are confident they have identified sure-fire methods for policing the 
quality of online learning would do well to remember that they are not the first to 
wrestle with these issues. Generations of policymakers and reformers have sought to 
juggle the exigencies of quality control with the desire not to smother or unduly inhibit 
more convenient, cheaper, or less conventional approaches to education.
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challenge, and one far beyond the scope of our current abilities, understanding, 
or assessment technologies. While extremely promising, then, these unbundled 
providers offer unique quality-control challenges.
Schooling in a digital world calls upon both school personnel and families 
to make new kinds of choices. School leaders will need to decide whether a given 
course should be taught by an online provider, a school-based instructor, or some 
combination of the two—and whether to offer students a choice of one or more of 
these modalities. In those cases where more than one option is available, students 
and families will then have to make a choice. This new system differs from even 
our current school-choice models, which require only that parents decide which 
school they want John Jr. to attend. Instead, it resembles more the relationship 
between a shopkeeper and consumer: The shopkeeper decides which goods to 
put on the shelves, but the consumer decides which shop to frequent—and which 
goods to purchase while there.
Unfortunately, it is difficult to craft quality-control systems that reflect and 
adapt to the seismic shift that digital learning represents. The best that policymak-
ers can do is to select among—or combine—three basic approaches, each with 
its own significant limitations: 
  Input and process regulation
  Outcome-based accountability
  Market-based quality control
The alert reader will note that these are precisely the same choices available 
to policymakers seeking to hold any public service accountable. 
Input regulation entails policymakers prescribing what entities must do to 
qualify as legitimate online providers. Outcome-based accountability relies on 
setting performance targets that providers must meet. And market-based quality 
control permits the universe of users to choose their preferred providers—and 
then trusts that market pressures will reward good providers and eventually 
shutter lousy ones. 
These are not mutually exclusive options, but together they comprise the basic 
menu of choices for policing digital learning (or any other public function). The 
difficulty is that these approaches were devised for assessing conventional insti-
tutions, not the more fluid networks of providers and learners created by digital 
instruction. In the digital world—where new tools and technologies offer dra-
matic opportunities to rethink teaching and learning by disassembling a school, 
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classroom, or course into its component parts, and then delivering instruction 
in more customized ways—these quality-control approaches will no longer be a 
comfortable fit for providers. Rather, like a Sunday suit that a teen has outgrown, 
they will tear, pinch, and constrict. 
Input Regulation 
Input regulation has long been the norm in policing school quality. It entails 
monitoring and regulating the “ingredients” of schooling—who does the teach-
ing, how many hours they teach, how many students are taught at one time, what 
materials are used, how much is spent, and so forth. This model was superbly 
suited to the circumstances and tastes of the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. A century ago, it was lauded by enthusiasts of Frederick Taylor’s “sci-
entific management” for its rigor. Monitoring inputs and processes was viewed 
by progressive reformers of the time as the surest way to ensure that schools (like 
factories) were well run and efficient. And, in an era before computers and mod-
ern testing technology, it truly was a reasonable way to ensure a baseline of quality. 
Input regulation requires that the school, school district, and/or state set 
and monitor rules detailing how and with what resources schools and educa-
tors should operate. Officials can decree that a classroom will have no more 
than twenty-four students, a teacher will hold a state teaching license, new math 
textbooks will be bought every six years, and so on. Rules of this sort ensure a 
minimal level of service, though none of them guarantees that students will be 
served well, much less that they will learn. The limitation is that, while officials 
can make sure schools do the things they’re told, they cannot ensure they do 
them effectively or well. Ultimately, the compliance-oriented approach rewards 
obedience rather than excellence.
Traditional brick-and-mortar schools are relatively easy places to deploy this 
kind of quality control. It isn’t hard for observers to check up on facilities, mate-
rials, and staff. A visible student body makes it possible to see whether students 
have books and are showing up on time. And a regimented, bureaucratic, and 
grade-ordered school system makes it possible to devise and record all manner 
of input statistics, from attendance rates to incidents of violence, that can be used 
to determine whether a given school is “good.” 
When it comes to digital learning, input regulation still holds considerable 
appeal, if only because its familiar, predictable strictures can mitigate some of 
the obvious risks posed by dubious providers. Skeptics of digital learning can be 
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excused for wondering about the invisible instructors providing instruction or 
about the number of students each might be teaching. The regulatory response 
is to insist that teachers have certain credentials and that class sizes be limited. 
Similarly, it is hardly unreasonable to fear that online courses may be too easy or 
entail little actual instruction. The regulatory response is to mandate a minimum 
number of instructional hours and tasks. Input regulation, in other words, does 
offer some protection against fraudulent operators.
Screening out fraudulent or dishonest operators is a low bar for ensuring 
quality, however. The obvious problem with input regulation is that policing 
inputs and processes can’t ensure quality (much less efficiency). Indeed, its ri-
gidities, norms, and compliance obligations tend to stifle innovation or efforts 
to adapt services to the needs of schools and students. Nor does traditional 
regulation make much sense in key domains of digital education. Consider the 
issue of teacher quality, for example. If online providers presumably have the 
opportunity to tap teachers and professionals around the world, what is gained 
by requiring potential instructors to hold a teaching credential from a particular 
state, a standard to which many virtual schools are currently held? Such restric-
tions prevent the use of collegiate faculty or out-of-state educators who might be 
attractive candidates. Class-size restrictions for digital providers—such as those 
in California—drive up costs while preventing even accomplished providers with 
terrific instructors from utilizing their best teachers as effectively as they might. 
(That’s every bit as true for providers in brick-and-mortar schools, of course.)
Familiar routines and metrics grow more complex as schooling moves online, 
and they become really tangled once a mélange of hybrid models starts to oper-
ate. Blending online and traditional models offers the opportunity to reimagine 
the use of space, resources, and staff time, but doing so makes it increasingly 
complicated to devise and apply simple input metrics for monitoring quality. 
Regardless of the merits of input regulation in general, there is one aspect of 
online learning for which it is indisputably appropriate: monitoring the finances 
of providers that are collecting public dollars. The charter school experience is in-
structive—and worrying. Nothing will more rapidly (and justifiably) undermine 
public confidence in digital learning than seeing charlatans using the medium to 
collect public dollars. A minimal requirement for provision ought to be a clean 
financial audit in which revenues, expenses, and profits are totally transparent. 
(For more on this topic, see chapter four, “School Finance in the Digital-Learning 
Era,” by Paul T. Hill.)
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Outcome-based Accountability
Frustration with input-driven regulation and quality control—specifically its 
rigidities, stifling red tape, and inattention to results—gave rise in the 1980s to 
the notion of “reinventing government” by focusing instead on outcomes. Public 
providers would be held accountable for results in return for more autonomy, 
flexibility, and control.
The appeal of this approach is obvious. In K–12 schooling, it has meant hold-
ing schools accountable for reading and math test scores and, more recently, using 
those results to compute value-added measures for schools and individual teach-
ers. Test scores offer a crude but useful way to identify schools that are doing an 
awful job teaching basic skills, and value-added analyses of those test scores yield 
a method for identifying which schools (and potentially individual teachers) are 
better, and which are worse, at helping students master key domains.
The limitation of outcome metrics is that they accept the familiar school-
house (or classroom) as the unit of analysis. They focus on determining whether 
a school is good or not, even if the conventional school no longer exists. In cases 
where a dozen online providers are teaching math and the school is functioning 
more as their conduit than as the source of instruction—where learning is the 
result of a blend of school faculty, computer-assisted tutoring, and online deliv-
ery—school-level metrics obviously fail to gauge the relative performance of the 
various providers. 
The type of metrics developed as part of No Child Left Behind (NCLB) of-
fer little aid here, for the questions needing to be answered involve the quality 
of particular courses, units, or providers, not the performance of the school as 
a whole. Trying to judge the performance of a “school” or “teacher” via state as-
sessment results makes little sense in the case of digital learning. What’s needed is 
something more granular and more reflective of the unbundled vision of virtual 
schooling.
Conventional approaches to outcome accountability in K–12 education un-
ravel when applied to online providers, which may teach material that transcends 
the assessed content, or content in disciplines that are not or cannot be tested, or 
only specific portions of an assessed course, or skills or capacities for which reli-
able assessments are lacking. For instance, New York City’s School of One uses 
dozens of providers to offer components of its middle school math curriculum. 
Different providers offer instruction geared to different objectives. Yet the New 
York state assessment measures only how well students are faring on grade-level 
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math objectives. It lacks the fine granularity necessary to evaluate the individual 
providers of customized content. Similarly, online providers offering instruction 
in music or art history or a foreign language—courses that lack meaningful state 
assessments—cannot be readily judged using current outcome measures.
No Child Left Behind’s experiment with supplemental education services 
(SES) offers a cautionary tale in this regard. SES permitted eligible students in per-
sistently low-performing schools to enroll in after-school tutoring using federal 
Title I dollars that had traditionally flowed to the school district. Federal policy-
makers were committed to holding SES providers accountable for performance. 
They constructed an elaborate mechanism for doing so, with states required to 
approve potential providers and then evaluate their performance based on student 
achievement. Once providers were approved, local districts could contract with 
any number of them, and then parents would select the providers of their choice. 
But confusion about how to judge the quality of providers, a lack of useful data, 
and ineffectual state efforts to patrol quality combined to yield a potpourri of 
providers of dubious merit.
Worse, state assessments used for monitoring educational outcomes were not 
precise enough to detect the impact of thirty or so hours of tutoring, regardless of 
the provider. This result probably should have come as no surprise, but it threw a 
large wrench into the SES quality-control framework. In response, big SES pro-
viders asked to use their own assessment data to demonstrate their impact. But 
allowing providers to self-police in this fashion raised obvious concerns about 
the integrity and reliability of results. 
Still and all, outcome-based accountability should not be dismissed altogether 
where digital learning is concerned. On the contrary, new technologies hold im-
mense promise for this approach. The development of Common Core assessments 
makes it likely that, within a few years, math and English language arts perfor-
mance will be measured by a uniform test across much of the nation.12 Online 
assessment technology will make it possible to administer frequent, targeted tests 
and get immediate results. Such assessments could conceivably be designed for 
every major objective in a set of standards or a curriculum, enabling instructors 
to gauge whether and how quickly their pupils are mastering designated content. 
Such assessments could then enable states to measure online providers’ quality: 
For online providers that augment classroom instruction by, for instance, ad-
dressing specific thorny concepts, the right gauge is not student performance on 
the end-of-grade assessment but on specific learning objectives. Targeted testing 
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of this kind would entail a fundamental shift in how states have learned to gather 
and report performance data in the NCLB era.
Tech impresario Tom Vander Ark has suggested a way of thinking about stu-
dent mastery that draws upon the Boy Scout concept of the merit badge. Mastery 
of a given learning objective would be signified by completion of a designated 
assessment, and the student would claim the appropriate “badge.” Vander Ark 
recommends that seat-time credit systems be replaced by assessment bundles 
modeled around these merit badges. “Take ratios and fractions as an example,” 
he writes. “A merit badge would describe what students need to know and a 
combination of ways they can show it including content-embedded assessment 
(e.g., game score), performance assessment (e.g., project), adaptive assessment 
(e.g., online quiz), and an end of unit test.”13 This doesn’t mean the assessments 
will be easy or cheap, however, and admittedly such a shift is not likely to occur 
soon. There remain plenty of preliminary challenges to overcome in determin-
ing which learning objectives ought to be identified and what constitutes an 
appropriate assessment. 
Three challenges deserve particular attention: First, for the vast majority of 
courses taught in schools, reliable assessments don’t even yet exist. Second, we 
have limited experience and expertise in designing assessments to track learning 
objectives rather than simply report on student performance on the whole of a 
course. Until partial-course metrics are available, outcome-based accountability is 
irrelevant to niche providers. Third, most high school assessments report whether 
students are proficient in the subject but not how much they learned from the 
course. This characteristic creates incentives for online providers to cream-skim, 
and works against providers that teach poorly performing students—since even 
if these students make gains they may not attain proficiency. Devising ways to 
measure both proficiency and value added is therefore essential. 
Ultimately, outcome-based quality control for digital learning will turn 
upon the ability of reformers to devise and implement a far more complex and 
sophisticated approach to testing. If a student takes Algebra I from one provider 
but absorbs a handful of learning objectives from a second, the quality-control 
challenges are severe. First, it’s necessary to have an assessment that demonstrates 
a student’s mastery of the requisite material. Second, it is desirable to have some 
kind of value-added measure that reflects how much the student has actually 
learned. Third, it is important to have sufficiently specific items so that the per-
formance of the two providers in question can be distinguished. 
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Of course, partitioning knowledge and skills into such discrete chunks may 
not finally be possible. (Whether it is desirable is another good question.) Even 
if partitioning proves feasible in some subjects or for some instruction, it’s not 
clear that it can be done effectively in other subjects. If targeted assessments are 
beyond our capabilities to devise, then outcome accountability for digital learn-
ing will prove elusive. 
In short, the value and reach of outcome-based accountability is hostage to 
the development of high-quality, granular assessments. Until new and satisfactory 
assessments are devised, outcome accountability will remain a limited tool. And 
it will remain a nonexistent option for all those courses in which assessments do 
not exist and are not yet being developed. 
Market-based Quality Control
Market-based accountability can avoid some of the problems posed by central-
ized, outcome-based accountability and input-based regulation by permitting 
users of educational services to decide what best meets their educational needs. 
Markets presume that diverse users may benefit from diverse providers, and 
that the quality of providers ought to be measured in a variety of ways. Under 
market-based quality control, the ultimate gauge of quality is whether users 
choose a particular provider (thus, the notion of “voting with one’s feet”). The 
degree to which competing for students enables meaningful quality control, 
however, depends on the degree to which parents and educators are discerning 
and demanding consumers of digital learning. Where outcome accountability 
fosters homogeneity in regard to essentials, a market approach creates room for 
heterogeneous providers to thrive. Markets leave room for new operators that may 
not fit within the strictures of input regulation and that may offer value or spe-
cialized services not easily captured by existing outcome accountability metrics. 
Ultimately, markets can do three things that input and outcome account-
ability cannot when it comes to quality control. First, markets can protect against 
excessive homogenization of providers (and their educational products). Second, 
markets can extend quality control beyond the basic forces of regulation and test-
ing. In cases where providers might evade regulation or manipulate test scores to 
their advantage, wary consumers are free to shift to other providers—along the 
way powerfully signaling their dissatisfaction. (Of course, this step depends on 
consumers having a reasonable sense of provider quality and the ability to act on 
47
Quality Control in K–12 Digital Learning: Three (Imperfect) Approaches 
it.) Third, markets enable entrepreneurial educators to challenge existing schools 
(and other providers) and the reigning orthodoxies and habitual practices. 
Market-based quality control also exhibits particular weaknesses, however, 
including the opportunities it offers to inept or unscrupulous providers—a 
problem that is familiar to any education observer who has followed the travails 
of problematic charter schools in states like Texas and Ohio. Some educators or 
parents will make poor choices or opt for low-quality providers, maybe because 
they don’t know any better, maybe because they don’t much care, or maybe be-
cause they’d rather engage with an easy or easy-to-satisfy program than a difficult 
one. It is wishful thinking to suppose that markets can prevent bad choices from 
being made. Markets permit consumers to satisfy their preferences, including 
preferences that strike observers as misguided. (Consider the millions who eat 
at fast food joints or buy “as-seen-on-TV” gizmos—choices many would deem 
poor ones.) The crucial thing in fostering an effective marketplace is that good 
and reliable information on provider quality be available for users. Otherwise, 
low-quality providers can hide their problems, inaccurately represent the qual-
ity of their service, and use aggressive and misleading marketing to woo clients.
How can markets ensure that users have good information on provider qual-
ity? The kinds of metrics used for outcome accountability can be useful here. But 
four additional kinds of measures can also prove useful in this realm:
  Professional, systematic ratings on customer satisfaction, something akin to 
the kind of information reported by sources like J. D. Powers and Associates. 
These make it easy for consumers to draw on the judgments of the universe 
of users. 
  Scientific evaluation by credible third-parties, such as those offered by 
Consumer Reports. The idea is for experts to put new educational products 
through their paces and then score them on relevant dimensions of perfor-
mance, as well as price. 
  Expert evaluation of services like that provided by the British School Inspec-
torate. Unlike input accountability, this type of evaluation focuses on reveal-
ing processes and hard-to-measure outcomes. And, unlike the Consumer 
Reports model, such evaluations draw more explicitly on informed, subjective 
judgment and far less on laboratory-style experimentation. 
  Data reflecting user experiences—essentially, drawing on the wisdom of 
crowds. TripAdvisor, eBay, and Amazon allow the public to readily access 
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quality rankings, while also letting users offer detailed accounts of their 
experiences with providers. Unlike professional rankings, these results do 
not aspire to be systematic or scientific; but for that reason they are especially 
well suited to flagging narrow or particular concerns. 
It is not essential that all users access or employ these data; it is necessary 
only that enough do so that others can follow their lead, and that providers have 
reason to be responsive. In studying consumer behavior in other sectors, econo-
mists have suggested that the critical mass needed for such a “tipping point” is 
probably in the vicinity of between one-fifth and two-fifths of users. (In the case 
of technology, however, the influence of a small group of tech-savvy early adopt-
ers is legendary.)
One other weakness of market-based quality control in education rests on 
the fact that paper credentials, such as a certificate of mastery or a high school 
diploma, have some value—whether or not the recipient has actually learned 
anything. Education providers can satisfy customers by helping them acquire 
degrees or certificates that they covet, even if those credentials signify no actual 
educational attainments. This practice is particularly common in the “credit 
recovery” segment of the K–12 digital sector. In higher education, the term 
“diploma mill” has historically referred to institutions that provide a diploma in 
return for little or no demonstrated performance. The crude market equivalent 
is cash for diplomas. In most transactions, such a deal wouldn’t make sense—
few consumers would write a check for a car that lacks an engine. In education, 
however, there is some value to even a hollow credential. 
Guarding against such chicanery will require some combination of exter-
nal graduation exams (to demonstrate that students have learned the requisite 
content), other forms of outcome regulation, and potentially input regulation. 
However, it is again worth noting that there are no perfect solutions. The diploma-
mill problem is one that accreditors have struggled with for decades with mixed 
success. They have tried to address it via input requirements that monitor whether 
institutions have the requisite number of books in their library, appropriately 
credentialed faculty, an acceptable student-teacher ratio, sufficient seat time, 
passable campus facilities, and so forth. The consequences of such regulation 
are particularly severe for online providers, as they force providers to assume a 
number of unnecessary costs or risk being denied accreditation. 
It is not yet clear how savvy educators and parents will prove to be in the 
digital-learning marketplace. They will have some opportunity to observe online 
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instruction and monitor the outcomes, but the amount that they will be able to 
glean and their vigilance are not yet known (and are likely to vary tremendously). 
Reformers must also be wary that any efforts to monitor providers could fall 
prey to a modern-day Horace’s Compromise, where students are free to coast in 
return for turning a blind eye to mediocre instruction; hard experience teaches 
that youths have typically been quite happy to embrace lax instruction if it means 
less work for them. Because participation in markets is ultimately a voluntary 
transaction, the risk that both sides might choose mediocrity is real, so long as 
even unearned credentials have value. Policymakers must either decide the risk 
is minimal or devise safeguards that counter or police such behaviors (such as 
insisting upon graduation exams that penalize students who have opted for insuf-
ficiently rigorous instruction). 
Balancing the Three Quality-control Mechanisms in the Digital Era
Education posed enormous quality-control challenges even before the advent of 
digital learning. Any given approach to regulating inputs, basing accountability 
on outcomes, or trusting markets brings risks, imperfections, and unintended 
consequences. Though these negatives cannot be eradicated, the alternative—no 
quality control at all—is far worse. So we’re well advised to recognize and ac-
knowledge the problems with available tools and mechanisms and then do our 
best to monitor, minimize, and combat them. 
Regulating inputs like class size, instructional time, and staff credentials of-
fers some minimal assurance as to what digital providers are actually doing, but 
carries a high cost in terms of stifling potential innovation, customization, and 
cost-efficiency. Policing outcomes offers the opportunity to ensure that providers 
are delivering results that meet a given standard for pupil growth or achievement, 
but encourages gamesmanship and disputes over the right metrics, even as it de-
ters providers whose service doesn’t map neatly onto existing outcome measures. 
Markets offer diversity and scope for customization, but invite shoddy providers 
to profit, allow some families to be taken advantage of, and encourage online 
providers to focus more on marketing than on delivering a high-quality service. 
The risks can be mitigated, if not eliminated, by thoughtful design and by 
combining these approaches judiciously. But there is no golden mean or foolproof 
formula. (See the sidebar “How Might Quality Control Work in Practice?”) Vari-
ous combinations mostly alleviate some concerns by posing new ones. Hence, 
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How Might Quality Control Work in Practice? 
Presume that state policymakers wish to aggressively embrace digital learning but, 
for the reasons discussed earlier, are unwilling to leave questions of quality to con-
sumer choice or to the market. What then? First, they could stipulate that for whole-
school providers or providers of currently assessed courses (i.e., the instruction for 
which conventional measures of performance already exist), acceptable performance 
will be spelled out in terms of student outcomes. One challenge is that many state 
assessments may measure student proficiency in a subject without gauging student 
growth, even though the more relevant measure of provider quality is growth rather 
than an absolute level of achievement. Unless growth is taken into account, there 
is a huge incentive for digital providers to recruit high-achieving students (who will 
post terrific results) and to shy away from low-achievers (who may learn a lot but still 
not be proficient). Just as in the brick-and-mortar world, these challenges require the 
attention to unintended consequences that has too often eluded policymakers.
Second, for those providers offering courses or units for which such outcomes 
cannot (currently) be measured, policymakers leery of trusting the market have two 
options. One is to put forward a set of input regulations governing the time, man-
ner, and nature of provision for at least this set of providers. The other is to permit 
these providers to proffer evidence of their own that documents their effectiveness, 
though policymakers would need to be confident that their education officials could 
distinguish acceptable evidence from unacceptable. To help this along, policymak-
ers must opt to set up an input-driven process, but agree to provide a waiver from 
teacher credentials, hours of instruction, and class size for those providers that can 
prove to an independently constituted review board that their student outcomes 
pass muster.
Third, school and district officials would be empowered to contract with any 
provider that has met the state’s approval criteria. They can opt for whole-course or 
more specialized providers, and can integrate them into their offerings as they wish. 
Finally, families would make choices among the offerings, both the “schools” 
and the courses offered by those schools. As they do with Advanced Placement 
or vocational education, school officials will inevitably try to steer the choices that 
families make. But families, armed with multiple sources of information from online 
communities and philanthropically supported third parties, will ultimately choose 
from the array of options yielded by the state’s approval process and the decisions of 
local, charter, and virtual school officials.
A bucolic vision? Certainly not. A messy, flawed system sure to be plagued by 
instances of mediocrity, rigidity, and bad decision making? Assuredly. But also a 
sensible, flexible framework that realistically and responsibly mixes and matches our 
three approaches.
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given our scant experience with digital provision, it seems prudent to avoid 
sweeping national policies or requirements, at least at this stage. 
While talk of assessment often trends toward the hypertechnical, the truth is 
that accountability and quality control are not technical exercises. Instead, they 
require fundamental judgments about how to weigh the risks and opportunities 
posed by mediocrity, red tape, standardized outcome measures, and markets. 
While the details of any approach will prove as crucial as they are variable, it is 
possible to discern the outlines of a blended approach that seems a sensible way 
forward for digital learning. 
The first step is to create a relatively uncomplicated vendor-approval process 
that ensures minimal fiduciary and academic standards are being met. Providers 
should have to document to a designated public entity that their books are clean 
and to report basic metrics for services provided. For those providers that offer 
certain categories of services—especially services that directly impact student 
achievement—it’s reasonable to have a state review process that features some 
kind of authorization and renewal. 
Second, as providers deliver their wares—and as families choose among them 
and students engage with them—it is essential that some institution or institu-
tions collect various kinds of data on performance. Data collection is apt to be a 
state responsibility but can easily be delegated to any number of third-party moni-
tors, each of which would bring its own strengths and weaknesses. But whether 
a state agency acts directly or relies on others, a wide array of data needs to be 
collected, gains measured and analyzed, and findings made public in transparent 
fashion. Just as important is to gather and disseminate information on consumer 
satisfaction and expert reviews of programs and providers.
Third, families need to acquire a vested interest in cost-effectiveness and new 
opportunities by being given control over some discrete portion of spending. This 
step is essential if parents are to approach schooling as more than a unitary service 
and to start thinking about the quality of particular services, and if education 
officials are to enjoy the encouragement and support they need in order for them 
to revisit and change deep-seated routines.
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Conclusion
In the end, creating an authentic and vibrant environment for high-quality online 
learning is about creating a new world of schooling that is hospitable to unbun-
dling. That world will demand that we make pivotal shifts. 
First, we must begin to think of education in terms of segmentation, not just 
whole schools. Second, we must begin to gauge educational quality in terms of 
cost-effectiveness as well as student achievement. Third, we must see that parents 
and educators benefit when they make choices that are cost-effective as well as 
educationally beneficial. Finally, we must provide both parents and educators 
with workable, comparable metrics by which to gauge both cost and effectiveness. 
The challenges involved in effecting these shifts are simultaneously familiar 
and new. In a sense, they are essentially the same challenges—to be addressed by 
the same tools—that educators and policymakers have wrestled with for decades. 
But in their current incarnation, they can be met only with a degree of granularity, 
agility, and precision that is new to the world of K–12 schooling. 
Moving into the digital-learning era, we are burdened by our deep-seated 
habit of regarding schooling as a unitary “thing” that happens in “a building” 
rather than a suite of discrete services that can be offered in many locations. This 
creates a tendency to define improvement as “better schools,” and to discour-
age efforts to improve discrete services or components. Moreover, schooling in 
America is primarily a public service and thus subject to the demands of parti-
sans and interest groups, an arrangement that conceals from both parents and 
educators the true costs of goods and services while giving them no incentive 
to emphasize cost-effectiveness. These long-standing realities combine to stifle 
new technologies, discourage labor-saving improvements, and diminish cost-
consciousness. So it’s no great surprise that technological innovation in schooling 
has consistently disappointed. 
Changing that state of affairs means changing the rules that shape schooling. 
The most significant of these govern how schooling itself is provided, paid for, 
and evaluated. Reshaping those rules entails addressing the quadruple challenge 
described above. If the emphasis is on learning rather than mere credentialing, 
and especially if the aim is to encourage cost-effective learning, it’s necessary to 
relax input regulations in exchange for a focus on accountability as measured by 
student outcomes and parental judgments. This step means eliminating caps on 
enrollment, rules that restrict class size and student-teacher ratios, geographic 
and regulatory barriers to what online courses students may take, and “school 
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site” definitions that limit blended models where a portion of student learning 
occurs outside of a traditional school building. It also requires clarifying outcome 
measures by gauging student progress based on demonstrated competency or 
gains rather than seat time.
Transformative improvement also requires stripping away conventional rules 
governing certification and licensure so that schools can use unconventional 
personnel in instructional roles, can extend the reach of effective teachers, and 
can tap instructional talent from far away. It requires allowing schools to redefine 
instructional roles and staffing, pay, evaluation, and scheduling.
Accountability rooted in student learning requires the construction of as-
sessments that measure mastery of specific courses or, preferably, of particular 
units and skills. Freeing schools from the long-outdated nineteenth-century 
school calendar involves allowing students to take the requisite assessments at 
any point during the year. 
Finally, enabling parents and educators to select individualized online ser-
vices creates market opportunities for providers to specialize in and focus on 
meeting specific needs. Those needs might be for tutoring in specific learning 
objectives or skills or for a complete course of instruction. Making such a market 
viable requires funding models that allow fractional per-pupil funds to follow stu-
dents to individual courses, and perhaps even to individual instructional units or 
kinds of support. If dollars flow only in chunks that reflect the entire allotment per 
student, or the entire allotment of a particular course, then it will be difficult for 
digital providers to thrive while delivering anything that’s more finely grained.14
Quality control in education, to repeat, is an imperfect science, and every 
approach brings its own shortcomings. The search for the perfect quality-control 
mechanism is a futile one, just as a laissez-faire disregard for quality control 
is sure to yield practical disappointments and political backlash. The sensible 
course, when dealing with a public mission and billions in public funds, is to 
seek an arrangement that addresses concerns about malfeasance and mediocrity 
without stifling innovation—and that is able to grow and evolve as we learn and 
as technology and tools mature. A formidable task? Surely; because it is one that 
will ultimately determine whether the advent of digital learning revolutionizes 
American education or becomes just another layer of slate strapped to the roof 
of the nineteenth-century schoolhouse.
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CHAPTER THREE
The Costs of Online Learning
  By Tamara Butler Battaglino, Matt Haldeman, and Eleanor Laurans
Online learning, in its many shapes and sizes, is quickly becoming a typical part 
of the classroom experience for many of our nation’s K–12 students. As it grows, 
educators and policymakers across the country are beginning to ask the ques-
tion: What does online learning cost? While the answer to this question is a key 
starting point, by itself it has limited value. Of course there are cheaper ways to 
teach students. The key question that will eventually have to be addressed is this: 
Can online learning be better and less expensive? 
Ultimately, new technology-rich education models will need to be evaluated 
based on their productivity, that is, the results that they produce relative to the re-
quired investment. Unfortunately, within the nascent field of online learning, this 
information simply isn’t yet available. While we embrace the need to understand 
and illuminate both costs and outcomes, our goal in this chapter is to explore the 
cost issue alone. We seek, to the extent possible, to compare the costs of digital 
education on various dimensions with the costs of traditional brick-and-mortar 
schooling in order to help lay the foundation for the ultimate lens on productivity. 
This analysis is not straightforward, of course, because costs vary within 
digital education just as they do within brick-and-mortar schooling options. 
Educators and policymakers pursue online learning for different reasons and 
adopt different flavors of technology-rich models. Broadly speaking, today’s 
policymakers and educators appear to pursue online-learning solutions for one 
or more of three primary reasons: to reduce overall costs (often in response to 
budget shortfalls); to increase the range of course offerings available to students 
(such as advanced or remedial classes or unusual subject areas); or, more radi-
cally, to use technology to rethink the traditional teaching-and-learning model 
(primarily reflecting a leader’s instructional vision, but often linked to budgetary 
56
EDUCATION REFORM FOR THE DIGITAL ERA
considerations). Of course, resource allocation varies significantly across these 
categories. Some models explicitly look for savings, while others aim to free up 
resources from one area for use elsewhere.
We therefore caution readers against looking for one simple “price tag” for 
online learning, or assuming that savings necessarily translate into a lower over-
all cost per pupil. For schools that deliberately use technology to reduce costs in 
one category in order to free up resources to invest elsewhere, the “savings” are 
often an important component of the school’s overall resource-allocation strat-
egy. Still, current and future economic pressures could require both traditional 
brick-and-mortar and online schools to cut costs (or keep costs neutral) relative 
to today’s per-pupil funding levels; this is possible, but further innovation in the 
field is required to ensure that robust student outcomes are not marginalized in 
the process.
With these important caveats in place, we explore the costs and resource-
allocation strategies that have emerged in today’s online-learning landscape. We 
present average cost figures for both virtual and blended models (for definitions, 
see “Types of Models,” below). Our goal is to articulate the size and range of the 
critical cost drivers for online schools versus those for traditional brick-and-
mortar schools, in order to understand how cost categories have the potential 
to change when technology is used in the classroom. The information presented 
here results from interviews with more than fifty entrepreneurs, policy experts, 
and school leaders. These interviews informed the set of estimates regarding the 
cost of virtual and blended schools across a number of categories. As is always 
the case in a nascent, ever-changing field, the figures for online learning are not 
definitive but represent at most a helpful starting point.
Before diving into the discussion of cost, it is worth sharing a few observations 
about the historic productivity of education technology. Long before our latest 
wave of online learning and digital innovations, school districts spent enormous 
sums to equip classrooms with televisions, personal computers, laser-disc sys-
tems, VCRs, and more. Decades and billions of dollars later, it is difficult to point 
to any evidence suggesting that technology has impacted student achievement, 
graduation rates, or other outcome measures. By contrast, while public educa-
tion reform has remained frustratingly stagnant, technology has been arguably 
the major driving force of productivity improvement in many other parts of our 
economy. From investment banks to grocery stores to travel agencies, big and 
small businesses have used technology to accomplish more with less.
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Why has technology had so little impact on our nation’s public schools? 
Technology has been used predominantly to supplement the traditional model—a 
row of computers in the back of a classroom, or a smart board at the front. (For 
existing schools, the time and costs required to transition to the use of technology 
as anything but an add-on are often too difficult.) Meanwhile, the fundamental 
classroom structure (one teacher standing in front of a group of students) has 
remained the same for the past fifty-plus years. Given the lack of improved student 
outcomes, the addition of technology to classrooms has translated to the same 
output at greater cost—in other words, reduced productivity. In economics, this 
is known as Baumol’s Disease: Too often, labor-intensive organizations increase 
expenses without improving productivity.1 
As noted above, our hope is that any investment in classroom technology 
leads to an increase in student outcomes. The limited availability of reliable 
and consistent cost and outcomes data prevents robust conversations related to 
productivity. Particularly for those entrepreneurs who aim to use technology 
to rethink the classroom, an interesting debate has emerged in the field as to 
whether bold new models must demonstrate that they are at least cost neutral at 
their inception. One camp contends that cost pressures are what will ultimately 
drive wider-scale adoption, and so new models must be cheaper from day one. 
Others argue that the degree of innovation taking place in some classrooms today 
requires a temporary respite from focusing on cost. This approach seeks solutions 
designed to address the needs of students and teachers, with the business model 
left to be revisited once the appropriate solutions have been identified. Given cur-
rent market dynamics and investments by philanthropic organizations, we will 
likely continue to see a range of innovation that includes both cost-neutral and 
resource-intensive solutions. We will likely also see some innovations accompa-
nied by lower net costs. This variation is healthy for the field. Costs and resource 
allocation must continue to be an active topic for conversation as innovation and 
evaluation unfold.
Types of Models
A decade ago, the majority of online learning was 100 percent virtual in nature—
i.e., carried out entirely outside of brick-and-mortar schools. Yet today, a wide 
range of online models currently exists. (In a recent report, authors Michael Horn 
and Heather Staker profile forty-eight unique approaches.2) For the purposes of 
examining costs, we will focus on two broad categories: virtual and blended. 
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Virtual
In virtual schools (examples include Florida Virtual, K12 Inc., and Connections 
Academy), all instruction takes place online. Students still interact with live 
teachers, listen to lectures, work on homework, ask questions, and more, but all 
activities occur at a distance, with interactions facilitated by technology. 
Virtual options currently serve both full- and part-time students. The former 
often either (a) have significant travel schedules or other constraints on their 
ability to engage fully with in-classroom learning on a regular basis, or (b) are 
frustrated (for whatever reason) with their neighborhood schools. The part-time 
students often take one or more courses online to supplement the offerings avail-
able through their local brick-and-mortar schools; many schools, particularly 
smaller schools and those in rural areas, struggle to provide students with a wide 
range of course options (e.g., advanced or remedial courses not already offered, 
or specialized course topics). Although predominantly purchased by schools 
on behalf of their students, online instruction can be and is purchased by other 
agencies as well (e.g., prisons, hospitals, day-care centers, and military bases).
Example: Florida Virtual School (FLVS) is the nation’s first statewide, online 
public high school and currently offers options across all grade levels for both 
full-time and part-time students. Instruction takes place online; students select 
their courses and then complete assignments, quizzes, and tests at their own 
pace. Homeschooled students in and out of Florida can take online courses; 
Florida Virtual has also partnered with many school districts nationwide to pro-
vide online supplemental options for students. The school, for instance, offers 
more than a dozen online AP courses for high school juniors and seniors. 
Blended
In blended schools, by comparison, students attend brick-and-mortar schools 
where they alternate between online and in-person instruction. (Examples in-
clude Carpe Diem, KIPP Empower LA, and Rocketship Education.) In many of 
these schools, educators regard technology as a tool used to personalize instruc-
tion that is integrated into the overall school model. In theory, though still in the 
early stages, technology can help to provide a range of content and modalities for 
each student depending upon his or her academic strengths, prior achievement, 
areas for development, interests, and learning styles. We examine two main types 
of blended models, rotational and flex.
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Under the rotational model, students in some blended schools spend a spe-
cific amount of time (typically one or two periods a day) participating in online 
learning. The online-learning sessions are a defined portion of each school day, 
and students receive technology-enabled personalized instruction within those 
blocks of time.
Example: Rocketship Education is a California-based charter school network 
focused on parent empowerment, teacher development, and individualized 
learning. Rocketship combines traditional classroom teaching with individual-
ized instruction through its “Learning Lab,” in which students spend one-on-
one time on computers utilizing adaptive educational programs and receive 
instruction in intensive tutor-led small groups to master basic reading and math 
skills. The Rocketship model generates approximately $500,000 annually in 
cost savings per school of 450 students, which can then be reallocated toward 
higher teacher salaries and professional development, among other things. 
Additionally, as a result of these cost savings, Rocketship schools are able to 
operate sustainably on traditional public school funding and without additional 
philanthropic funds.
Under the flex model, blended schools utilize a “workplace model,” where 
students follow their own path online, checking in with an instructor when they 
have questions. The amount and nature of the time spent online varies by student 
and by day—and sometimes even by hour. The level of technology-enabled per-
sonalized instruction is driven by students’ needs on any particular topic or day 
and is thus less predictable, so these models are often referred to as “flex” models.
Example: At Flex Academy, a full-time California-based blended school using the 
K12 Inc. curriculum, the educator-to-student ratio is about one to twenty-five 
(with a credentialed teacher-to-student ratio of approximately one to forty-two), 
but class size is typically five to eight students. Students often pursue online 
learning or work on projects with supervision by paraprofessionals, and spend 
only a portion of their time participating in face-to-face classes with creden-
tialed teachers. Students progress through online curricula at their own pace, 
complete hands-on projects and science labs, and connect one-on-one or in 
small groups with instructors when they need specific concepts explained or 
when the teachers want to engage or inspire the students with a certain educa-
tional activity. Flex Academy parlays its labor-cost savings into more spending 
on curriculum and technology.
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Resource-allocation Cost Categories
Historically, public school districts have had relatively little budget flexibility, 
because so much of their budgets is tied into multiyear contracts, tenured staff, 
and other fixed obligations. Recently, however, innovative technology-rich school 
models have begun to experiment with new ways to repurpose limited dollars. 
Many of these innovators are charter schools or vendors to traditional schools, 
which have the flexibility to pursue options unavailable to many traditional 
district schools. 
While we frame such cost changes as “savings” below, many entrepreneurs in 
the field view online learning as an opportunity for reallocation of resources away 
from an existing category and toward a new strategy aligned with the school’s 
overall vision, which may or may not yield net savings in the end. Rocketship 
Education, for instance, “saves” about $500,000 per school of 450 students per 
year by decreasing teacher and facilities costs relative to traditional elementary 
schools through its online Learning Lab. But as part of its model, the organization 
reinvests this money in talent development, academic deans, response to interven-
tion, higher teacher salaries, and future scaling. Other virtual or blended schools 
have experimented with reallocating savings toward lowering student-teacher 
ratios, improving school facilities, and more.
Figure 3.1 outlines the variation in online-learning models. The average per-
pupil figure of approximately $10,000, not including central administrative costs, 
combines all public school types (elementary, middle, and high school) across the 
United States, without regard to district or state variations.3 The virtual-school 
number represents an estimate for full-time high school students. The blended 
figure represents middle school students, as some of the most promising blended 
models are middle schools. Additionally, as scale can be a critical factor in de-
termining ongoing costs, our cost numbers reflect schools with enrollments of 
approximately five hundred full-time equivalent students. 
As is evident in figure 3.1, the traditional school model spends over half of its 
budget on labor, with the majority of the remainder allocated to school operations. 
Content and technology costs combined are a tiny fraction of overall costs. A 
blended model, by comparison, has the potential to save approximately $1,100 per 
student (11 percent). By significantly reducing school-operations costs, a virtual 
school can potentially save approximately $3,600 per student, a savings of more 
than a third over a traditional school. These cost estimates reflect the current 
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variation in the field. They are not a guarantee of quality, given insufficient data 
on student outcomes associated with the range of models.
One important note: For online and blended students, costs are sometimes 
reallocated in different ways that do not mean savings from an overall systems 
standpoint. A virtual school, for instance, may not charge for certain services 
(i.e., special education services) that are provided by the home district. This does 
not represent savings from a system level; it simply means that costs are divided 
between the virtual school and a student’s home district. 
The cost figures outlined in figure 3.1 represent estimates gathered from avail-
able public documents and conversations with experts and vendors within the 
field. A wide variety of funding levels exists within online learning; for example, 
research on virtual-school funding reveals that virtual schools are operating 
on funding levels that range from below $4,000 per student to above $9,000 per 
student. Given this fluctuation, we also provide an estimate for variation within 
each figure (although outlier models at both the high and low ends do not neces-
sarily fall within these bands).
Note once more that these figures outline current cost estimates within the 
field, as opposed to ideal or recommended expenditures. They do not speak to 
school quality or student outcomes, and are simply meant to provide a framework 
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Table 3.1: Cost Bands for Virtual- and Blended-School Models
A. VIRTUAL MODEL
Category Cost 
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work remotely)
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  Time spent in computer-facilitated learning
   Human capital during computer-facilitated 
learning




  Content quality (level of personalization)





  Student-laptop ratio




   Potential small cost savings around facilities and 




   May potentially change depending on student 





The Costs of Online Learning
for important resource-allocation decisions at blended and virtual schools. 
Note, too, that state funding levels often drive the cost base for online learning; 
the ability and willingness of states to fund online learning sets the baseline for 
online costs. In this analysis, we attempt to separate costs and funding as much 
as possible.
The next few pages outline the five primary cost-driving categories that 
differentiate schools’ resource-allocation strategies: labor, content acquisition, 
technology and infrastructure, school operations, and student-support services. 
Within each category, certain expenses are nonnegotiable, while others have the 
potential to be cost-savings levers. Table 3.1 outlines the important key cost con-
siderations for each category (and is subject to the same caveats and conditions 
as noted above for figure 3.1).
Cost Driver 1: Labor
Labor (which typically makes up well over half of district budgets) represents 
the largest opportunity to rethink resource allocation and seek possible “sav-
ings.” Not surprisingly, online schools vary widely in terms of human-capital 
structure, including student-teacher ratios, salaries, and more. At its most basic 
level, calculating labor costs per pupil is a simple equation with two variables: the 
number of instructors and the average costs associated with those instructors 
(recognizing that these may vary at different points in the school day). Reducing 
labor costs through the use of technology necessarily involves either decreasing 
the student-instructor ratio or reducing average instructor payout, typically by 
modifying the overall instructor mix—that is, combining the use of traditional 
teachers with other instructors such as paraprofessionals or aides.
Two related costs that are often overlooked in blended and virtual schools 
are professional development and IT costs. Training is a critical component for 
online schools, as most teachers (and other staff) must learn new skills that al-
low them to be effective within a new school model. Additionally, virtual-school 
and blended-school models often require additional IT support—and many such 
schools employ one or more IT support staffers.
Labor in the Virtual Model
As table 3.1 (on page 62) indicates, an average estimate for labor costs in the vir-
tual model is $2,600 per student, with potential variation of about 15 percent in 
either direction. Along this range are virtual schools with labor models relatively 
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similar to those of traditional schools as well as virtual schools with models 
that significantly reduce labor costs. Among the former are virtual schools that 
maintain a ratio of one teacher to twenty-five students (similar to traditional 
districts) and pay virtual teachers according to the same pay schedules as teach-
ers in brick-and-mortar schools, resulting in similar labor costs. At times, the 
decision to invest in comparable levels of instructional expenditures has been 
driven by statewide collective-bargaining agreements (required by state law) 
and at other times by school leaders’ instructional vision (which could reflect a 
commitment to typical student-teacher ratios or varied approaches to staffing 
levels and structures).4
On the other end of the cost spectrum, virtual schools with lower labor costs 
typically either (a) increase student-teacher ratios, or (b) reduce teacher salaries 
by transitioning to a part-time or paraprofessional workforce. It is interesting to 
note that student-teacher ratios at virtual elementary schools are often signifi-
cantly higher than at virtual middle schools or high schools that have additional 
support expenses such as guidance counselors and others. Elementary schools 
also often require that a parent or someone else play the role of a live “coach” 
who assists the virtual teacher. The cost of the parent “coach” is not included in 
the cost estimates for the elementary school alternatives, which is why we have 
focused our analysis on middle school blended models and high school full-time 
virtual models. As an additional cost-saving measure, online schools may resort 
to virtual professional instruction (i.e., professional development using a webcam 
and online forums), in this way saving money on teacher training and facilities. 
Although these costs are often overlooked, virtual schools typically have a 
principal and other administrative supports. A virtual school may potentially see 
some administrative savings by eliminating an assistant principal position (for 
example), but the addition of necessary IT staff often cancels out any potential 
savings.
We observe some correlation between lower-cost labor models and lower 
overall per-pupil funding, but also see different labor models in schools operating 
within the same states with the same funding levels. Thus external factors explain 
some, but not all, of the variation in labor models.
Labor in the Blended Model
The blended-learning model typically has smaller labor savings than the virtual 
model, as blended schools inevitably have labor needs (i.e., lunch duty, detention) 
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that virtual schools do not have. These blended schools are also unlikely to experi-
ence any cost savings in terms of reduced administrative expenses. An estimate 
for blended-school labor costs is $5,500 per student, again fluctuating by approxi-
mately 10 to 15 percent on either end. Three drivers dictate labor costs at blended 
schools: time spent by students in computer-facilitated learning, the type of staff 
employed to supervise this computer-facilitated learning, and instructional staff-
ing models for the remainder of the day:
  Time spent in computer-facilitated learning. Blended models vary dramatically 
in the percentage of the school day that students spend online. At schools 
like AdvancePath or Flex Academy that use a flex model, students spend the 
majority of their time online (or working on independent projects); those at-
tending schools like KIPP Empower that use a rotational model spend only 
a period or two online daily.
  Human capital during computer-facilitated learning. Some school models 
have realized savings by employing lower-cost staff to monitor and support 
students while they use computers. At New York City’s School of One, for 
instance, student-teachers or paraprofessionals (with lower average salaries) 
supervise online lessons, while certified teachers are used to deliver live 
instruction. 
  Human capital for the remainder of the day. For many blended schools, the 
school day beyond the online portion is unchanged. However, some blended 
models have chosen to rethink the remainder of the day, often by repurpos-
ing funds that have been made available by lower-cost online portions of the 
day. For instance, some schools have significantly lower class size; others have 
moved to a longer school day.
Cost Driver 2: Content Acquisition and Development
Content costs in a traditional brick-and-mortar school are relatively small com-
pared to total per-pupil spending; some districts spend less than $200 per student 
on instructional materials. However, the very definition of the word content 
changes significantly for virtual and blended schools. In a traditional school 
setting, content typically refers to the supporting materials used by teachers for 
face-to-face instruction: textbooks, workbooks, manipulatives, videos, instruc-
tional games, and more. 
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Online schools, by comparison, spend content dollars on tools that traditional 
schools typically do not use, such as data integration/management tools—which 
are often sophisticated (and expensive). Not surprisingly, costs in this category 
can vary tremendously. Some online schools spend even less on content than 
traditional schools, utilizing mostly open-source and teacher-created materials. 
Alternatively, other models have opted to spend millions of dollars on content 
development in order to produce unique, proprietary learning-management 
systems that are often used across multiple schools. There are three primary 
types of content, each used to differing degrees by full-time virtual programs 
and blended programs.
  Open-source/teacher-created content. This option is typically the least resource 
intensive; content is either posted online free of charge (e.g., web videos from 
Khan Academy) or developed by teachers who are paid a small fee. A free 
content-management system (e.g., Moodle) can be used to integrate teacher-
created content. Although schools can minimize or reduce expenditures on 
content through this option, they may invest more in labor to manage and 
maintain these homegrown systems. These labor costs are often understated 
because they use existing staff time, but the opportunity costs associated with 
these efforts can be significant and should be considered.
  Off-the-shelf online content. Purchasing content requires expenditures on 
individual courses or bundles of courses. For online content, the major 
distinction is whether the course comes with a virtual instructor to assist 
students. Course pricing is typically about $75 per course without instruc-
tors, compared to between about $200 and $400 with instructors. (This is 
calculated per semester-long course, though courses can be bundled and/
or priced on a per-seat basis as well.) The price of courses without instruc-
tors continues to decline; once developed, these courses can be delivered to 
almost any school for minimal cost and can be recycled over time. Courses 
with instructors, by comparison, appear to have more stable (and recurrent) 
costs, as scale does not materially impact the human-capital costs.
  Large-scale development of content. At costs of millions of dollars (both 
public and private), some districts, states, and school operators have chosen 
to hire large content-development teams to create courseware, proprietary 
learning-management systems, and more. Given the significant levels of up-
front investment required, content development can make sense to the extent 
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that a district, state, or school operator expects to achieve significant scale of 
enrollments and to amortize the costs over time. (Our ongoing cost estimates 
consider only school content purchases; for more on the issue of “build versus 
buy,” see the “Start-up, Size, and Scale” section below.) 
Content Acquisition in the Virtual Model
Many full-time virtual schools choose one of the latter two options listed above, 
either purchasing off-the-shelf content or investing in large-scale development. 
We estimate that content costs for virtual schools average approximately $800 
per FTE student, but these fluctuate significantly. Included in this estimate is 
the cost of courseware, a content-management system, and students’ materials 
(this cost includes purchase and shipping). Our estimates (visible in table 3.1 on 
page 62) reflect a school that has chosen to purchase content rather than develop 
its own—which is increasingly common for virtual schools given the rise of the 
Common Core standards and wide variety of online-content vendors offering 
courseware to virtual schools. Given that labor costs are already included in our 
model, we also assume that the virtual school has chosen to purchase content 
offerings that do not provide access to an instructor, as virtual schools typically 
employ their own teachers. Although an individual course may cost about $75 per 
student, offerings for full-time virtual schools are typically priced on a per-seat 
(as opposed to per-course) basis, and access to a full suite of courses can cost as 
little as $200 per student.
Even for schools that purchase off-the-shelf content, however, price varies 
depending on the complexity of the product and level of services provided. More-
expensive courses are often highly personalized; individual students receive dif-
ferent content in order to meet their learning needs more directly. For instance, 
for some content, results of student performance on integrated tests and quizzes 
fully or partially determine the content students receive. These vendors will also 
often mail students a range of physical materials, including textbooks and sci-
ence equipment for experiments, as opposed to providing them with electronic 
materials.
Content Acquisition in the Blended Model 
As at virtual schools, the cost of content at blended schools includes courseware, a 
content-management system, and student materials. Electronic or online content 
costs at blended schools are often lower than at virtual schools, however, simply 
because students spend less time engaged with online courseware. For blended 
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schools, we estimate a content cost of $400 per student (fluctuating by 50 percent), 
which assumes that a school purchases off-the-shelf products (this would be in 
addition to the cost of content for the off-line portion of the day). A handful of 
blended schools have chosen to develop their own online courses from a variety 
of open-source content, which drives down the cost of content. For instance, eC-
ADEMY, a districtwide program within the Albuquerque Public Schools system, 
represents a low-cost approach; the school pays its teachers a small fee to develop 
their own courses. With the increase in open-source content, and a variety of free 
online options, some schools choose to reallocate content dollars to other areas.
One important cost trade-off (in terms of both labor and content) for a 
blended school is the amount of time that students spend online. More online 
time generally means fewer teachers, but also requires robust (and often relatively 
expensive) content to substitute for reduced teacher time. Typically, the shift 
toward more online instruction tends to produce net savings for the school, as 
reduced labor costs outweigh increased content costs.
Cost Driver 3: Technology and Infrastructure
Technology, often a minimal portion of a traditional school’s budget (about $200 
per pupil) is a far more significant expense for online schools. Infrastructure is 
often a critical roadblock as traditional brick-and-mortar school systems look to 
integrate blended and virtual options. For a traditional school looking to transi-
tion to blended learning, the key question is what infrastructure (i.e., hardware, 
software, connectivity) already exists. The answer could mean a difference in 
hundreds of thousands of dollars.
Technology in the Virtual Model
Technology costs have the potential to be a large portion of a virtual school’s 
costs, with an average estimate of $1,200 per student. Regardless of the virtual-
school model, schools must pay for teacher instructional devices (i.e., computers 
or tablets); infrastructure (i.e., connectivity, storage, and servers), which are often 
outsourced to vendors; and maintenance. Virtual schools may opt for additional 
expenses either to (a) offer their students instructional devices (each his or her 
own computer or tablet), as well as Internet connectivity subsidies; or (b) offer 
teachers additional teaching aids, such as webcams or document cameras.
69
The Costs of Online Learning
Technology in the Blended Model
Technology is not necessarily a large cost for a blended school, with an average 
of $500 per student. Like virtual schools, however, blended schools must pay for 
teacher hardware, infrastructure, and maintenance. Some rotational blended 
schools do not need to pay more for technology than a traditional school with a 
robust computer lab. On the other hand, models like those used by Flex Academy 
or School of One demand a one-to-one student-to-computer ratio and wireless 
connectivity throughout the school building.
Cost Driver 4: School Operations
From transportation to custodians to food services, traditional schools spend 
significant amounts of money (typically about 15 to 25 percent of total budgets) 
on noninstructional operations. In some cases, virtual and blended schools have 
managed to reduce these costs to almost nothing; in other cases, they actually 
pay more within these categories. 
School Operations in the Virtual Model
Virtual schools typically spend far less on school operations ($1,000 per student) 
than an average traditional school, and some less resource-intensive models have 
found ways to reduce these figures further. Virtual schools experience savings 
on custodians and food-service employees, but they do incur some operational 
costs. Virtual schools also have facilities costs; in most states, they are required to 
have a physical location for school administration and staff. Some virtual schools 
require teachers to work from a central location, while others allow them to work 
from home—a decision that obviously has implications for facilities costs borne 
by the taxpayer. And some resource-intensive virtual schools spend money on 
field trips, student get-togethers, and related transportation expenses.
School Operations in the Blended Model
In theory, blended schools have the potential to save money on both facilities and 
transportation, but few schools have begun to realize this potential. As a result, 
our cost estimate of $1,700 per student is only slightly lower than the average at 
traditional schools. A system of staggered student schedules could potentially 
reduce the needed building size or the number of students requiring transporta-
tion on a daily basis—although facilities and busing are typically managed at 
the district level, sometimes even for charter schools. Rocketship Education and 
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Carpe Diem are two of the pioneers in this area and have actually sought and/
or built smaller facilities as a result of the online options they provide students. 
Cost Driver 5: Student-support Services
Guidance counselors, special education teachers, and other student-support ser-
vices (which typically cost up to about $800 per student in a traditional setting) 
cannot be ignored when considering the costs of online learning. At blended 
schools, these additional costs (mostly labor) are more easily aligned to the regular 
school day. At virtual schools, these support services can be significant expenses 
that require in-person visits.
Student-support Services in the Virtual Model
Student-support services are often overlooked in virtual-school cost models, but 
they can be a significant expense when factoring in the appropriate support ratios 
(counselors or teachers to students) and the associated travel costs for live support. 
Guidance counselors and special education teachers have a critical role within 
all schools (online and otherwise). Some virtual schools have sought to reduce 
expenses by combining roles (i.e., principals or teachers playing guidance roles 
as well), though limited data are available on the efficacy of the various models. 
The cost estimate we provide for virtual-school student supports is similar to the 
average for a traditional school, at roughly $800 per student per year, although it 
certainly varies depending on the student populations served. In reality, although 
many virtual schools provide student-support services at lower cost, this figure is 
representative of school models that are investing in meaningful levels of student 
supports to ensure the development of the entire student. We expect to observe 
continued innovation in the area of student supports in the short and long term.
Student-support Services in the Blended Model
Student-support services at blended schools are also likely to cost about the same 
as traditional support. We have assumed an estimate of approximately $800 per 
pupil, similar to the virtual-school costs described above. Blended-school models 
often find innovative ways to reallocate resources, but given the current state of 
the field, we have not assumed a reduction in student-support services. Again, 
this is an area where we expect to see ongoing innovation.
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Start-up, Size, and Scale
Start-up costs are a critical component of virtual- and blended-school develop-
ment—as of any major innovation in education (and other fields). Online learning 
offers new resource-allocation possibilities in the long term, but it is accompanied 
by a number of unique start-up costs, including content development and acquisi-
tion, hardware, software, storage, servers, and more. For a state or district look-
ing to price out a new virtual or blended school, the costs associated with online 
learning before a single student enrolls can easily reach the millions.
Policymakers and school operators have three options in tackling start-up 
costs for virtual schools: (a) purchasing a complete turnkey solution from an out-
side provider (resulting in limited start-up costs incurred by the state or district 
and ongoing expenditures with one or more external vendor); (b) purchasing 
content, servers, and other products à la carte from outside vendors (some start-
up costs and required ongoing vendor support); or (c) developing an entirely 
homegrown solution including content (high start-up costs incurred by the state 
or district, investment in internal capacity required to sustain operations on an 
ongoing basis). States and districts looking to develop an online school have to 
answer this ultimate “build versus buy” question: Should they spend millions in 
start-up costs tailoring a product to individual needs, or build on the experience 
and research of an established vendor? Ultimately, the build-versus-buy question 
hinges on two things: the vision for scale and the need for customization. States 
and districts that build their own online offering typically either expect sufficient 
enrollment to cover initial investments or are working to develop an innovative 
or customized model not currently offered by outside providers.
It is important to remember, though, that start-up costs don’t have to be a 
barrier to developing online-school models. Today, states, districts, and school 
operators can benefit from organizations that have already developed effective 
models. In states such as Georgia, Wisconsin, and Pennsylvania, outside providers 
have set up virtual schools, bearing almost all up-front costs, in exchange for per-
pupil funding typically between $5,000 and $7,000 (which includes a management 
fee of about 10 to 15 percent). In this arrangement, an outside vendor incurs the 
start-up costs and recoups the investment over time, reflected in higher annual 
operating costs for the state or district.
Aside from facilities (which are a significant start-up cost for blended schools), 
the initial costs for virtual and blended schools are reasonably similar. Course 
development and technology (hardware, connectivity, servers, etc.) are two large 
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cost buckets, but both can be acquired through leases from outside providers for 
an annual fee. Adequate planning time for the principal and school-leadership 
team is another critical investment for blended, virtual, and traditional schools. 
Often overlooked, professional development can also be a substantial addi-
tional cost for virtual and blended schools. Most traditional teacher training and 
preparation is geared toward traditional models of instruction, and retraining 
teachers (and rethinking instructor roles) is a new area that many schools are 
just beginning to tackle. Finally, recruiting and marketing to students, as well as 
community outreach, are often significant concerns for new, innovative school 
models that might potentially face skepticism from parents.
One important note: Almost all new virtual and blended schools to date have 
been start-ups; very few schools have attempted to convert from a traditional 
school to either a virtual or a blended model, although some exceptions do ex-
ist. For many schools, the barriers of converting are partially financial, but also 
cultural. A switch to a blended-learning (or virtual-learning) model requires 
expectation-setting and training for both students and teachers as they transition 
to a new mind-set and new roles.
Additionally, in virtual/blended education—as in any major innovation—
there are “regulatory costs,” i.e., add-on costs of complying with various rules 
and conditions and constraints. Whether fire-code regulations for a new blend-
ed-school building or a requirement limiting enrollment in a virtual school to 
residents of a single district, these regulatory costs must also be factored into any 
business model for online schools.
The Future of Online-learning Costs
Amidst the excitement and promise of new virtual- and blended-school models, it 
is easy to lose sight of the fact that online learning is an immature, still-developing 
sector. No discussion of the economics of online learning is complete without ac-
knowledgment of the changes the field has experienced over the past decade—and 
the changes that are undoubtedly on the way over the next decade and beyond.
Growing supply (the number and capacity of vendors offering tools and 
services) plus increasing demand (willingness of states, districts, policymakers, 
students, and parents to experiment with new school models) suggests that online 
learning will continue to accelerate and new models will continue to proliferate. 
Interviews with states, districts, entrepreneurs, and vendors revealed a wide range 
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of possibilities for the future of online-learning costs. This section considers the 
future of our first two cost drivers, labor and content acquisition.
The Future of Labor Costs
The next decade will undoubtedly continue to encourage the redefinition of the 
teacher’s role, a topic discussed briefly here and more fully explored in the first 
chapter of this volume. Traditional classroom teachers face extraordinary chal-
lenges—often a thirty-to-one student-teacher ratio and students with varying 
educational needs, interests, and learning styles in the same classroom. Teaching 
is multiple jobs rolled into one; schools of the future will likely continue to search 
for ways that technology can ease this challenge while boosting instructional 
effectiveness. Many entrepreneurs are beginning to break down the various ele-
ments of a teacher’s day and look for points of opportunity for technology to take 
over certain of these components, freeing up teacher time to focus elsewhere, such 
as on direct student instruction.
How will technology redefine the role of teacher? First, online learning can 
redefine who can become a teacher and the range of potential roles for adults who 
support student learning. Traditional school environments require teachers who 
can work full time in a prescribed setting. Online learning provides teachers with 
flexibility regarding where and how long they work, which in turn creates the 
potential for flexible hours and salaries for teachers based on experience, interests, 
and expertise. And as technology disaggregates the role of the teacher, opportuni-
ties may arise for teachers with different levels of experience, training, and skill to 
take on different roles, with the possibility to differentiate teacher compensation 
based on those factors and teachers’ relative importance in the school.
Second, online learning will likely continue to increase the amount of indi-
vidual attention that teachers can provide to their students. Today’s teachers must 
spend time planning content (and differentiation strategies) for the next school 
day, identifying individual needs, grading student assessments, and otherwise 
preparing for class. Online learning, however, has the potential to do some of 
that work for teachers, allowing teachers to spend more time spent with students. 
Finally, online learning has the potential to redefine professional development 
for teachers. In theory, online learning requires many different types of instruc-
tional roles and should enable teachers to progress at different paces and take on 
different levels of responsibility (e.g., teaching virtually, in-person, or for small 
or large groups). The data generated by online learning will provide a wealth of 
information that can be used to tailor professional development to the unique 
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needs of individual teachers. Just as online learning can personalize instruction 
for students, digitally enabled professional development has the potential to do 
the same for teacher growth and learning.
The Future of Content Acquisition
For the past several decades, three large publishers have provided the nation’s 
public schools with almost 80 percent of all traditional basal textbooks. The 
size of each of these firms offers them significant economies of scale in content 
development, sales distribution, and more. 
Three key changes may potentially shift these market dynamics. First is a 
nascent but increasing trend toward decentralization, which is a result of the char-
ter school movement and the rise of weighted student funding and technology-
based content. A growing number of schools are gaining independence to make 
their own content-acquisition decisions. Second, electronic content has begun 
to make it possible for smaller companies to compete. Updating a textbook is a 
complicated, costly, multiyear affair, but the introduction of electronic content 
has the potential to make this process simpler, faster, and less resource intensive. 
Finally, the Common Core State Standards Initiative is expected to reduce bar-
riers of entry even further, as less state-by-state customization will be necessary.
What will be the combined effect of these three changes moving forward? 
Content is increasingly becoming a commodity. As one interviewee explained, 
“If you can buy B-minus content for free, and B-plus content for very little, who’s 
going to be willing to shell out for A-plus content?” As more players enter the 
market at a variety of price points, content-acquisition costs will almost certainly 
go down. An inevitable question then arises: How can schools effectively manage 
quality? 
One potential solution for virtual and blended models is using modular 
content and analyzing student outcomes broken down to the individual-lesson 
level. Programs like Florida Virtual School and School of One have even begun to 
experiment with the concept of paying vendors based on student-skill acquisition 
(i.e., vendors get paid according to the number of students who can prove they 
have learned specific skills). The potential consequence is a new accountability 
system for vendors, and a cost-effective way for schools and districts to gauge 
the quality of new and existing products. Frederick Hess’s discussion of quality 
control in the previous chapter of this volume explores this concept further.
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Conclusion
The promise of online learning is twofold: More-effective uses of technology have 
the potential both to improve student outcomes and to create a more productive 
educational system. This chapter has worked out the current costs of both vir-
tual and blended models—and has articulated where policymakers must ensure 
there are no barriers to innovation. It has not, however, systematically tackled the 
question of productivity (i.e., how to improve and maximize student achievement 
while keeping costs down). The focus on productivity is accompanied by mul-
tiple challenges. The first is today’s dearth of high-quality data. Absent broadly 
accepted measures of student achievement (the “output” side of the productivity 
equation), calculating productivity is extremely difficult. Emerging policies—such 
as state and federal accountability statutes outlining universal reporting require-
ments around school finances, student achievement, and system performance—
have the potential to lead to a greater focus on overall productivity.
A second challenge is the fundamental design of our K–12 delivery system. 
The near-monopoly enjoyed by most public school districts means that few 
districts are prodded to seek out and adopt higher-productivity solutions. Even 
hard-working and well-intentioned district officials rarely have the means avail-
able to them, or the associated flexibility, to reallocate resources to school models 
and vendors according to productivity. A private, for-profit company must deliver 
results and have a sustainable business model to compete, or risk going out of 
business. 
We hope that in addition to outlining potential resource-allocation strategies 
for state and district policymakers and online-school operators, this chapter will 
encourage a focus on better outcome data to help identify the most productive 
and effective school models. Highlighting productivity is undoubtedly the first 
step toward rewarding productivity.
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CHAPTER FOUR
School Finance in the Digital-Learning Era
  By Paul T. Hill
America’s system for financing K–12 education is not neutral about innovation 
and the use of new technologies. Indeed, that system is stacked against them. To 
remedy this, our education-funding system needs to shift dramatically. Instead 
of today’s model—which rigidly funds programs, staff positions, and admin-
istrative structures, instead of schools and students—we need an approach in 
which funding follows the student. At present, America’s charter school finance 
structure provides the best prototype, but even it does not go far enough. An ap-
propriate school-finance system must also be able to defund ineffective schools 
and provide space and incentives for online providers to bring their products to 
the marketplace.
Today’s Online Learning Landscape
Futurists have written for decades about using technology to improve education 
by giving thousands (instead of dozens) of students access to the very best teachers 
and by deploying computer-based systems that allow students to learn at their 
own pace at any time of the day or night.1 This vision is becoming a reality now, 
partly because fiscal limitations are forcing K–12 schools to employ fewer teachers 
and increase the productivity of those still on the payroll, an endeavor that can 
be aided by technology.2 
Though the cycle of invention and refinement has just begun in technology-
assisted instruction, several promising approaches are evident:
  Brief online courses (one hour or less) addressing key concepts in virtually all 
the science and mathematics disciplines that students are likely to encounter 
in K–12 schools. 
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  Computer-based instruction on basic topics (e.g., factoring or oxidation-
reduction equations) that also tests students and provides teachers with 
feedback on what their pupils have learned and where they are stuck.
  Online courses that students can access at any time, repeating sections until 
they are able to pass a test that is embedded in the course software.
  Instructional-management programs that can direct struggling students to 
new ways of explaining the material, and that can direct abler students to 
more challenging materials or enrichment resources.
  Management programs that prescribe a new set of online materials for every 
student every day, and that suggest to teachers challenging questions they can 
pose to students to prompt the application of skills just learned. 
Capacities like these open up vast possibilities for improved instructional 
delivery. Students who do not want to attend school can access entirely self-
managed online learning. Self-managed “virtual” schools can match a student’s 
interests, learning rate, and even work schedule. Students can also take advantage 
of blended or hybrid schooling that uses computer-based and online resources 
to deliver some coursework while also providing in-person teacher-student 
interaction, and relying on teachers to act as diagnosticians and mentors. These 
“blended” schools can also individualize instruction while assuring parents that 
a responsible adult is keeping an eye on their children. 
There are many advantages to such uses of technology. The most important 
is that content can be individualized and rapidly adapted to meet individual 
students’ needs, leading to the possibility of more rapid and consistent student 
growth. Similarly, equipment, web connections, and technology-vendor contracts 
can be managed more flexibly than live teachers. It is easier to replace a less effec-
tive technology-based program with a better one than it is to abandon a teacher 
who has worked hard but is no longer the best available. 
Those advantages notwithstanding, plenty of policy and structural barriers 
stand in the way of widespread adoption of these promising technology applica-
tions. The thorniest and most entrenched of them is our approach to education 
funding. 
The problem boils down to this: Our system doesn’t fund schools, and cer-
tainly doesn’t fund students. It funds districtwide programs, staff positions, and 
so forth. This structure makes it difficult, if not impossible, to move money from 
concrete facilities, established programs, and entrenched staff roles to new uses 
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like equipment, software, and remote instructional staff. Yet to encourage devel-
opment and improvement of technology-based methods, we must find ways for 
public dollars to do just that—and to follow kids to online providers chosen by 
their parents, teachers, or themselves. 
To date, a few states have found work-around solutions to make possible such 
funding arrangements, but these are fragile, clunky, and problematic, as I will 
show below. A much better approach is to start from scratch and create a new 
school-funding system—for digital learning and everything else, too—based on 
a simple principle: Make funding for education follow the child to any school 
or instructional program in which he or she enrolls. Subsequent sections will 
show how this principle can be put into practice and what else must be done to 
maximize benefits for students and the broader community. 
This chapter details the problems with today’s education-finance system, the 
ways in which it stymies innovation, and the limits of work-around solutions for 
funding digital learning. It then outlines a design for a new school-finance system 
that would enable online learning—and other promising innovations—to reach 
their full potential.
The Inflexibility of Our Current Public Funding System
In the twentieth century, as engineers worked to design buildings capable of 
surviving earthquakes, two competing camps emerged. The first constructed 
steel-frame buildings: These were strong and extremely rigid. The second erected 
buildings that flexed readily, had multiple independent structural supports, and 
dissipated energy in myriad ways. Under the right circumstances either of these 
approaches can work.
Public education in the United States is modeled on the second, flexible 
energy-dispersing approach. It is not a monolith but is instead comprised of 
many parts, each with its own means of support. When faced with external 
shocks, the whole structure is extremely good at bending and then returning to 
its previous shape.
Nobody deliberately engineered the system of mutually reinforcing struc-
tures. It arose over time starting in the 1950s, as courts decided civil rights suits. 
Congress created new services and entitlement programs for particular groups, 
state legislatures started small programs to solve emergent problems, school 
employees sought job protections and control over their work assignments, 
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universities sought gatekeeper status for potential teachers and administrators, 
and families sought advantages in the competition for the best school placements. 
Independent but Mutually Supporting Elements of the  
U.S. Public School System
 Regulations governing use of funds. Government doesn’t fund students or 
schools. Instead, it funds particular categories of activity like general instruction, 
extracurricular activities, programs for handicapped students, teacher in-service train-
ing, transportation, and building maintenance. The unit of accounting is the district, 
not the school or the student. Principals generally have budgets of $10,000–$50,000, 
and all other spending decisions are made at the federal, state, or district levels.
Central control of investments. Money for new materials and technology is con-
trolled at the district level. Districts allocate as much as 10 percent of the total budget 
for teacher release time and training costs. But many separate bureaus control small 
amounts, and their initiatives are usually less significant and unrelated. These funds, 
moreover, cannot be used for alternative ways of improving teacher quality, e.g., 
higher salaries or signing bonuses for outstanding young teachers.
Regulations governing human resources. State licensing requirements establish 
entry requirements for teachers and principals. Once hired, teachers are assigned to 
schools according to the terms of collective-bargaining agreements. In most locali-
ties, the most senior teacher who applies for it fills a vacancy. Teachers’ hours of 
work, daily minutes of contact with students, and obligations to attend meetings or 
perform other duties are usually spelled out by labor contracts.
Regulations governing instruction. Individual teachers and schools have some 
freedom to choose materials and teaching methods. However, state curriculum 
rules require coverage of a wide range of subjects, and also bound the use of time, 
controlling how much is spent on particular subjects and establishing the length of 
the school day and the school year. Finally, federal laws on education of the disabled 
and bilingual education also specify what child shall get what services under what 
conditions.
Regulations governing student assignment. Students are generally assigned to 
schools near their neighborhoods, and though districts allow transfers, these are 
possible only if the desired school has vacancies and if the change would not worsen 
racial imbalances in the sending and receiving schools. Because some families are 
trapped in schools they would rather not attend, principals and teachers are obligated 
to make a variety of accommodations and compromises. Rather than specialize in 
a particular approach to instruction and attract like-minded families, schools are 
limited by the wishes of parents who cannot send their children elsewhere.
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The American approach to funding education has emerged slowly and hap-
hazardly, a product of such politics and advocacy efforts, not design. For example, 
the federal Elementary and Secondary Education Act included only a few pro-
grams when first enacted in 1965, but over time new funding streams and sets of 
regulations (for purposes spanning the gamut from teacher professional develop-
ment to bilingual education) have proliferated.
The result is a labyrinth of rules and regulations connected to an ever-growing 
network of separate funding paths, each with its own “allowable uses” and report-
ing requirements. System challengers and other education innovators get locked 
in the maze of this funding structure, unable to break free. 
The sidebar “Independent but Mutually Supporting Elements of the U.S. Pub-
lic School System” sketches five of the main mutually supporting structures that 
deter and retard innovation. They do so by privileging some uses of funds over 
others and by making it difficult for funds to flow from one use to another. Thus 
people with ideas about how to do things differently—to introduce some actions 
that cost money and to substitute them for other current uses of funds—have 
great difficulty getting their ideas adopted, or even seriously tested. Outsiders, 
observing that U.S. schools have remained about the same despite revolutions in 
technology and economic life, conclude that education stasis is due to the lack of 
new ideas. But that is patently false. Individual teachers, principals, and technol-
ogy innovators are coming up with them all the time—and often put them into 
small-scale practice. This the system will allow, but it does not allow widespread 
use of ideas that challenge its core. 
Because funds cannot flow from established uses to new ones, good ideas 
can’t be fully developed or persuasively demonstrated. Imaginative people who 
have ideas about uses of technology will suspect that applications they invent for 
K–12 education cannot be funded, so they will likely apply themselves in other 
realms instead.
The arrangements we have made are very costly. They discourage the ex-
perimentation that could uncover promising options and resist the analysis that 
would be required to show what is working and what is not. These deficiencies are 
built into our particular education system, but they are not endemic to education. 
As this paper will show, a very different system for funding schools is both pos-
sible and desirable. But breaking free from K–12 education’s current labyrinthine 
system requires a fundamental restructuring, which—as Hill, Roza, and Harvey 
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conclude in their 2008 report on how to finance productive schools—is possible 
if the following criteria are met: 
  No particular use of money is required, and no institution is guaranteed 
funding. Money and people can flow from schools, administrative structures, 
instructional programs, and independent providers that are less productive 
to those that are more productive.
  Potential innovators are encouraged to invest time and money developing 
new approaches.
  Fair comparisons can be made between new and dominant approaches.
  Performance improvement is the focus of accountability.3
None of these criteria is met under today’s system. 
Marginal Uses of Technology under Today’s Funding System
Today’s funding arrangements for public education were not designed with 
technological options in mind. They assume that a student will attend a specific 
school, in which teacher salaries and other costs are paid by the school district. 
Strictly speaking, schools are not funded at all but resourced: School leaders get 
very little money to spend on their own because the district both decides how 
to spend the money and how to allocate teachers, administrators, and other 
resources to the schools. Money flows to schools on a rough per-pupil basis, but 
in a lumpy way, e.g., one additional teacher for every twenty pupils. A school can 
lose one student (or as many as nineteen) and not lose any resources. In the rare 
case in which a student might take some courses at another school or outside the 
district (e.g., at a community college), the district, not the school, covers the extra 
costs out of a central fund.
These arrangements do not absolutely bar the emergence of innovative uses 
of technology. But they do limit the number of options students have to do any 
of the following:
  Take all their courses from virtual schools offered by online providers located 
anywhere in the world. 
  Enroll in hybrid or blended schools in which they spend some time in face-to-
face contact with teachers and other students, and take some courses online. 
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  Mix and match courses and other experiences purchased from different pro-
viders (e.g., literature, math, and science online, all from different vendors, 
and piano lessons from a neighborhood instructor). 
Limits on Virtual Schools’ Access to Funds
The virtual school that provides all the instruction a child needs to gain credit for 
a year’s learning is the least challenging to the existing finance system because 
all the money goes to one place and because it is clear who is accountable for 
results. But our financing system still creates barriers to the full exploitation of 
this possibility. 
Funding any form of online schooling is complicated by the myriad fund-
ing sources presently available to schools: state-based funding for schools, state 
categorical-program funding, federal categorical-program funding, and local-
source funding. States or school districts could bundle together funds from these 
different sources and distribute them to full-time virtual schools. However, that 
would require concerted action among levels of government that would have to 
give up their separate revenue streams or their ability to impose rules. 
As table 4.1 shows, virtual schools run under different auspices—e.g., by the 
state, by a local school district, or by an entity holding a public charter—now have 
access to different sources of taxpayer funds. Each of the kinds of virtual school in 
table 4.1 has its own implications for public costs, the solvency of full-time virtual 
schools, and their ability to compete with existing public schools. 
Still, table 4.1 is a best-case analysis, which assumes that agencies that now 
control funds would part with them as students moved to virtual schools. Funds 
can be available but, in practice, the public agency holding them can still manage 
not to transfer them to a virtual school. 
As the table reflects, public funding can (but doesn’t necessarily) come to 
virtual schools via
  special state appropriations (as is the case with the Utah Electronic High 
School) that do not involve transfers of funds from one school to another and 
do not draw on locally raised levy funds;4
  transfers of federal categorical-program funds as students eligible for services 
take courses at virtual schools;
  transfers of per capita state funding; and 
  transfers of local levy funds (available only to district-run virtual schools).
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At present, public funds are channeled through state or local education 
agencies, so that only schools run or chartered by public agencies can receive 
public funding. Further, it is very difficult to transfer public funds to out-of-state 
or foreign vendors—public or otherwise. Local school districts that operate or 
authorize virtual schools can (but don’t always) provide services funded by federal 
categorical programs (like Title I) to the students who attend them. 
Blended Schools’ Access to Funds
It is more difficult to get public funds to blended or hybrid schools that provide 
some instruction via computer and some via in-person teaching. Even if states 
and school districts permitted money to flow to virtual schools in the ways sum-
marized in table 4.1, the funding status of blended schools would be precarious. 
States and districts could decide that these schools were attracting too many stu-
dents and drawing too much money out of their conventional schools, and either 
close the hybrid schools or cripple them via regulation. (The same can happen to 
charters authorized by school districts.) 
At present, the most secure channel of public funds into blended or hybrid 
schools is the charter school route. If state law allows hybrid charter schools, they 
can be authorized by entities other than school districts. Independent authoriz-
ers are not responsible for district-run schools and therefore have no incentive to 
inhibit the flow of students and funds to hybrid schools. 






State per capita 
student funding
Local per capita 
student funding
State-run virtual 
schools Available Available Varies by state Not available
District-run 
virtual schools Not available Available Available Available
Statewide virtual 
charter schools Not available Varies by state Available Not available
Local virtual 




Not available Not available Not available Not available
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In general, hybrid charter schools have access to the same sources of public 
funds as their purely brick-and-mortar counterparts. In states that provide more 
funding for pupils attending district-run schools than for those attending charters 
(in other words, most states), unequal funding almost certainly dampens the 
growth of the charter-based hybrid-school sector.
Access to Funds for Parent-Assembled Instruction
Today, no arrangement provides public financial support for parents who wish 
to assemble unique mixes of instructional experiences for their children. Parents 
might persuade their child’s school to pay for an online course or a course pro-
vided by another institution. But schools control the funds and have no incentive, 
other than the desire to satisfy a parent, to make such arrangements.
District-run schools are sometimes willing to allow a student to take free 
courses from a state online school, and parents are always free to invest their 
own money in supplemental courses. However, neither of these arrangements 
funds independently provided courses equally with courses provided by state 
or local entities. 
Except for parents whose children are eligible for Title I supplemental educa-
tion services, families that buy particular supplemental courses for their children 
are on their own. Like homeschoolers—and the vendors who provide online 
courses for them—they do not receive public funding. Nor do students who enroll 
on their own without the approval of a school district or charter school, except 
in states where the statewide virtual school is funded by direct appropriations. 
Thus the deck is stacked against learning options that make creative use 
of technology. It is, however, possible to describe a simple, feasible, alternative 
finance system that could fund innovative learning options equitably. 
What a Technology-friendly Funding System Would Look Like
What would a public funding system that promotes digital learning and innova-
tion look like? In general terms, the system we need would be designed to provide 
taxpayer support for the best possible instruction to students by any means that 
can work. Unlike the existing system, which provides a lot of money to educate 
children but tries to do so within extensive constraints imposed by laws, regula-
tions, court orders, labor contracts, and school-board politics, an alternative 
system would put priority on educating children as effectively as possible with 
the money available, with as few constraints as possible.5
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A technology-friendly funding system would need to
  fund education, not institutions;
  move money as students move;
  pay for unconventional forms of instruction; and
  withhold funding for ineffective programs without chilling innovation. 
Fund Education, Not Institutions
Under an innovation-friendly alternative funding system, federal and state 
governments would not mandate particular uses of funds, or support particular 
programs, administrative structures, or salary scales. An innovation-friendly 
funding system would tie money directly to individual students’ education. 
Of course there would be some constraints on the use of funds—they would 
need to pay for instruction, not unrelated purchases, and to support only schools 
and organizations that practice nondiscrimination, do not advocate violent 
overthrow of the government, and account honestly for funds. (Different forms 
of performance management, which might protect students from wasting their 
time and taxpayers’ money, and provide evidence of productive use of public 
funds, are discussed below.)
Supporting forms of digital learning with public funds means allocating a 
specific amount for every child and distributing money to districts, schools, and 
instruction providers solely on the basis of enrollment. States and localities could 
opt to “weight” pupil-based funding by allocating more for one group of children 
than for another (e.g., providing more than the average amount of money to sup-
port education of students with disabilities or English language learners or those 
in high-risk communities).
If states and localities combined all the money they now spend on K–12 
education and divided it up by enrollment, with the same or weighted fraction 
of the total assigned to each child, and distributed dollars to schools in the same 
way, they could eliminate the barriers to innovation and improvement inherent 
in current funding systems and simultaneously force a dramatic reduction in 
costly administrative structures. Money would not be held centrally to preserve 
particular schools or programs, but would go wherever children are educated. 
This would allow new uses of funds, an essential precondition to innovation and 
widespread use of digital learning. 
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The federal government could reinforce the movement toward pupil-based 
funding by making its major grant funds pupil-specific. It could do that by 
sharply defining student-eligibility criteria for such programs as Title I and 
special education, then requiring that states divide the money received from any 
such program equitably among all eligible recipients in the state, and allocate it 
as extra money to the schools those children attend. Thus federal programs could 
still increase spending on designated beneficiaries without privileging particular 
uses or creating bureaucracies.6 
Move Money as Students Move
Funding students (and not programs) is a step in the right direction, but it is not 
enough. States must also make sure that all funds move from one district, school, 
or instruction provider to another as students transfer. This arrangement requires 
a choice system: Students could move whenever their parents identified a more 
suitable school or set of instructional programs, or as ineffective schools were 
closed and students shifted to more effective ones. 
Rudimentary versions of such a system exist already in forty-one states, to 
fund charter schools. Funds follow students directly to the schools they attend, 
and are taken away from schools out of which pupils transfer. Unlike waiver poli-
cies that offer limited escape from constraints of the dominant system, charter 
laws cut the Gordian knot. They ensure that schools don’t have to negotiate their 
freedoms one by one but instead start with most of them guaranteed.
Still, state charter laws are imperfect in many ways, including their narrow 
reach: They apply only to students who enroll in such schools; all other students 
are still in district schools where funds are tied up, hidden, and inflexible. Many 
states, moreover, leave some funding behind in district-run public schools even 
when pupils transfer to charter schools. Depending on state and charter laws 
and local policies, charter students either do or don’t benefit from public funds 
allocated for federal programs, transportation, and facilities. And charter students 
often don’t benefit from locally raised funds (e.g., from property tax levies). 
However, the basic charter paradigm—funding based on enrollment; school 
control over spending, staffing, and use of time; and a structure that includes fam-
ily and teacher choice, lottery admissions, and oversight by an authorizer whose 
only powers are allowing schools to open and closing them for nonperformance—
is a useful frame for at least part of a system that funds technology innovation.
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A technology-friendly funding system would have to apply to all students 
wherever they receive their education, and whether just one provider or several 
serve them. Funds available for a child’s education must include all the taxpayer 
funds available to support students’ education. To make this happen, some gov-
ernment entity would need to assemble all of the funds available from all sources 
for K–12 education in a locality, keep an account for every student, and faithfully 
allocate the contents of the account to whatever school or education program a 
student attends. In theory, school districts could perform this function, though 
their track record of fiscal opaqueness and preference for schools they run directly 
suggests that some other entity would be better. 
Ideally, a new kind of public entity, possibly a county or regional finance 
office of the state government, would assemble and disburse all funds. It would 
also account for funds on a pupil basis. Every student would have an account that 
showed what funding from all sources was available for his or her education, and 
to what schools and vendors it had been disbursed.
Each student’s account would, in a sense, constitute a “backpack” of funding 
that the student would carry along to any eligible school or instructional pro-
grams in which he or she enrolls. The contents of the backpack would be flexible 
dollars, not coupons whose use is restricted to a particular course or service.
If a family decided to rely on one school or instructional provider for all of 
a child’s education, all of the money would go to that school or provider. How-
ever, students might also enroll in courses provided by different organizations, 
in which case the funds would be divided. Students and families would then be 
free to shop for the best combination of courses and experiences their backpack 
funds could cover. Providers would compete with one another to offer services 
that were of high quality, effective, and reasonably priced. 
Every school or independent instructional provider would have to post its 
prices for particular courses. No school could charge tuition in excess of the full 
amount in a potential student’s backpack. Schools and other providers could 
also offer partial instructional programs, and students and their families could 
mix and match to the limit of the funds in the backpack. (See below for possible 
safeguards against misuse of backpack funds.)
This backpack-based funding would impact existing schools’ budgets im-
mediately, creating incentives for schools to avoid losing students to other edu-
cational institutions or instructional providers. 
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School districts might choose to tax affiliated schools for central services 
provided. However, if school leaders find themselves losing students and money 
to charter schools and other providers of instruction, they are likely to consider 
either demanding changes in district policy or petitioning an independent autho-
rizer for charter status. This would force movement of school districts toward the 
“portfolio model”—in which the district manages a diverse portfolio of schools.7 
Under this model, districts would enter charter-like arrangements with affiliated 
schools, hold schools accountable only for student performance, seek new models 
and providers of schools to replace low-performing district schools, and foster 
development of multiple independent providers of services that schools need.8
Innovators (educators and social service professionals with new ideas) would 
also be encouraged by the certainty that they could get full funding for every 
student enrolled in their school or program.
Pay for Unconventional Forms of Instruction
A technology-friendly funding system must have low barriers to entry and al-
low new entrants to be paid for every student who uses their services. Backpack 
funding helps here, because innovators can be paid even if they serve only a few 
students. Full exploitation of technology requires more. Innovators should be 
able to receive public funding for even a partial instructional program (e.g., one 
course, or part of a course), both to provide students broader opportunities and 
to create cash flow for promising but small-scale operators. 
For free movement of funds to promote experimentation and innovation, 
it must be possible for students to enroll in schools that are configured in novel 
ways. Technology opens up myriad possibilities: students using a computer-based 
system to receive individual instruction, students linking to a set of lectures and 
other presentation materials along with literally thousands of other students, 
students learning through a mix of technology-delivered and teacher-delivered 
approaches. All of these kinds of learning experiences should be eligible to 
receive support from the public funds in student backpacks, notwithstanding 
current rules about teacher certification, class sizes, mandatory hours of school 
attendance, etc. 
Students must be able to join online courses provided by schools other than 
the ones they normally attend and take advantage of courses that combine 
experiential learning (e.g., participation in workplaces, arts events, or social 
services) with online materials that prepare students for those experiences and 
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assess learning. Students could purchase any combination of courses and learn-
ing experiences that their backpack funds could afford. (See the sidebar “What 
This Means for Capital Costs” for more on how funds previously earmarked for 
facilities and maintenance could be included in the backpack.)
Student-based backpack funding would also provide a mechanism whereby 
online providers with new ideas about instruction could test their products and 
build customer interest. Growing use of their services could help entrepreneurs 
accumulate enough funds to expand their current services dramatically or to 
develop a broad enough set of materials to create an online school.
Schools and instruction providers should not be punished for being efficient. 
Blended schools might save money on teachers. Virtual schools and providers 
of more limited instructional programs could, if they attract enough students, 
pay far less to educate each additional student than they receive from student 
backpacks. These results are desirable because they can attract investment; even if 
providers are nonprofits, the low marginal costs of online instruction can enable 
continual investment in new and improved resources. 
Backpack-based funding is the core of a public-financing strategy for technol-
ogy-based instruction. A fully innovation-friendly system needs a mechanism for 
encouraging innovators who have ideas about particular aspects of a school to join 
with others to create a whole school. In today’s innovation-hostile environment, 
few can afford to take the necessary risks. Even if the system were more open to 
new ideas, grave uncertainty about whether any K–12 education idea can ever 
turn a profit limits venture capital investment. 
Thus states, districts, and foundations interested in exploiting the full poten-
tial of online learning might need to invest directly in development and testing 
of new instructional technologies. One emerging example is New York City’s 
iZone, which provides up-front funding for schools to develop or adopt new 
instructional modules. Another is the U.S. Department of Education’s ARPA-ED 
(Advanced Research Projects Agency for Education) proposal, which, if funded, 
would “aggressively pursue technological breakthroughs that have the potential 
to transform teaching and learning the way the Internet, GPS, and robotics…
have transformed commerce, travel, warfare, and the way we live our daily lives.”9 
States could create their own versions of ARPA-ED or share in the cost and ben-
efits of a national institution. 
The idea of state and local government investment in new instructional 
resources is nothing new. States and localities now invest in teacher training, 
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professional-development programs, development of new curricula, and methods 
of student assessment. All such investments are meant to benefit children, but 
they also benefit other parties—the teachers who use new skills to make higher 
salaries, the vendors who sell professional development services, etc. In the same 
way, development of innovative instructional programs and organizations ready 
to provide new options for families is in the public interest and is an appropriate 
use of taxpayer funds. 
Withhold Funding for Ineffective Programs without Chilling Innovation
A funding system that is open to innovative uses of technology must also have a 
mechanism for deciding which schools and instructional programs are eligible for 
the funds traveling in students’ backpacks. As long as public money is involved, 
What This Means for Capital Costs
To create a level playing field for competition among all schools and instructional 
programs, states would need to include funds now set aside for facilities construction 
and maintenance. States now fund separate line items for construction and build-
ing maintenance, and these are not counted in calculations of schools’ operating 
costs. Thus even if online schools’ operating costs were equitably funded, traditional 
schools would get a significant extra subsidy in the form of funds for construction 
and maintenance. 
In a time when innovation is necessary, and the cost structures of different forms 
of schooling differ dramatically, a special subsidy for bricks and mortar is counter-
productive. It defrays the costs borne by brick-and-mortar schools, while ignoring the 
investment costs of online schools, which must pay for computers, methods develop-
ment, and back-office administration out of their operating costs. 
Under this arrangement, a school—whether charter or district run, traditional, 
hybrid, or online—would pay whatever capital costs it encountered. Schools and 
instructional-program providers with high costs for equipment, research and devel-
opment, and oversight could cover these costs with funds from student backpacks. 
And schools paying high rents could meet their costs. In the long run, this arrange-
ment would probably lead conventional schools to reduce their costs by renting less 
space and refusing to pay for expensive amenities like theatres and swimming pools. 
Even with a level playing field, it is not obvious that schools without facilities 
costs would come to dominate the market: Parents might prefer the custodial and 
socializing functions that conventional or hybrid schools offer, especially if those 
schools, by efficient use of their space, could also afford to give students access to 
technology options. 
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scandalous misuse can destroy any financing scheme. A financing system must 
include arrangements to withhold or withdraw funds from ineffective providers. 
For whole schools, including hybrid and virtual schools, chartering provides 
a useable framework for performance management. Charter authorizers can close 
low-performing charter schools or refuse to renew their authorization, and they 
can evaluate hybrid and virtual charters on grounds similar to those used for 
conventional schools. 
No one thinks today’s authorizers are doing these jobs well; oversight of 
hybrid and virtual schools would strain them further. However, an authorizer 
as the gatekeeper for public funding of independently provided instruction is 
indispensable. Any other form of public accountability would inevitably focus on 
inputs and thereby put the brakes on innovation. This is not the first, nor will it 
be the last, Fordham-sponsored research to argue that competent and unbiased 
charter authorization is a necessary element of an innovative and performance-
oriented public education system.
However, chartering keeps schools in the role as gatekeepers to publicly fund-
ed digital education. Even if parents chose the schools their children attended, 
it remains the case that the options available to students, and the opportunities 
for entrepreneurs, are limited by the imaginations and tastes of school operators.
Is there a way to eliminate the middleman, so that families can make their 
own choices among online courses and other resources? 
Of course parents could be given full access to their children’s backpacks 
and allowed to purchase any form of instruction they wanted from any source. 
Children’s education would then depend on the quality of their parents’ choices. 
In the long run, parents might learn to choose well, and the supply of good op-
tions could rise to meet the demand. 
This possibility calls up the ghosts of the voucher debate: Would parents be 
able to appropriate public funds in any way they wanted? Would vendors be able 
to take advantage of customers’ naïveté and lack of performance information and 
make money selling shoddy products? If students or parents made bad purchases, 
so that students did not learn what they needed in order to graduate or succeed in 
higher education and work, would the public be forced to pay again for instruction 
the student should have gotten the first time? 
These questions are too persistent to ignore; moreover, if ignored, they could 
become causes for political opposition or litigation. Though it is not possible to 
eliminate every risk in any situation, even one where uses of public funds are 
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tightly controlled, it is possible to reduce the risks through a few key measures. 
But as will be readily apparent, each of these risk-minimizing actions would either 
heighten costs imposed on the government or reduce the diversity and boldness 
of options available to parents. 
Risk reducers that might be attached to the funding of parent-guided choices 
include
  tracking and reporting on the quality of services provided and outcomes 
produced by all eligible vendors;
  limiting parents’ choices to certain “qualified” vendors;
  maintaining a list of ineligible (low-performing) vendors;
  paying only after children have completed courses and demonstrated benefits, 
thus withholding payment from ineffective vendors (pay for performance);
  limiting the amount of money parents can dispose of; and
  limiting parents’ choices only to supplementary or enrichment programs 
(which could be online or brick-and-mortar).10
All of these risk reducers create new functions for government or for gov-
ernment-supported independent institutions. They also create new hazards of 
their own.
The first risk reducer, providing performance information, is the least intru-
sive, but it imposes heavy monitoring and analysis burdens on government. State 
and local governments historically underfund and underperform this function. 
Moreover, it creates opportunities for maneuvering and controversy about data 
and evidence, which can be turned against new and innovative providers. State 
contracts with independent analytical institutions might stabilize the function 
and reduce the conflicts of interest experienced by state and local education 
agencies. 
The second risk reducer, allowing only qualified vendors, also engages gov-
ernment in making judgments, and creates opportunities for well-organized 
vendors to resist new and unfamiliar ones. This remedy might protect parents and 
students from disastrous options, but it cannot guarantee quality and can pro-
tect well-organized vendors from desirable competition. Again, state-supported 
independent accrediting agencies or inspectors might be more objective, but 
they could also be susceptible to capture by interest groups and proponents of 
particular tastes in instruction. 
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The third, maintaining a list of ineligible vendors, would allow people with 
innovative ideas to compete for students and money. Government could exclude 
vendors with bad track records, but it could not exclude anyone whose track re-
cord was not yet established. This would punish frauds and bad performers, but 
only after some children had been demonstrably hurt by them. The difference 
between this approach to risk reduction and the allowance of only “qualified” 
vendors illustrates the dilemma that the designer of any public funding must face: 
whether to risk chilling innovation or to allow harm to a few people in the name 
of encouraging innovation. 
The fourth, implementing a policy of pay for performance, would allow 
transfers of public funds only after students had demonstrated, in independently 
administered tests, that they had met specific learning objectives. Providers—in-
cluding conventional public and charter schools—would be paid only after the 
fact. This arrangement would require a major investment in public oversight in 
order to track student enrollment in particular courses and assess results. New 
instructional models could be funded only if appropriate end-of course tests 
were available. 
Overall, pay for performance would create a harsh environment for all edu-
cation providers. Conventional, virtual, and hybrid schools might spend money 
on a student’s instruction for a whole course or semester yet receive nothing in 
return. Online vendors of all kinds, who have little control over their students’ 
effort or persistence, could be even more at risk. In general, this approach would 
limit the unproductive use of public funds and quickly destroy any vendor that 
could not demonstrate good results. It would favor providers with deep pockets, 
e.g., district-run schools and online vendors supported by large foundations. 
Performance-based payment as defined here could create a lethal environment 
for smaller-scale innovators. 
The fifth and sixth risk reducers, limiting the amount of money parents can 
dispose of and limiting parents’ choices only to supplementary or enrichment 
programs, are promising if taken together. Parents could choose any whole-school 
provider, but would also control a limited amount of backpack money and could 
use it to pay for tutoring and enrichment programs. This would allow some public 
funds to flow to new and innovative programs. Vendors could gain the support 
they need to develop and market their ideas to the point that charter- or district-
run schools might adopt them. Yet parents could not be led into making choices 
that compromised their children’s core instruction. 
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A combination of the fifth and sixth risk reducers would create a cafeteria 
plan for extracurricular activities and supplementary learning (either online or 
in-person).11 Under this plan, parents could get a publicly funded debit card to 
pay for enrichment activities—everything from remedial tutoring to SAT prep. 
Amounts on the debit card could vary: Disadvantaged children, or those who 
would otherwise be eligible for extra tutoring or be required to attend catch-
up courses or summer school, could get larger amounts than students without 
special needs. 
This arrangement would eliminate the need for government to vet every on-
line provider or to negotiate with vendors about costs. Costs would be regulated 
by the amounts available on the debit cards, and parents would have incentives 
to avoid vendors that required all of their available funds for one service.12 
When it comes to risk reduction, designers of technology-friendly funding 
systems can choose their poison. Any option introduces some risk that funds 
will be misused, children won’t learn as needed, or innovators will be denied 
government funds. Based on the foregoing analysis, some combination of track-
ing vendors so the lowest performers can be eliminated, limiting parents’ choices 
to whole schools (including virtual and blended schools), and freeing parents to 
choose supplemental services seems most promising. 
Conclusion
A funding system can’t cause innovation: It can only interfere with it, or let it 
happen. Whether innovation occurs, at what pace, and to what ultimate benefit, 
depend on factors other than public funding. But a system like the one described 
here would make promising breakthroughs, especially in the digital realm, much 
more likely—and much more likely to scale rapidly. 
A lot depends on whether K–12 education can compete successfully for the 
attention of the most imaginative people, those who are working on online learn-
ing, game structures, and information architecture. To date, K–12 education has 
been a less remunerative field than adult education and training, business simu-
lation, and game sales. However, many developers remain personally motivated 
to work on K–12 applications. The right public policy environment, and smart 
philanthropic-investment strategies, could speed up innovation and create new 
opportunities for America’s children.13
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Overcoming the Governance Challenge in 
K–12 Online Learning
  By John E. Chubb
Technological innovation has thus far had little impact on K–12 education. Pub-
lic schools, their classrooms, and their methods of instruction work much the 
same today as they have for decades. Experts have predicted for some time that 
technology would transform schooling. But no transformation was wrought by 
television, computers, interactive whiteboards, or even the Internet. The reason 
for this is surely not a lack of need for improvement: Weak achievement in Ameri-
can schools is a longstanding issue. Nor is it a lack of suitable technology: Online 
learning and computer-based instruction have promising track records of raising 
achievement in K–12 schools as well as in higher education, where technology is 
already used extensively. The reason is the capacity of the public school system 
to resist innovation.
If policymakers want to see faster technological innovation in K–12 educa-
tion—innovation that works to the clear benefit of students—they will need to 
take a hard look at how the public education system has managed to forestall 
innovation for so many years. They will need to consider how that system is 
structured, governed, and controlled. In the end, public schools are government 
bodies. They make decisions about technology as they do everything else: through 
the political process. That is where the resistance centers—and where it so often 
succeeds. Hence that is where policymakers will need to bring change.
An Alternative Model
There is nothing inherently sclerotic about K–12 education. It is a nearly $600 
billion industry, a potentially attractive market for investors betting on technol-
ogy. It is far larger than higher education, where students are already making 
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extensive use of technology and where private investment has been huge. Like 
those in tertiary education, primary and secondary students could also benefit 
from what technology and online learning have to offer right now. Gobs more 
investment and years of innovation are not even necessary to reap rewards. But, 
as currently controlled, public education cannot and will not adopt the changes 
that technology stands ready to provide. Its current organization is sclerotic.
Consider a quick comparison between K–12 and America’s esteemed higher 
education system: In 2007–08, the most recent year for which federal data are 
available, 4.3 million undergraduates took at least one online course.1 That rep-
resents over 20 percent of all undergraduates at the time. In the same year, 1.03 
million K–12 students took a course online.2 That represents just 2 percent of all 
students. In other words, postsecondary students are more than ten times as likely 
to take an online course as K–12 students. This probability is even higher—about 
forty times—if we take multiple course enrollments into account.
Yet online technology is arguably more valuable in the K–12 space than in 
postsecondary education. K–12 schools are far more limited than colleges and 
universities in what they can offer via traditional classrooms. Many are too 
small, with too few specialized teachers, to offer all the courses that students 
may want or need. Cases in point: upper-level science courses, the full range of 
foreign languages, and the complete repertoire of Advanced Placement classes. 
Public schools, particularly in inner cities, also face daunting challenges serving 
diverse student bodies, with many pupils reading well below grade level and 
others anxious for acceleration. Online programs allow schools to customize 
instruction to individual student needs. They also offer students one-on-one 
tutoring by teachers working remotely. And they boast features that are particu-
larly attractive to younger learners: animation, simulation, adaptive assessment 
and instruction, voice recognition, personal avatars, gaming environments, and 
more. In sum, technology can bring many instructional tools to the student that a 
regular classroom teacher simply cannot.3 These tools may be especially powerful 
in lifting the achievement of special-needs students or unleashing the potential of 
gifted students. A typical college-age student of eighteen to twenty-five years or 
an adult learner returning to higher education may also benefit from innovative 
technologies. But the case is much stronger for students in K–12. 
When technology is used, it boosts student achievement. A 2009 review 
of fifty studies of online learning, including both K–12 and higher education, 
concluded that achievement in online courses was better than achievement in 
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face-to-face courses. It also found that “blended” courses, those offering online 
instruction coupled with face-to-face discussion, might be better still.4 The latter 
finding is especially important because most K–12 families have childcare needs 
as well as education needs and will therefore continue to prefer a place-based 
education for their children, with technology a major part but not the whole of 
the experience.
Despite these benefits, technology and online education play a very small part 
today in K–12 education, particularly when compared with higher education, 
where the use of online learning is determined by the incentives of the competitive 
market, subject to regulation by the government. The use of online education in 
K–12 is determined in opposite fashion—by government regulation, subject to a 
little pressure from the market.
Fundamentally, higher education is a buzzing, competitive marketplace of 
public and nonprofit and for-profit private institutions. It is, to be sure, subsidized 
in various ways by state and federal government, but it ultimately depends on 
the voluntary enrollment of students. By contrast, nearly all of K–12 education 
consists of government-owned and -operated public institutions, with little com-
petition among schools or choice for students and families. There the political 
process determines the education that is provided.
The proliferation of technology-based instruction in postsecondary educa-
tion was not dictated by government policy. State legislatures did not require 
online learning or dictate the conditions under which it needed to be offered. 
Individual professors were free to experiment with the structure of courses of-
fered fully online or through mixtures of face-to-face and virtual instruction. 
Companies like Blackboard, the leading learning-management system, and 
Moodle, an open-source competitor, brought rapid technological innovation to 
the online environment—again, not in response to policy but in response to the 
preferences of students, professors, and colleges. Companies emerged not only to 
provide technology and content—the traditional roles of education firms—but 
to compete as educational institutions.
No one knows what the most effective models of online instruction will be 
in higher education. And policymakers now would never try to specify them; 
the models are always changing. Higher education looks first to the market 
to determine what is most effective and efficient. States writing K–12 online-
education policy should similarly aim to promote innovation. They should offer 
incentives and flexibility for providers of online and blended models to invest in 
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new approaches. They should offer opportunities for students to choose among 
them. The market must then be overseen. But that is a different and more man-
ageable role for policymakers than attempting to prescribe how educators should 
use technology.
The Politics of Resistance
Technology could do for K–12 education what it has done for virtually every other 
industry throughout history: make people and their industries more produc-
tive. Sometimes this happens by substituting technology for labor—a computer 
or other technology does what once required numerous people to do, such as 
presenting a full curriculum. Sometimes it happens by giving labor the ability to 
do what it could not practically have done before—for example, analyzing moun-
tains of student data in real time. However, technology always requires change, 
sometimes wrenching change, and thus affects the people within the industry: 
They must learn new skills—and are at risk of losing jobs. Consequently, people 
within industries faced with new technology tend to resist it.
In competitive industries, such resistance typically proves futile. Firms that 
adopt technology improve and take customers from those that fail to adopt and 
adapt. In K–12 public education, however, where competition is largely absent, 
resistance can succeed at least for a good while. In 2009, Terry Moe and I argued 
that the resistance would eventually—in twenty to thirty years—be undone.5 
Online education would slowly seep into K–12 schools. It would find niches where 
resistance was weakest, places like credit recovery for failing students, dropout 
recovery for students who have already left school, and Advanced Placement 
classes for students that some schools simply lack resources to serve. As more 
students work online, teaching forces would slowly shrink, more teachers would 
find work teaching online, and—this is the critical point—organized opposi-
tion from the school workforce, in the form of teacher unions, would weaken as 
unions lost members, resources, and power. Harvard business professor Clayton 
Christensen forecast a similar triumph of technology in K–12 education, but for 
reasons having more to do with economic than political forces.6
It seems inevitable that in time, technology and online learning will come 
to play a sizable role in public schools. But without the driving force of competi-
tion, this could be a very long time coming. At present, online education plays 
an almost trivial role in K–12 education. In 2010–11, roughly 250,000 public 
school students were involved in full-time online education, nearly all through 
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virtual charter schools, not through the regular public school systems.7 That is 
0.45 percent of public school enrollments. To be sure, full-time online education 
may not be right for many students. It requires a great commitment from parents, 
in particular. But the parents of two million students already homeschool their 
children and could take advantage of online support.8 Full-time online education 
is approaching 10 percent of all college students.9 The paltry full-time numbers 
in K–12 are a mark of institutional resistance.
Indeed, while thirty-eight states now authorize online charter schools, half of 
all enrollments are concentrated in a handful of states that do not restrict the size 
of the schools or handicap them financially.10 In 2010, for example, Massachusetts 
authorized online charter schools but restricted their service to five hundred 
students, at least 25 percent of whom must reside in one “home” district and no 
more than 2 percent of whom can reside in any other one district—effectively 
limiting enrollment to a single district. What online school will survive with the 
few students it can enroll from a single district? What sense does it make in any 
of these states that limit access to say that students in one district can experience 
some of the benefits of the online-education universe and students in another 
district must experience other benefits? The Internet obviously imposes no such 
limits, nor do the course providers. And what of the twenty-three states that al-
low no online charter schools at all?11 What is their argument against learning 
online full time?
State governments have tried to offer their own alternatives to the online char-
ter school. As of fall 2011, forty states ran their own virtual schools. In all, they had 
536,272 semester-course enrollments.12 The enrollments are largely to fill holes in 
face-to-face public school programs—AP, credit recovery, and supplementary or 
specialized courses. The students are almost all part time, taking a course here or 
there. The courses are not integrated, by and large, into robust blended-learning 
models back on the home campus. If the semester enrollments were converted 
into full-time student equivalents, the number of students served would be less 
than 45,000.13 Scant progress—as the politics of resistance would predict.
But progress need not be so slow. Resistance to technological innovation is 
abetted by one feature of the current public education system, above all others. 
That is the exclusive authority granted to local school districts to determine how 
students are educated. Except for the right that forty states and the District of 
Columbia grant students to opt out of their local school districts in favor of a 
charter school, school districts throughout the United States enjoy what amounts 
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to monopoly power in their local school markets. School districts have the right 
to determine which schools students attend, what curricula they receive, and 
how much access they have to online education. School districts are disciplined 
by the political process—school-board elections and decision making—but those 
politics are notoriously vulnerable to pressures from district vested interests, in 
favor of the status quo.
The district model of governance has been much debated (look to Fordham’s 
recent paper series “Rethinking Education Governance for the Twenty-First Cen-
tury” for more). But the issue is different when the subject is online education. 
School districts lack the scale, in most instances, to create comprehensive online 
institutions—ones that offer complete K–12 curricula, expert online instructors 
in all subjects and courses, vibrant online social networks, cutting-edge technol-
ogy, and access to the best instructional resources in the world. Such institutions 
require capital, research and development, and expertise far beyond what any 
school district can accumulate. They also require enough students—hundreds 
of thousands, not thousands—to support the cost of investment and operation. 
School districts can be terrific customers for online institutions, purchasing the 
best that an online industry has to offer. But school districts can never become 
that industry.
If districts are left exclusively in charge of online learning, they will not 
become the online providers that technology has the capacity to offer. They sim-
ply lack the scale to do this. They will also remain slow adopters or customers, 
because of the threat that technology poses to the status quo, and especially to 
jobs. The politics of local school systems make it too easy for established district 
interests to block rapid change.14 So for reasons on both the supply side—the lack 
of scale to become high-quality online providers—and the demand side—the po-
litical biases in favor of the status quo—school districts should not have exclusive 
control over student access to online education.
Then who should? The argument here is that access should be controlled by 
the states. Policymakers at the state level have available to them practical, even 
research-based, measures they could adopt to govern and finance a vibrant public 
market in online education. A series of steps for state policymakers is outlined 
below. These steps are recommended not only on their education merits. They 
make sense politically. State control will buffer the political resistance that here-
tofore has slowed innovation. 
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Step 1: Set K–12 Online-Learning Policy at the State Level
Currently, state policymakers face strong pressures from interests tied to the 
welfare of local school districts. These pressures have thus far succeeded in limit-
ing the number of states that permit online charter schools, holding funding for 
online schools well below funding for brick-and-mortar schools, and otherwise 
protecting districts from level-playing-field competition for students. However, 
states have demonstrated that political coalitions will support more ambitious 
change. During the governorship of Jeb Bush, for example, Florida adopted a law 
giving all high school students the right to take any course online from the Florida 
Virtual School (FLVS), which would receive pro rata funding from the sending 
school district upon students’ successful completion of a course. In less than a 
decade, the program has become a huge hit, with students logging 260,000 half-
credit course enrollments in 2010–11—nearly half of all state virtual-school enroll-
ments nationwide.15 The program’s popularity has changed the politics, building 
support among the countless families whose children now enjoy the choice.
Much as the politics of brick-and-mortar charter schools have changed in the 
twenty years since Minnesota authorized the first charter school in 1991, so will 
the politics of online education. In the early days of charter schools, before two 
million children were enrolled in them, opponents—largely school districts and 
unions—had a relatively easy time hamstringing charter schools if not blocking 
them altogether. Supporters were far more likely to be Republicans than Demo-
crats. Today, charter schools retain some of the traditional opposition, but they 
have become mainstays of urban education and enjoy the support of the nation’s 
leading Democrat, President Obama. Online education will experience the same 
rise in support as it expands—though even more so than brick-and-mortar 
charter schools. Online education has a part-time as well as a full-time potential 
constituency. Tens of millions of students could one day participate.
The key is for a state to take the first step, limiting the exclusive control of 
school districts over online education. States will hear the objections of districts 
and unions loud and clear. But states will also hear from the families of students 
who may benefit uniquely from online education: rural folks without access to 
full and advanced curricula, urban students stuck in failing schools, advanced 
students without access to acceleration, students who have been bullied and are 
at risk of dropping out, athletes and performing artists who want more flexibility 
for practice, and special-needs students who want more opportunity to work at 
their own pace. These students, along with “mainstream” kids simply interested 
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in experiencing what technology has to offer, will number in the tens of millions 
nationwide. Most will be part-time online pupils, some will be full-time. All will 
provide a growing constituency for preserving the right to choose—online. They 
will be joined by growing numbers of teachers, technologists, and businesses 
anxious to develop online solutions.
States are urged to take primary responsibility for creating the system that will 
govern and finance online public education. On the education merits, districts 
simply cannot handle this role. Politics makes the role even less tenable. Districts 
will object to the loss of control. But they should be able competitors in a system 
where students and families can choose among various online providers. Dis-
trict facilities are close to student homes and may offer blended options that are 
especially appealing. The state is not taking students and resources away from 
school districts; the state is rather creating a system that asks districts to earn the 
allegiance of students rather than being guaranteed it.
To be sure, state control is not a panacea for what ails school districts. The 
political opposition, though bound to weaken, is still there. Some states are quite 
small and will not by themselves become adequate online markets. States may 
decide not to open their markets to providers across state lines or internationally. 
But states are a superior locus to school districts for policymaking.
And states are superior to the only other available option, the federal govern-
ment. In Washington, the political combatants are the same as at the lower levels, 
providing no guarantee of promarket policies. The federal government lacks the 
constitutional authority to establish the range of rules necessary to create one ef-
fective national system of public online learning. The federal government also has 
had no success with the intricate issues that individual states will be called upon to 
address. The federal government can become an important partner to the states; 
for example, it can provide flexibility in education-grant programs such as Title I 
to allow students to receive federal support while pursuing instruction online. But 
the federal government ultimately funds less than 10 percent of public education, 
and is in no position to call all the shots for digital public education nationwide.
Step 2: Create a Public Market for K–12 Online Learning
Notwithstanding the political forces that may work to the contrary, states should 
set policies for online learning that promote the development of a competitive 
market. Policies should encourage widespread student participation in on-
line programs. Policies should attract multiple providers of online content and 
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instruction. Policies should provide funding ample to reward private investment 
in better products and services. Policies should not discriminate between for-prof-
it and nonprofit providers. Online education offers policymakers an opportunity 
to channel the beneficial forces of the marketplace into education in a practical 
and powerful way—more than is possible in brick-and-mortar education. 
The online environment allows many providers to compete for student en-
rollments—providers throughout a state or across the nation, or even around the 
world. In the brick-and-mortar world, students can choose only among schools 
within commuting distance of their homes. In the online world, there is no limit 
to the number of providers or schools from which a student could choose. If the 
student market is large—and it’s already up to fifty-five million in the U.S. to-
day16—providers will proliferate. State policymakers should rely on this market 
to produce the innovation that schools and students require. The state should 
then govern the market, as described below, to ensure that it drives toward the 
desired outcomes.17
Step 3: Provide Students the Right to Choose Online  
Learning Full Time
States should give students the right to choose online instruction as a full-time 
source of their public education. Just as states (and the federal government) 
have developed policies over the last two decades that afford many students and 
families the right to choose among brick-and-mortar schools, states should now 
develop policies to extend that right to full-time online learning—another form 
of “school.”
Students should be guaranteed specifically the right to choose any full-time 
virtual school in the state, whether operated as a charter or run directly by a state 
agency. States should not limit the choice of full-time schools to those based in 
a student’s home district (as Massachusetts has effectively done) or contiguous 
counties (as California has done). These restrictions on choice serve no educa-
tional value and limit the development of vigorous markets.
Full-time online education is not likely to occupy a large part of the K–12 
education market—certainly nothing approaching the 10 percent market share 
in full-time online higher education. Young students require adult supervision. 
If they are taking classes online from home or other nonschool settings, parents 
or guardians must be present at least through students’ early teen years, if not 
through high school. Working parents cannot provide this supervision; they 
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require schools that can. As a practical matter, therefore, most parents will not be 
able to have their children educated online from home. Learning is also a social 
process; many families will prefer to include the face-to-face peer and teacher 
relationships found in brick-and-mortar schools. Nonetheless, states should en-
sure that high-quality full-time online schools develop. They are important to the 
students who attend them, and they are a potentially valuable source of part-time 
online instruction, for which demand will continue to grow.
The online world holds the possibility of virtual-school environments that 
are much more than just collections of online courses or tutorials. Virtual com-
munities provide extensive opportunities for student participation and interac-
tion over the Internet. Some students may find social interaction and academic 
participation easier in a virtual setting. Online teachers and advisors can interact 
with students in many constructive ways besides lecturing or grading student 
work (using Skype and interactive whiteboards, text messaging, and more). As 
virtual schools evolve, they promise better experiences for students who use their 
services only part time, as well as for students who are enrolled full time. The best 
online schools today provide students with a well-rounded education experience 
that goes beyond just taking courses. More important, the future holds the pos-
sibility of more innovation—with technology, educators, and students combining 
in new ways to improve the learning experience. 
Policymakers hold the key to this future. If policymakers permit the devel-
opment of sizable potential student markets, entrepreneurs will invest in the 
innovations necessary to create engaging and effective full-time online-school 
environments. These environments will likely benefit not only full-time online 
students but millions of students who want to enroll part time. States should value 
such innovation. But to promote it, states cannot leave full-time online education 
restricted to district-bounded schools or others subject to within-state geographic 
limits. Entrepreneurs will not invest district by district in full-time online schools, 
each governed by different district standards and with enrollments of only a few 
hundred students. Providers will sell individual courses to small district-operated 
online schools, but that service falls far short of the promise of comprehensive 
virtual schooling. To maximize innovation and quality, states should permit 
full-time online schools to admit students from anywhere within a state and to 
innovate and improve through economies of scale. 
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Step 4: Provide Students the Right to Choose  
Online Learning Part Time
While full-time online schooling has generated massive political resistance and 
heated controversy, that innovation pales in revolutionary potential when com-
pared with its part-time complement.18 This is hardly intuitive. Public schools 
have been battling, after all, to keep “their” students and, of course, their fund-
ing in their home schools and out of full-time virtual schools. Traditional public 
schools argue that they can provide the online alternatives that students need, 
whether on a full-time or part-time basis. Where is the potential for a major 
shake-up in teaching and technology in that solution?
Part of the answer is obvious. Tens of millions of public school students are 
candidates for online education as part of their place-based or brick-and-mortar 
education. It is very easy to imagine high school students opting to take some of 
their courses online, some face to face, and some through a “blend” of the two. 
Every course in the high school catalog is a candidate for online instruction—not 
just specialty courses like Advanced Placement, world language, or credit recov-
ery. Many middle school students would also have the maturity and self-discipline 
to take courses completely online. At the elementary level, it is easy to imagine all 
students benefiting from differentiated online instruction to help develop their 
reading and math skills, beyond what whole-classroom instruction can accom-
plish. The market share for online learning could easily reach 20 or 25 percent of 
all instructional time across all grade levels if part-time or supplementary online 
instruction were permitted to grow in response to student need and demand. 
That is a revolutionary market. 
The key question is if part-time online instruction will be permitted to grow. 
Policymakers have everything to say about that answer. At present, school dis-
tricts largely control how much online learning occurs on a part-time basis. There 
are exceptions. The state of Florida effectively took control out of district hands 
when it guaranteed high school student access to FLVS. A few states have required 
that students take one online course (or two) to receive a high school diploma. 
But districts generally exercise tight control over access to online instruction, un-
less a student chooses to leave for a full-time online school—which relatively few 
students have chosen to do. Districts have used their control to offer the meager 
selection of courses, focused, as already noted, on “extras” like AP and credit 
recovery. Most public school students experience little or no online instruction. 
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State policymakers can and should limit district authority over part-time 
access. Online instruction makes it possible to unbundle education in a way that 
was once almost unthinkable. In the days when education could be delivered 
only face to face (correspondence schools notwithstanding), students could not 
practically choose to take science and math in their home high school, English in 
another high school, and perhaps history at the local college. While some states 
have guaranteed students the right to choose courses from state or community 
colleges, the demand for such options has not been great: Physical separation 
has made choice among place-based courses impractical. The Internet changes 
all of this. Students now can easily take some courses at their home schools via 
traditional classroom instruction, others on computers while present at their 
home schools, and still others at their actual homes. 
The revolutionary potential lies in giving students the right to do so. States 
should complement the guarantee of student access to full-time online schools 
with a guarantee of part-time access as well. The precise form of this guarantee 
will require careful consideration. Unlike guaranteeing full-time access—in 
which an online school assumes complete responsibility for the student—guar-
anteeing part-time access requires consideration of how two or more schools or 
providers share responsibility for a student. The sharing has educational, opera-
tional, and financial dimensions. It will also likely differ with the age or grade 
level of the students.
For high school students, the state should guarantee the right to choose on-
line instruction for any course eligible for credit toward high school graduation, 
and the right to choose the online provider, subject to the provider satisfying 
essential financial and educational standards. (Middle school students eligible 
for high school coursework should also be permitted to participate.) High school 
students should be permitted to take as few or as many of their courses from 
online providers as they wish, including their entire curriculum. This guarantee 
would shift control over access to the gamut of high school courses from schools 
to students and their families. It would quickly open up a market of online pro-
viders competing for the choices of students.
For the schools’ part, states should require all high school students to des-
ignate a “base school,” or school of record. In most cases, this school would be 
a brick-and-mortar institution, but it could also be a full-time virtual school 
that must also offer part-time access to other online providers. The base school 
would be responsible for the student’s records, credit accumulation, graduation, 
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extracurricular activities, and overall welfare. It would be paid, as described 
below, for its services beyond the teaching of courses. More important, the base 
school would be a fierce competitor for the student’s course-taking choices. If the 
base school were brick-and-mortar, it would become the natural site for blended-
learning options. Base schools would have incentive to work with online provid-
ers to devise instructional models that blend face-to-face support with online 
instruction. Base schools would also be free to offer their own courses composed 
of whatever mix of traditional classroom instruction and nontraditional experi-
ences they wish. Students would no longer be required to take what their base 
schools were offering, but there is ample reason to believe these schools would 
compete successfully.
Part-time choice becomes more problematic below the high school level. In 
brick-and-mortar elementary schools, students do not follow a course schedule. 
Different subjects occupy different amounts of time, often depending on the 
aptitude and progress of students. Curricula often integrate standards across 
subjects, such as using history and science materials to teach reading. In this 
environment, it is not straightforward to guarantee students access to part-time 
online instruction. If a student opts out of the regular classroom to take math, 
for example, online, what does he miss while he’s gone—reading?—and to what 
does he return—more math?
In middle school, the same problem can present itself if schools teach in-
tegrated curricula or if they give classroom teachers responsibility for multiple 
subjects. A movement afoot in many urban school systems is the replacement of 
middle schools with schools running from Kindergarten through eighth grade. 
The idea is to return students in grades six through eight to the care of one or two 
teachers, as in elementary school, rather than have students change classes and 
teachers seven times a day as in high school. Teachers also need the flexibility to 
devote the requisite time to different subjects—something not provided within 
a rigid day composed of forty-five minutes per subject. To the extent that middle 
schools operate like elementary schools, they also present a problem guaranteeing 
students the right to take individual courses online.
At the same time, schools serving students in Kindergarten through eighth 
grade could be doing much more than they are to use technology and online in-
struction to improve teaching and learning. Such students should not be stuck in 
schools unwilling to move into the digital age. Policymakers should therefore pro-
vide some form of guaranteed choice to these students and their families. States 
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should already be guaranteeing access to full-time online schools to students in 
Kindergarten through eighth grade. To complement this, states should guarantee 
students the right to limited online instruction. A modest initial recommendation 
would be one hour per day for students up to grade five and two hours per day 
for grades six through eight. If the market is statewide, providers will have ample 
incentive to determine what mix of core skills, academic subjects, and “extras” 
like world language or music would be most attractive to young students. The 
advent of new online options would also encourage base schools to work with 
providers to create more blended options on the school site. Whatever disruption 
might be caused at the outset by young students and their families opting out of 
traditional classrooms would likely be accommodated in due course by more 
innovative options in base schools.
The recommendations in this step are absolutely vital to unleashing the full 
potential of education technology. To date, states have been far more willing to 
give students the right to choose alternative education full time—brick-and-
mortar and virtual charter schools—than part time. But without the part-time 
option, most students will not have access, and the traditional system will not 
face sufficient pressure to innovate. Policymakers will have to grant this right 
with great care, nonetheless.
Subsequent steps outline how the right to choose online education part time 
as well as full time can be protected from market failures. A core protection 
should be understood up front. The base school that students must designate 
should remain accountable to the state for the student’s overall progress and per-
formance. It is likely that base schools will be encouraged through competition to 
offer blended programs that most students will use for most of the school day. But 
to the extent that students opt to take courses or subjects elsewhere—from state-
approved providers, as described below—base schools will need to acknowledge 
and accommodate student accomplishments wherever they are made. 
There are precedents for this expectation already. A number of states give 
students the right to take courses at local community colleges and universities 
without district approval. The federal Title 1 program gives parents in failing 
schools the right to choose private tutoring at district expense. In both cases, 
the home school still remains accountable for overall student performance. The 
rules for online learning that states are urged to adopt continue to have a single 
school—district, charter, traditional, blended, or online—responsible for each 
student’s overall welfare. 
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Step 5: Authorize Statewide Online Charter Schools,  
Overseen by Statewide Charter Authorizers
Once states provide students the right to choose online education, whether full or 
part time, they face a new major obligation. Policymakers will need to determine 
who is eligible to provide online education. In making this determination, these 
leaders should be mindful of the importance of creating competitive markets for 
high-quality online education. In particular, that means ensuring that the markets 
guard against monopoly power. School districts should not control who competes 
for “their” students. Nor should any new entity, such as a state-run virtual school—
which states may want to support as one among many statewide providers.19 
A proven vehicle for authorizing multiple alternative providers of public 
education is the public charter school. Forty states and the District of Columbia 
now authorize charter schools in some fashion. About 5,600 charter schools now 
dot the nation, attended by two million students.20 And policymakers have twenty 
years of experience with them in operation. About half of the states that permit 
charter schools also allow them to offer education online, to varying portions 
of a state’s students. About 217,000 students now attend online charter schools, 
and provide at least a decade of evidence of what works and what doesn’t.21 The 
charter sector has also produced many of the more innovative models of blended 
instruction. Policymakers would be wise to build on the foundation of charter 
schools to provide online-education options for the growing numbers of students 
who will seek them.
Online charter schools should be authorized according to the best practices 
that have emerged through practical experience with charter schools of all kinds. 
Comprehensive guidelines offered by the National Association of Charter School 
Authorizers (NACSA) provide policymakers an excellent start.22 NACSA provides 
guidance for initial authorization, ongoing oversight, and renewal of charters, in 
the online as well as brick-and-mortar context. 
These practical guidelines should be supplemented with state policies that 
strengthen charter laws—especially helping them generate more effective compe-
tition. States should provide for multiple authorizers of online charter schools—
a best practice for brick-and-mortar charters as well. School districts may be 
permitted to authorize charter schools, but statewide entities should be, too. 
Examples include the state board of education (as in Massachusetts and Califor-
nia), a special state charter board (as in D.C.), state universities (as in New York 
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and Michigan), or other state-based nonprofit organizations (as in Ohio and 
Minnesota).
The funding and staffing of these entities must be adequate to the task of 
effective supervision.23 States should place no cap on the number of students 
who may enroll in any single full-time online charter school. States should place 
no cap on the number of full-time online charter schools that may operate in a 
state, or on the number of students statewide who may enroll in full-time online 
charter schools. The market should determine the number of schools in a state 
and their most effective size.
Online charter schools must assume the full responsibility for students who 
declare them their base school, or school of record. This means that, in addition to 
handling all student records and overall student progress, online charter schools 
must be responsible for all student services such as special education, gifted and 
talented programs, and English language learning.
As schools of record or base schools, online charter schools should not be 
limited to serving only their full-time students. They should be permitted to serve 
part-time students, too. Like all public schools, online charter schools will serve 
students with the right to take online courses outside of their schools of record. 
While students enrolled in full-time online charter schools may be inclined to 
take all of their online courses from that school, organized expressly to teach on-
line, students may want the variety offered by multiple providers. Online charter 
schools should be able to compensate for the part-time loss of their students by 
serving part-time students from other schools. In addition, the state should want 
students in traditional brick-and-mortar schools to have access to the specialized 
expertise of online charter schools for their part-time online experience.
Finally, online charter schools should be able to contract for their full edu-
cation program from for-profit providers. The reality of online learning is that 
sophisticated technology and interactive content can require substantial in-
vestment. At present, almost all elementary and secondary online courses and 
comprehensive programs are products of private businesses. K12 Inc. provides 
the program for over a quarter of all students in online charter schools.24 Con-
nections Academy, owned by the multinational education giant Pearson, powers 
another large percentage. Technology companies like Blackboard certainly make 
it possible for schools and districts to create and post their own online courses. 
Higher education uses this functionality extensively. The future is also likely to 
see more free content online.
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Nevertheless, state law should ensure that online schools have access to high-
quality content and technology, whether provided for profit or not. This means 
that online charter schools should be permitted to contract for their programs 
from for-profit providers—as is common today. It also means that states should 
permit private companies that satisfy all other requirements for online charter 
schools to hold charters and operate online charter schools directly. This is a 
controversial recommendation, to be sure. These private firms are able to act 
as charter governing boards in only a few states at present—Arizona and Texas 
among them.25 But the large role that business will inevitably play in providing 
online instruction makes it logical to consider businesses to run online charter 
schools directly. All providers, for-profit or not, must also be subject to strong 
accountability measures to ensure that the privilege of serving this new public 
market is not abused.26 
Step 6: License Supplementary Online Providers
The authorization of online charter schools goes a long way toward providing 
choice in online education for students and competition for traditional schools. 
Online charter schools may also become significant providers of part-time on-
line education. But states must consider other providers of online education if 
they wish to create competitive markets. In step 4, states are urged to guarantee 
students access to part-time online education. But from which providers may 
those students choose?
Today, school districts decide which online providers their students may 
use. Districts also decide what courses are even eligible for online instruction. 
This means that high school students often cannot take core courses online. And 
their choices of supplementary courses—like AP, world language, and credit re-
covery—are limited to the district’s chosen providers. If a student wants to take 
a supplementary course from, say, K12 Inc., but the district has contracted solely 
with Connections, the student would be out of luck.
This arrangement protects a district from any course competition that it may 
not want. It also makes complete sense given the current organization of public 
education. Besides charter schools, the school district is the only state-authorized 
grantor of diplomas and provider of transcripts. Subject to state standards, the 
school district is responsible for determining whether a student earns credit for 
a high school course or a passing grade for a lower-level subject. If a student takes 
a class outside of the district school, the district alone is responsible for deciding 
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whether the course should count toward the student’s diploma. The district is 
currently the only authority recognized by the state to decide what counts. If a 
student wants credit for learning a world language, for example, through Rosetta 
Stone, but the district recognizes only Berlitz, the district prevails. And prevail it 
should. Students cannot be the arbiters of their own academic progress.
But there is also a problem with this arrangement. In a world where state 
policy is attempting to provide choice for students and stimulate competition 
among providers, school districts should not be left to decide from which provid-
ers students will be awarded credit. Districts simply have too much incentive to 
limit students to instruction by their own teachers. Fewer students enrolled in 
district classes means less need for district teachers and potentially painful layoffs. 
Students will be better served if district schools must earn student enrollments 
through high-quality teaching and innovative uses of technology. These same 
arguments apply to traditional brick-and-mortar charter schools, which could 
also be reluctant to release students for external online instruction.
If districts (or traditional charters) are not the gatekeeper for student credit, 
who is? The most logical candidate is the state’s charter-school-authorizing au-
thority. This authority already approves and supervises online charter schools. 
To fulfill that responsibility, the charter authorizer must have expertise in online 
programs and providers. Most online charter schools today deliver programs 
provided fully by online-education companies. Charter authorizers must know 
these companies and their services to carry out their duties competently. No state 
agency is likely to know more about online-education providers than authorizers 
of online charter schools. States are also urged to allow online charter schools 
to provide part-time online instruction. If a charter authorizer is capable of 
judging an online charter school, based on a company provider, as a part-time 
online provider, the authorizer should be able to judge the company provider 
independently as well.
States should expand the responsibility of charter authorizers, then, to include 
oversight of part-time online providers, as well as online charter schools. Charter 
authorizers would be responsible for approving, reapproving, and supervising 
all part-time providers not otherwise approved by the state. Thus charter autho-
rizers would not have to approve online courses offered across district lines by 
school districts. Authorizers would not need to approve colleges and universities 
otherwise eligible to provide courses to public school students for credit. Nor 
would charter authorizers would have authority over online providers that school 
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districts choose at their discretion. Charter authorizers would approve providers 
seeking to offer part-time instruction to students choosing options not sponsored 
by their base public schools.
To be clear, in the role as licensers of part-time online providers, charter 
authorizers are not taking on any role in supervising online instruction or other 
elements of accountability in district schools. District schools and public charter 
schools—traditional, online, and blended—remain subject to state accountability 
requirements such as proficiency testing and standard graduation conditions. 
Base schools, regardless of their form of organization, retain responsibility for 
overall judgments of student progress, grade-level progression (if it remains 
relevant), and the awarding of diplomas. The main contribution of the authori-
zation of online providers is the assurance that courses or subjects taken from 
a provider meet state standards and should therefore be given credit in the base 
school—contingent on passage of examinations, as described below.
So limited, the added responsibility for charter authorizers is not likely to 
become a great burden for them. The focus would be mostly on companies al-
ready providing comprehensive services to online charter schools under autho-
rizer oversight, or providing courses to school districts that have already done 
significant vetting. Authorizers could issue term-limited licenses to companies 
to offer credit-bearing courses to students in any school district in a state. Much 
like online charter schools, part-time providers would need to provide annual 
reports and be reviewed periodically for renewal of their licenses.
A word of caution here: Some states already have approval processes for on-
line providers. The processes are often painfully slow, dragged down by course-
by-course scrutiny, and infrequent review cycles. They are subject to the same 
political pressures that resist competition from alternative providers of all kinds. 
But none of these review processes is currently in the hands of charter authorizers; 
state education departments normally preside. If charter authorizers apply their 
own best practices to this new area of responsibility, and if multiple authorizers 
take up the task, pitfalls of past approval systems may be avoided. Charter autho-
rizers are not perfect, to be sure, but they have the collective experience to make 
them the best bet for state policymakers to license online providers effectively. 
Step 7: Fund All Learning Opportunities Equally Per Pupil
Funding is critical to the success of any education system. It is especially so in a 
system that aims to capitalize on the forces of the market. Public education today 
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is not market driven except in limited ways—competition from charter schools 
and private schools and among school districts.27 The new system, however, aims 
to spur private investment and direct public dollars toward educational choices 
that survive and indeed benefit from vigorous competition among providers. 
America’s higher education system has demonstrated both the interest in edu-
cation among private investors and the potential of education institutions of all 
types to innovate and compete. Public education could generate its own positive 
dynamic—if it allows funds to find their most productive uses. Money, then, 
would clearly matter.
In designing a funding system to accommodate online learning, states should 
aim first and foremost to allow all dollars to follow the student.28 Funding should 
be neutral with respect to where and how the student receives equivalent educa-
tion value. The funding system should not care whether the value was received in 
a brick-and-mortar school, a blended environment, or a full-time online charter 
school. Education value should be measured in education outcomes and not in ed-
ucation inputs. If a student passes a class taught fully online, the provider should 
be paid the same as if the student earned the pass in a traditional classroom.
This point is a matter of controversy, as some would argue that technology 
should reduce the cost of education. In chapter three of this volume, Tamara 
Butler Battaglino, Matt Haldeman, and Eleanor Laurans estimate that a full-time 
virtual school can represent a savings of more than a third over a traditional 
school. But, as they also caution, savings should not arise simply because poli-
cymakers decide arbitrarily to pay online providers less money than brick-and-
mortar providers. Such price determinations would require countless decisions, 
for which policymakers have insufficient information, about how technology is 
“best” used in education. Setting prices for online versus brick-and-mortar edu-
cation would stifle innovations in online learning and in creative combinations 
or blends of technology and face-to-face instruction. Policymakers should leave 
it to schools and providers to decide the best mix of educators and technology. 
Policymakers should fund all options at the same level, allow them to compete 
for students, and let the market reveal what savings are possible. Granted, the 
savings will not be as evident as they are in markets like higher education, where 
providers can set prices—e.g., tuition. But providers can and should be required 
to provide reports on their spending, including profits, to reveal to policymakers 
over time what savings are possible. 
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Specifically, then, how should the new system be funded? Rules must be 
established for online charter schools and online courses. The latter is a novel 
area of funding and regulation. Online charter schools should be funded at the 
full per-pupil average spending level of students’ home districts. All funding to 
which a student is entitled—local, state, and federal—should travel with him or 
her to a full-time online charter school. (This same principle should be applied 
to the funding of all schools, as most public schools will eventually become some 
mix of traditional teaching and technology. Schools should not be denied state 
or federal funds as they adopt more online instruction.) The “cost” of full-time 
online schooling can vary, depending on the inputs to it, particularly the intensity 
of online teacher support. Online schooling certainly enjoys certain savings over 
traditional education—student facilities, transportation, and food. But online 
education also comes at significant unique cost—online content and software 
development, computers, and servers.29 Online education also employs numerous 
teachers and advisors, not to mention far more technology staff.
The cost of full-time online education should be left to the marketplace, 
as providers compete to provide the best education possible for the full price 
taxpayers are willing to pay for a public education. If online schools are asked to 
provide the very same education services and satisfy the same standards as brick-
and-mortar schools, they should be paid at the same operating funding level. 
Currently, no states fund online charter schools with all federal, state, and local 
dollars.30 Pennsylvania once did so, but now allows local districts to retain some 
of their per-pupil funds.31 In general, online charter schools suffer worse versions 
of the financial handicap suffered by charter schools in general. If policymakers 
are committed to bringing technological innovation to public schools, they will 
not disadvantage the innovators financially. Online charter schools, brick-and-
mortar charter schools, traditional district schools—they all carry the same 
full-time responsibilities and should be funded comparably.
The same principles apply to part-time online learning. But the details are 
different, and tougher to specify. They are also extremely important to get right. 
Online education must become an integral part of place-based education if it is 
to improve education for the vast majority of students. Most students, even at the 
high school level, will not want full-time online learning. The youngest students, 
needing adult supervision, may find blended learning the only appropriate use of 
technology. Schools will undoubtedly play a lead role in designing blended envi-
ronments and offering choices among online and traditional classes. Schools and 
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districts, subject to competition, will shop among online providers, and pay the 
price per course or offering that makes sense for their budgets and needs. Schools 
will use their overall funding per pupil to pay for innovations and allocate dollars 
among teachers and technology. The market will drive prices down and quality 
up. Policymakers require no new funding rules to support or drive this change. 
But what about students exercising their right to choose online learning part 
time? States should guarantee this right, to ensure that students are not prevented 
from accessing ample online options. When schools cannot deny students ac-
cess to part-time online learning, students may find themselves wanting an 
online option contrary to the wishes of their school. A high school, for example, 
may decide that it is teaching Algebra I to all students the old fashioned way, 
face-to-face, with no blended learning. A student and family may decide the 
student would be better served learning online. The student is not in control of 
the school’s budget and therefore is not in a position to decide what online op-
tion the school can afford. The state will have approved providers and courses 
through its charter-authorizing function. But this approval does not come with 
pricing. Prices should be determined competitively through transactions in the 
marketplace. But the student cannot decide how much of a school’s money to 
spend in the marketplace. So, what can a student pay for an online course that is 
not selected or negotiated for by the school?
States should address this question by requiring school districts to calculate 
two different price ceilings available to students purchasing courses online. One 
ceiling would be for courses taken off school premises with computer equipment, 
broadband access, and all other needs met by the provider. A second and lower 
ceiling would be for courses taken on school premises, using school computers 
and broadband, with a school teacher as the teacher of record. A technical analysis 
would be necessary to get the price ceilings correct. State policy would specify 
how the ceilings would be calculated. In principle, the ceilings are set equal to 
the theoretical avoided cost, fully loaded, of a student taking an online course. 
Whether schools actually avoid the costs is their challenge. States should require 
schools to pay up to the level of maximum savings. Policymakers should bear in 
mind that market prices are likely to be driven below these ceilings as provid-
ers compete for school and district business. But states cannot leave students to 
choose prices when they subscribe online individually. 
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Step 8: Exempt Online and Blended Teaching from Traditional 
Teacher Requirements, Including Certification and Class Size
The above steps are designed to create competitive statewide markets for online 
learning. Students are guaranteed the right to choose online options full time 
in virtual schools, or part time in any school, most likely the brick-and-mortar 
variety. This new demand should be met by online schools and online provid-
ers, now encouraged to enter the market through a fair approval process crafted 
to reduce political obstructionism. Funding should provide encouragement as 
well—being neutral with respect to the method of instruction, online or tradi-
tional. These innovations correct the major impediments to supply and demand 
for online learning in public education today.
With one major exception. Teachers are the ultimate driver of quality in the 
traditional model of schooling. Nothing, at least within the control of schools, 
affects student achievement more than the effectiveness of the teacher providing 
the instruction. Over the span of only a few years, high-quality teachers can help 
students gain multiple deciles in the national achievement distribution.32 The 
recruitment, development, and retention of high-quality teachers are therefore 
key to school quality in the traditional model.
Public policy, however, does not align well with what research tells us is neces-
sary to build the best teaching force. Teachers must receive state certification to be 
recruited into the classroom; yet there is no evidence that certification identifies 
stronger teachers or even weeds out incompetence. Teachers are compensated 
based on seniority and advanced degrees that predict little or nothing about 
teacher effectiveness, certainly nothing after the first few years on the job. Teacher 
evaluations and rewards are not connected to student achievement. On top of 
these policies are union-driven collective-bargaining agreements that reinforce 
them and further dictate how teachers may work.
In recent years, reformers have tried to revise these policies. The Bush ad-
ministration attempted to strengthen teacher certification through No Child Left 
Behind (NCLB). The Obama administration has encouraged states to link teacher 
evaluations to student achievement. Thus far these efforts have borne little fruit. 
Teacher policies remain largely as they have been for decades. This is problem 
enough, but it becomes ever more vexing with the advent of online learning.
Online instruction makes altogether different uses of teachers. Technology 
takes over many of the roles that teachers perform in traditional classroom in-
struction. Teachers then perform new roles, along with some of the established 
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ones.33 Because online instructional models are rapidly evolving, it would be 
most unwise for policymakers to try to prescribe an online teacher’s role. It is 
not possible to say at this moment what constitutes “best practice.” The Interna-
tional Association for K–12 Online Learning (iNACOL) has issued recommended 
standards for online teachers.34 But these constitute only estimates of what online 
instruction requires—at this time. There is no research to validate the relationship 
between these recommended standards and student achievement.
Online instructional models take countless forms. Teachers may be assigned 
full responsibility for an online class and do everything that a teacher would do for 
the class if it were in a brick-and-mortar setting (except deliver the content, which 
is handled by technology): hold synchronous classes online, grade and comment 
on student work, provide individual tutoring, and contact parents when issues 
arise. But other models differentiate these roles: Different educators may tutor, 
grade papers, and serve as advisors.35 Technology can also perform more or less 
of the instructional role, leaving less or more work for online teachers. In higher 
education, Capella University maintains a twenty-to-one student-teacher ratio 
for its courses; Western Governors University employs ratios over double that.36
Instructional models also vary in their use of face-to-face instruction. In 
K–12 education, blended models are likely to dominate. Students are already in 
facilities with teachers. Younger learners clearly need adult support and supervi-
sion. Various mixtures of online instruction and face-to-face interaction are all 
but inevitable. Today, with blended learning in its infancy, scores of models have 
already been documented.37
The models vary in the role of teacher—facilitator of follow-up discussions, 
individual tutor, evaluator of student work, leader of small-group instruction. 
The models vary in the frequency of student-teacher interactions as well as the 
size of student groups. The models add new professionals and paraprofessionals 
to the mix—technology experts and lab facilitators, for example.
This is exciting, as it should be. The goal at this stage of technological innova-
tion should be to find the most effective technology-infused instructional models 
for students. This can happen only through experimentation. But experimenta-
tion is not easy in public education, especially when it comes to the role of teach-
ers and other school staff. Policies and collective-bargaining agreements specify 
who is qualified to perform what instructional roles, what work teachers may do 
and not do, and what size classes must be—to name just the major few. Teacher 
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policy and collective-bargaining agreements could easily stifle innovation in 
online learning, if flexibility is not built in from the outset.
State policymakers should therefore look carefully at teacher policy as it af-
fects online learning. Most important, states should lift any class-size restrictions 
on online courses. The concept of a “class” assigned to a single teacher may not 
even be applicable. Policymakers should eliminate class-size restrictions on full-
time online courses. For blended courses, in which online instruction constitutes 
at least half of the estimated time for course completion, policymakers should 
also eliminate class-size limits for the face-to-face portion. If a teacher can work 
with four groups of fifteen—for a class size of sixty—during each group’s time 
off-line, let the teacher and school decide what is workable. If a school wishes to 
have students supervised in large groups—say two or three classes’ worth—in 
a large lab or media-center environment, do not impose class-size limits on the 
lab or require certified teachers to supervise students working online. These are 
just prime examples. The point is not to restrict innovation or impose needless 
cost by presuming what the role of educators working online or offering online 
support should be.
Policymakers should remove or avoid unnecessary restrictions on teacher 
credentials as well. Teachers working fully online should not be required to 
hold traditional state teacher certifications. Teacher roles online vary with the 
instructional model. Providers should be able to hire anyone with at least a 
bachelors degree (and no criminal record), and train them for the instructional 
role required by their model. Online teachers should not be required to satisfy 
new certification requirements either—such as those proposed by iNACOL. We 
simply know too little at this time to require traditional certification, let alone 
brand new certifications. In time, research will demonstrate what teacher skills, 
knowledge, and attributes are associated with success by students. Then, training 
and certification requirements can be entertained.
Finally, online education is inherently not a state-bounded enterprise. Great 
instruction can be beamed into schools in any and every state from anywhere in 
the United States or the world. States should want their students to be able to take 
advantage of the best that the United States, or the world, has to offer. State policies 
must therefore walk the fine line between protecting legitimate state interests and 
opening the state to valuable contributions from the outside. Teacher-certification 
laws have the potential to insulate states from worthy external support.
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Online providers have an interest in finding the very best teachers (and other 
staff) to work with students online. Providers also have incentives—economies 
of scale—to build online instructional systems that can serve students in as 
many locations as possible. Providers want their teachers to be able to work with 
students in whatever state they may live. It may not be efficient or even feasible to 
run a low-demand online course for students in just one state. To use an obvious 
example, an AP Calculus teacher can work as effectively with a student in New 
York as in California. But state certification rules not only require that teachers 
be certified; they require they be certified in the state in which they are teaching. 
If online teachers must be certified in every state from which their students 
are enrolled, online-teacher preparation then becomes very expensive (getting 
certified everywhere) or very inefficient (teaching only students in single states). 
This problem is easily rectified. States can either require no state certification for 
online teachers, or recognize or offer reciprocity for teacher certification in all 
other states. The former is preferable, as it opens the possibility of international 
teachers helping students in the United States.
Step 9: Establish Student Learning as the Foundation of 
Accountability for Online Schools and Providers
Online education provides a golden opportunity for policymakers to focus 
schools more attentively on student achievement. The very point of creating a 
vigorous market for online education is to maximize innovations in online and 
blended models—that raise student achievement. Neither experts nor policymak-
ers now are in a position to say just how future schooling should be organized 
to best employ teachers and technology. So policymakers are urged to create a 
market-based system that will promote experimentation and innovation—in 
pursuit of student learning. To ensure that the market makes learning its top 
priority, states should then carefully specify their goals for student achievement 
and measure how well students, providers, and schools are meeting them.
States have already made great strides in this direction. They only need to 
continue—and make some important additions. States now have nearly two 
decades of experience writing academic standards, developing student assess-
ments, and implementing accountability systems for schools. Research has now 
documented that these practices, when well designed, can be effective in raising 
student achievement.38
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States should continue with efforts to raise their academic standards, to align 
them with the ultimate goal of graduating students from high school ready to 
succeed in college or an immediate career. They should cooperate with national 
consortia, such as the Common Core State Standards Initiative, in trying to de-
velop standards for multiple states. In an online environment, where providers 
can serve students nationwide, progress is abetted by shared standards that allow 
developers to focus resources on one high-quality program for many states, if not 
the entire nation. The Common Core project is encouraging online providers to 
build programs for the forty-seven states (including D.C.) that are now part of 
that endeavor. States that are part of Common Core will likely see more resources 
directed toward the development of programs for them than states tackling new 
standards on their own. All states should continue, as well, with efforts to design 
assessments better matched to higher standards and to adjust accountability 
systems to measure student academic growth.
This work is all the more important—and urgent—in an online environ-
ment. The measure of success for any and all technological innovations should 
be improvement in student learning.39 As schools and providers try out new 
models, their effects on student achievement should be carefully recorded and 
examined—a natural offshoot of the online-learning model. Online systems 
record every bit of data about how students have interacted with online lessons, 
how they have performed with ongoing formative assessments, how they have 
responded to online tutoring, and in the end, how they performed on final proj-
ects and assessments. Online databases are treasure troves of information about 
instruction and its impact on achievement.
States can gain maximum advantage from this resource by creating standard-
ized examinations for all courses in a state’s core high school curriculum. Students 
could be required to pass the state exam to receive credit for each course toward a 
high school diploma. The exams could be delivered online. Their content could be 
part objective, closed-ended, electronically scored items—ready-made for online 
courses—and part extended-response questions or problems, scored by state-led 
teams of online and traditional teachers. For academic standards below the high 
school level, states should consider using their grade-level reading, math, and sci-
ence assessments to award grades or credit. States should also consider requiring 
end-of-course exams for credit in brick-and-mortar and blended courses. 
Assessment policies in traditional schools are a larger issue—and should fol-
low the same guidelines as for online courses. But assessment policies must be 
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addressed up front for online learning if virtual schools and providers are to be 
driven in the desired direction—of raising student achievement. Online learn-
ing cannot be assessed using the traditional model of course credit—namely 
seat time. Online learning is inherently performance based. Students are given 
content to learn and are assessed on their mastery. When they master one piece, 
they move on to the next piece. Students should be allowed to move at their own 
pace and depending on the content. If mastery is demonstrated, it makes no dif-
ference whether a student required an hour to succeed or a week. Some students 
may complete a semester-long course in a month; others may require more than 
the normal four months. It should make no difference to state authorities how 
long a student required to achieve mastery.
The easy recommendation for policymakers is to eliminate seat time as a 
requirement for earning credit for a high school course or recognition for com-
pleting a lower grade-level subject.40 Full-time online courses should not have 
seat-time requirements for high school credit. The harder question is this: On 
what basis, then, should states, through charter authorizers, approve the award-
ing of course credit? One model is simply to leave the decision to award credit 
in the hands of authorized schools and providers. If XYZ virtual school or ABC 
online provider is authorized or licensed to educate students in the state, it will 
present its methods of assessment to the authorizer and, once approved, be the 
arbiter of successful student achievement. This is certainly defensible, though 
policymakers may be uneasy at the prospect of students winning course credit 
with little “seat time” invested.
A stronger model would put online students to a standardized test. Then, 
credit would not be at the discretion of an online school, provider, or teacher. All 
online instruction would be held to a common standard, which the state would 
set and enforce. The Sunshine State does this already for courses taken by students 
at Florida Virtual School. Students cannot earn credit unless they pass. Details 
would need to be worked out for any mandatory testing system. Course grades 
may be at the discretion of the online teacher but credit dependent on the state 
test. Students may be given multiple opportunities to pass the state test. Schools 
may be given the opportunity to appeal failed tests by presenting student course-
work. States, of course, would have to show the courage to set high standards in 
their tests, if those tests were to drive higher quality effectively. These are familiar 
issues in debates over high school end-of-course exams and competency testing 
in general.
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But the difference here is the online environment. Students will frequently be 
taking courses—both part time and full time—that are removed from the direct 
oversight of teachers. The progress of these pupils must be assessed rigorously to 
ensure that they have actually mastered the material. States should err on the side 
of objective assessment. On the more positive side, state policymakers are setting 
the wheels in motion for major technological innovation. They should want to 
ensure that innovation is for the purpose of higher achievement. The online envi-
ronment makes testing easy. With learning properly measured, online databases 
provide a wealth of information to make instruction better still.
If students enrolled in online schools or even online courses are required to 
pass state tests to earn credit, arguably students in all public schools should face 
similar standards. One could argue that the online environment presents a unique 
accountability challenge and therefore merits special assessments. States might 
embrace this argument and use the online environment as a way to pilot course 
assessments for all students and schools. But in the end, performance-based ac-
countability should apply regardless of the modality of instruction.
A similar perspective applies to a final opportunity to employ performance-
based accountability. Funding for online courses might depend on student pas-
sage of a state exam. Florida Virtual follows this practice already. The sending 
district does not pay the online school until the student passes a state exam. 
Performance exams certainly provide this opportunity for leverage. States are 
encouraged to experiment with performance-based compensation. They should 
not limit the experimentation to online schools. Brick-and-mortar institutions 
might benefit from similar discipline. 
Step 10: Address Market Imperfections by Providing Abundant 
Information to Students, Families, Schools, and Districts
Public education is not a naturally occurring market; the argument here is to 
make it more so. Private enterprise, competition, and resources available world-
wide have the potential to drive innovation in the delivery of online learning 
much faster than any system operated directly by the government. The preced-
ing recommendations are designed to establish the conditions for supply and 
demand, satisfying as far as possible the economic conditions of a perfect market, 
albeit a publicly created one. Yet no market is perfect. And policymakers must 
stand ready to correct market imperfections that may arise.
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In higher education, we have seen significant problems with student out-
comes. Both for-profit and nonprofit providers responded to government sub-
sidy incentives, mainly in the form of federal loan programs, to educate tens of 
thousands of students who had not been served well by colleges and universities 
in the past. But many students were not served well by the new entrants, either, 
and the federal government has stepped in with regulations that require schools 
to raise student success rates, or not receive federal dollars. In K–12 online learn-
ing, policymakers will need to be on the lookout for performance issues as well. 
By setting academic standards for online schools and providers, and requiring 
students to pass state tests to receive credit, policymakers are taking major steps 
to ensuring performance. But as we know from both traditional schools and 
brick-and-mortar charters, assessment and accountability are no guarantee of 
strong academic performance.
Regulators—specifically state authorizing and licensing bodies—will need 
to be tough in approving providers, vigilant in overseeing them, and strict in 
enforcing standards for renewal. Experience in authorizing traditional charter 
schools for two decades, and online charter schools for the last decade, should 
prepare these public overseers to handle this expanded role better than any new 
entity the state might conceive.
Nevertheless, no government entity can ever manage the behavior of the 
various players in a marketplace. And policymakers need to appreciate this basic 
fact. The reason to set up a publicly sponsored market in the first place is to obtain 
better results than government can achieve directly. So policymakers should do 
everything possible to create the conditions for the market to do the hard work 
of driving change, and not overburden regulators with work that better market 
controls could accomplish more successfully.
The most powerful tool that regulators have to help the market do its work 
is information. The better informed parents and students are about their choices 
in online learning, the more likely they are to choose high-quality providers 
and online schools. They are not the only consumers, though. This is important 
to appreciate. Traditional public schools, charter schools, and school districts, 
potentially more sophisticated consumers than families, will be making many, 
perhaps most of the decisions about online providers, as they offer online and 
blended options to their students. Schools and districts need information about 
online providers besides the promotional literature of the providers themselves. 
All decision makers need objective information about the educational attributes 
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of online programs, especially including the achievement of students enrolled 
in them. Schools and districts also need financial data, so that they can obtain 
economic value.
States now have a decade or more of experience providing information to 
families about school quality. States are required by the federal government 
to provide school report cards with essential data about teachers, test scores, 
graduation rates, safety records, and the like, on a state website. Federal and 
state accountability systems rate schools with letter grades or improvement sta-
tuses—so-called Adequate Yearly Progress (AYP) under NCLB. These informa-
tion systems are a good start toward what states could and should require online 
schools and providers to report. These public sources of information will likely 
be supplemented by private sources, like GreatSchools, for which there will be a 
growing market.
As part of its recommended online policy, each state should have a transpar-
ency requirement. Such a requirement would call for the expansion of the state 
report cards to include licensed online providers as well as online charter schools. 
The report cards would include all currently required data. This information 
would be supplemented with data unique or at least especially important to 
judging online performance. Suggestions include persistence rates by course; 
average time to complete courses, by course; average score for first-time test tak-
ers on state end-of-course tests; average hours of teacher contact with students, 
by course; and student reenrollment rates, year on year. In addition, report cards 
should include summaries of all subjects offered, instructional methods employed 
asynchronously and synchronously, formative assessment methods, and tutoring 
and advising practices.
At the outset, states could rely on the power of information to drive improve-
ment. The more that districts, schools, parents, and students know about the track 
records of online schools and providers, the more they will choose proven options 
over uncertain ones. In time, states may be able to set performance standards that 
providers must meet to remain eligible to work in the system—along the lines of 
AYP, but focused on course success. The federal government has just adopted such 
standards for for-profit colleges and universities. States could eventually set mini-
mum standards for persistence rates or test-score performance at the course level, 
for example. By shining a bright light on performance, state policymakers can 
get the maximum out of market forces and limit the burden on state authorizers.
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In the end, it is impossible for policymakers to correct every market failure or 
imperfection. The state cannot prevent some parents (or schools) from choosing 
an inferior online option. Bad decisions get made even when information to make 
better decisions is ample. The state cannot prevent online schools or providers 
from offering less-than-optimal programs or cutting corners to save money. The 
state can take measures to mitigate these risks, as recommended above, through 
rigorous authorization, licensing, and performance-based accountability—as 
well as by providing lots of information. But policymakers will promote far more 
innovation in education technology if they allow market forces to drive change, 
subject to government oversight, however imperfect, than if they allow govern-
ment oversight, by local school districts, to remain in control.
Taking Resistance Seriously
The needs of K–12 education are well aligned with what online technology today 
has to offer. The potential of online education to do even more in the future is 
greater still. There are a range of challenges ahead, including all that stymie tra-
ditional schools—good teachers, involved families, motivated students, higher 
standards, and more. But the biggest challenge may well be the K–12 system of 
education itself. It has formidable powers to protect itself from disruptive change. 
Technology will eventually break down the resistance, offering benefits, here and 
there, that are just too good to turn down. But it will take a long time—and a 
longer time than necessary.
State policymakers could change this. They can look to America’s more in-
novative model of higher education for guidance. But in the end, policymakers 
will need to take seriously the fundamental nature of the challenge.41 Technologi-
cal innovation, new approaches to teaching and learning, and higher levels of 
achievement will not come to public education—at least any time soon—without 
reforms that break down the system’s inherent resistance to technology. The surest 
way to do this is to shift control of K–12 online learning from the political powers 
that now favor resistance to a market-based system of control that better allows 
the most effective solutions to emerge. The market is no panacea. It will require 
close government oversight. It will also provide incentives for innovation and 
improvement that the current system of governance never will.
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